black-flirt.de
Observed Aug 2, 2026, 20:36 UTC (11d ago). Every field below was attested with an Ed25519 signature at scan time.
black-flirt.de is on the survey sweep, which works its way across the whole catalog rather than returning to one name on a schedule. Putting black-flirt.de under watch moves it to the fast lane, where DomainDrift re-checks it about every 5 minutes and signs each reading, so a change becomes a dated event within minutes instead of waiting for the sweep to come round.
Watch black-flirt.de Watching a domain needs a DRM3 account. The reading above stays free and public either way.
Let's Encrypt
Google Search ConsoleDomainDrift asked this domain for a TXT record at a name nobody registers, and got an answer back. A domain that answers a name that was never created is answering names in general, and that is wildcard DNS.
Wildcard DNS clusters around domain parking, dynamic DNS and catch-all hosting. It is also a real attack surface: if every invented hostname resolves, then a hostname an attacker invents resolves too, which is the ground state for subdomain takeover and for phishing hosted under a name that looks legitimate.
This is evidence of wildcard behaviour, not a proven fact. It rests on one control name: a domain could legitimately serve a TXT record at exactly that name for an unrelated reason, and a wildcard that answers address records but not TXT records would not be caught here at all. What this reading is and is not.
DNS Records
A 1
116.203.103.124
AAAA 1
2a01:4f8:c0c:7570::1
MX 1
10mx.black-flirt.de
TXT 3
Acumbamail-domain-verification: 92707d8c-c7ce-11ec-8da1-005056bd5094google-site-verification=beM020aEPCZnPqS-BLeBfWtoKDEIEjDtdPRjDb2tAT8v=spf1 a mx include:spf.acumbamail.com ~all
NS 4
ns02.wnamed.dens01.wnamed.dens03.wnamed.dens04.wnamed.de
SOA 1
ns01.wnamed.de jan.weisssieker.de
CAA 3
issue "letsencrypt.org"iodef "mailto:jan@weisssieker.de"issuewild "letsencrypt.org"
MCP_RECORDS 3
google-site-verification=beM020aEPCZnPqS-BLeBfWtoKDEIEjDtdPRjDb2tAT8v=spf1 a mx include:spf.acumbamail.com ~allAcumbamail-domain-verification: 92707d8c-c7ce-11ec-8da1-005056bd5094
DMARC_RECORDS 1
v=DMARC1;p=quarantine;pct=100;rua=mailto:rua@black-flirt.de;ruf=mailto:ruf@black-flirt.de;adkim=s;aspf=r
BIMI_RECORDS 3
google-site-verification=beM020aEPCZnPqS-BLeBfWtoKDEIEjDtdPRjDb2tAT8v=spf1 a mx include:spf.acumbamail.com ~allAcumbamail-domain-verification: 92707d8c-c7ce-11ec-8da1-005056bd5094
MTA_STS_RECORDS 3
v=spf1 a mx include:spf.acumbamail.com ~allAcumbamail-domain-verification: 92707d8c-c7ce-11ec-8da1-005056bd5094google-site-verification=beM020aEPCZnPqS-BLeBfWtoKDEIEjDtdPRjDb2tAT8
TLS Certificates (4)
| Common Name | Issuer | Expires |
|---|---|---|
*.black-flirt.de |
C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=YE1 | Thu, 22 Oct 2026 23:59:10 +0000 |
YE1 |
C=US, O=ISRG, CN=Root YE | Sat, 02 Sep 2028 23:59:59 +0000 |
Root YE |
C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG Root X2 | Thu, 02 Sep 2032 23:59:59 +0000 |
ISRG Root X2 |
C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG Root X1 | Thu, 02 Sep 2032 23:59:59 +0000 |
Subdomains (0)
None observed.
Signed at scan time. Check the math yourself. Every line above is part of one signed observation. Re-hash it and check the Ed25519 signature in your own browser; the only network request the check makes is for the published public keys.
Verify this receiptEd25519 Receipt
- Receipt ID
rcpt_3da5f5a8f2939dda- Output Hash
3ae052d433b141a7cc19492fc776707988d438ad4fa9a7979de37edd8d40c386- Signature
ed25519:e2262d737c5a0ff907f0cb46abf7be5549e9ec67b0e27900136b190fc06531d7acf7c07a19f5df8f478445ce9e85c85d75a207544ee1ac19943e5bfd4b5da906- Public Key
ed25519:4859bb613d650e12dd7478cc307c73a8712fabc115a9dc59f65534ed3c09a8f9- Parent
(genesis)- Plane
- fast