bkk-linde.de
Observed Aug 11, 2026, 04:16 UTC (5d ago). Every field below was attested with an Ed25519 signature at scan time.
bkk-linde.de is on the survey sweep, which works its way across the whole catalog rather than returning to one name on a schedule. Putting bkk-linde.de under watch moves it to the fast lane, where DomainDrift re-checks it about every 5 minutes and signs each reading, so a change becomes a dated event within minutes instead of waiting for the sweep to come round.
Watch bkk-linde.de Watching a domain needs a DRM3 account. The reading above stays free and public either way.
Amazon
Let's Encrypt
Google Search ConsoleDomainDrift asked this domain for a TXT record at a name nobody registers, and got an answer back. A domain that answers a name that was never created is answering names in general, and that is wildcard DNS.
Wildcard DNS clusters around domain parking, dynamic DNS and catch-all hosting. It is also a real attack surface: if every invented hostname resolves, then a hostname an attacker invents resolves too, which is the ground state for subdomain takeover and for phishing hosted under a name that looks legitimate.
This is evidence of wildcard behaviour, not a proven fact. It rests on one control name: a domain could legitimately serve a TXT record at exactly that name for an unrelated reason, and a wildcard that answers address records but not TXT records would not be caught here at all. What this reading is and is not.
DNS Records
A 1
75.2.60.5
MX 2
10mta151.bitmarck.org10mta152.bitmarck.org
TXT 3
v=spf1 mx a include:ispgateway.de ~allgoogle-site-verification=ZV_agCBQo6k3QyFsmfUd8cWrYuqAEL3leFzncAsJ6447jpd73c1ck8aht1lst22f3rb0c
NS 2
ns81.domaincontrol.comns82.domaincontrol.com
SOA 1
ns81.domaincontrol.com dns.jomax.net
MCP_RECORDS 1
v=spf1 mx a include:ispgateway.de ~all
DMARC_RECORDS 1
v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@bkk-linde.de
BIMI_RECORDS 1
v=spf1 mx a include:ispgateway.de ~all
MTA_STS_RECORDS 1
v=spf1 mx a include:ispgateway.de ~all
TLS Certificates (4)
| Common Name | Issuer | Expires |
|---|---|---|
bkk-linde.de |
C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=YE2 | Sun, 08 Nov 2026 04:43:48 +0000 |
YE2 |
C=US, O=ISRG, CN=Root YE | Sat, 02 Sep 2028 23:59:59 +0000 |
Root YE |
C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG Root X2 | Thu, 02 Sep 2032 23:59:59 +0000 |
ISRG Root X2 |
C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG Root X1 | Thu, 02 Sep 2032 23:59:59 +0000 |
Subdomains (1)
Signed at scan time. Check the math yourself. Every line above is part of one signed observation. Re-hash it and check the Ed25519 signature in your own browser; the only network request the check makes is for the published public keys.
Verify this receiptEd25519 Receipt
- Receipt ID
rcpt_41ea4d8c78ad5c9b- Output Hash
f82b63714c88f6c50fd01e56e5137fe39eb8a0c441aba88cefff91ca0b567e37- Signature
ed25519:0f33a60563b3be881a0aed8b3de671b65e7aa7de452177287eeaf812e8210b7feec89875b13d1b84e07b7258740ba85aa6017b350558ed0be75940a0ab41c10c- Public Key
ed25519:4859bb613d650e12dd7478cc307c73a8712fabc115a9dc59f65534ed3c09a8f9- Parent
(genesis)- Plane
- fast