asso-msn.fr
Observed Aug 2, 2026, 20:43 UTC (7d ago). Every field below was attested with an Ed25519 signature at scan time.
asso-msn.fr is on the survey sweep, which works its way across the whole catalog rather than returning to one name on a schedule. Putting asso-msn.fr under watch moves it to the fast lane, where DomainDrift re-checks it about every 5 minutes and signs each reading, so a change becomes a dated event within minutes instead of waiting for the sweep to come round.
Watch asso-msn.fr Watching a domain needs a DRM3 account. The reading above stays free and public either way.DomainDrift asked this domain for a TXT record at a name nobody registers, and got an answer back. A domain that answers a name that was never created is answering names in general, and that is wildcard DNS.
Wildcard DNS clusters around domain parking, dynamic DNS and catch-all hosting. It is also a real attack surface: if every invented hostname resolves, then a hostname an attacker invents resolves too, which is the ground state for subdomain takeover and for phishing hosted under a name that looks legitimate.
This is evidence of wildcard behaviour, not a proven fact. It rests on one control name: a domain could legitimately serve a TXT record at exactly that name for an unrelated reason, and a wildcard that answers address records but not TXT records would not be caught here at all. What this reading is and is not.
DNS Records
A 1
51.68.155.121
MX 1
1smtp.google.com
TXT 3
v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com -allgoogle-site-verification=UuW6Dqv2pHWqsvzvTUbDk8m9yGJehINsD0XPexX0Kh0google-site-verification=uj84fbRT3AX_AkZoxb9heBQtIQx2CD3ylyiNYtAQKLA
NS 2
ns110.ovh.netdns110.ovh.net
SOA 1
dns110.ovh.net tech.ovh.net
MCP_RECORDS 3
v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com -allgoogle-site-verification=UuW6Dqv2pHWqsvzvTUbDk8m9yGJehINsD0XPexX0Kh0google-site-verification=uj84fbRT3AX_AkZoxb9heBQtIQx2CD3ylyiNYtAQKLA
DMARC_RECORDS 1
v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc@asso-msn.fr; pct=100; adkim=s; aspf=s.
BIMI_RECORDS 3
v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com -allgoogle-site-verification=UuW6Dqv2pHWqsvzvTUbDk8m9yGJehINsD0XPexX0Kh0google-site-verification=uj84fbRT3AX_AkZoxb9heBQtIQx2CD3ylyiNYtAQKLA
MTA_STS_RECORDS 3
v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com -allgoogle-site-verification=UuW6Dqv2pHWqsvzvTUbDk8m9yGJehINsD0XPexX0Kh0google-site-verification=uj84fbRT3AX_AkZoxb9heBQtIQx2CD3ylyiNYtAQKLA
TLS Certificates (4)
| Common Name | Issuer | Expires |
|---|---|---|
asso-msn.fr |
C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=YE2 | Thu, 24 Sep 2026 13:32:35 +0000 |
YE2 |
C=US, O=ISRG, CN=Root YE | Sat, 02 Sep 2028 23:59:59 +0000 |
Root YE |
C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG Root X2 | Thu, 02 Sep 2032 23:59:59 +0000 |
ISRG Root X2 |
C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG Root X1 | Thu, 02 Sep 2032 23:59:59 +0000 |
Subdomains (0)
None observed.
Signed at scan time. Check the math yourself. Every line above is part of one signed observation. Re-hash it and check the Ed25519 signature in your own browser; the only network request the check makes is for the published public keys.
Verify this receiptEd25519 Receipt
- Receipt ID
rcpt_0f334e058129a99d- Output Hash
b488b77aa71525896367c3a13ea5eb4a1706909db2d51e997455bd50492a1335- Signature
ed25519:2189e996cf3d23415d76d391d6bb9cac064792b71d2164d859fab1ca4f5ade9edbcbe4d246927a53dd3110817e4bbeb531ed4a3c947abb8689e788d3d1aff808- Public Key
ed25519:4859bb613d650e12dd7478cc307c73a8712fabc115a9dc59f65534ed3c09a8f9- Parent
(genesis)- Plane
- fast