bibliaconsigo.com
Observed Aug 10, 2026, 22:57 UTC (5d ago). Every field below was attested with an Ed25519 signature at scan time.
bibliaconsigo.com is on the survey sweep, which works its way across the whole catalog rather than returning to one name on a schedule. Putting bibliaconsigo.com under watch moves it to the fast lane, where DomainDrift re-checks it about every 5 minutes and signs each reading, so a change becomes a dated event within minutes instead of waiting for the sweep to come round.
Watch bibliaconsigo.com Watching a domain needs a DRM3 account. The reading above stays free and public either way.
AWS CloudFront
AmazonDomainDrift asked this domain for a TXT record at a name nobody registers, and got an answer back. A domain that answers a name that was never created is answering names in general, and that is wildcard DNS.
Wildcard DNS clusters around domain parking, dynamic DNS and catch-all hosting. It is also a real attack surface: if every invented hostname resolves, then a hostname an attacker invents resolves too, which is the ground state for subdomain takeover and for phishing hosted under a name that looks legitimate.
This is evidence of wildcard behaviour, not a proven fact. It rests on one control name: a domain could legitimately serve a TXT record at exactly that name for an unrelated reason, and a wildcard that answers address records but not TXT records would not be caught here at all. What this reading is and is not.
DNS Records
A 4
3.167.69.303.167.69.1163.167.69.263.167.69.96
AAAA 8
2600:9000:27c8:2000:9:b45b:d5c0:93a12600:9000:27c8:6600:9:b45b:d5c0:93a12600:9000:27c8:6c00:9:b45b:d5c0:93a12600:9000:27c8:dc00:9:b45b:d5c0:93a12600:9000:27c8:fc00:9:b45b:d5c0:93a12600:9000:27c8:7000:9:b45b:d5c0:93a12600:9000:27c8:4800:9:b45b:d5c0:93a12600:9000:27c8:be00:9:b45b:d5c0:93a1
MX 3
5mx2.feishu.cn10mx3.feishu.cn1mx1.feishu.cn
TXT 2
v=spf1 +include:_netblocks.m.feishu.cn -allverification-code-site-App_feishu=9GxIGDph1hirdlS8hJYC
CNAME 1
d3eglpk9vc3gpj.cloudfront.net
NS 2
vip1.alidns.comvip2.alidns.com
SOA 1
vip1.alidns.com hostmaster.hichina.com
MCP_RECORDS 2
80ccba9ddd4940388f904a9a43e554a2e6dd41cbad57432197bc9e75f105ae83
DMARC_RECORDS 2
80ccba9ddd4940388f904a9a43e554a2e6dd41cbad57432197bc9e75f105ae83
BIMI_RECORDS 2
80ccba9ddd4940388f904a9a43e554a2e6dd41cbad57432197bc9e75f105ae83
MTA_STS_RECORDS 2
80ccba9ddd4940388f904a9a43e554a2e6dd41cbad57432197bc9e75f105ae83
TLS Certificates (3)
| Common Name | Issuer | Expires |
|---|---|---|
bibliaconsigo.com |
C=US, O=Amazon, CN=Amazon RSA 2048 M01 | Sun, 13 Dec 2026 23:59:59 +0000 |
Amazon RSA 2048 M01 |
C=US, O=Amazon, CN=Amazon Root CA 1 | Fri, 23 Aug 2030 22:21:28 +0000 |
Amazon Root CA 1 |
C=US, ST=Arizona, L=Scottsdale, O=Starfield Technologies, Inc., CN=Starfield Services Root Certificate Authority - G2 | Thu, 31 Dec 2037 01:00:00 +0000 |
Subdomains (1)
Signed at scan time. Check the math yourself. Every line above is part of one signed observation. Re-hash it and check the Ed25519 signature in your own browser; the only network request the check makes is for the published public keys.
Verify this receiptEd25519 Receipt
- Receipt ID
rcpt_be65dcd0aba095e7- Output Hash
790c2c23d9abe604b85f5fee654b30ce8dba0aa1edb3d1c9f724a565c034d627- Signature
ed25519:89633f3575333eea50daf24e337498c491b3946ccf6f928e45edaec123e87cdc9340d8703de10528c110e342826547a1e601469002b2f29f469f8af28a7f4a0e- Public Key
ed25519:4859bb613d650e12dd7478cc307c73a8712fabc115a9dc59f65534ed3c09a8f9- Parent
(genesis)- Plane
- fast