bline.hu
Observed Aug 11, 2026, 04:52 UTC (2d ago). Every field below was attested with an Ed25519 signature at scan time.
bline.hu is on the survey sweep, which works its way across the whole catalog rather than returning to one name on a schedule. Putting bline.hu under watch moves it to the fast lane, where DomainDrift re-checks it about every 5 minutes and signs each reading, so a change becomes a dated event within minutes instead of waiting for the sweep to come round.
Watch bline.hu Watching a domain needs a DRM3 account. The reading above stays free and public either way.DomainDrift asked this domain for a TXT record at a name nobody registers, and got an answer back. A domain that answers a name that was never created is answering names in general, and that is wildcard DNS.
Wildcard DNS clusters around domain parking, dynamic DNS and catch-all hosting. It is also a real attack surface: if every invented hostname resolves, then a hostname an attacker invents resolves too, which is the ground state for subdomain takeover and for phishing hosted under a name that looks legitimate.
This is evidence of wildcard behaviour, not a proven fact. It rests on one control name: a domain could legitimately serve a TXT record at exactly that name for an unrelated reason, and a wildcard that answers address records but not TXT records would not be caught here at all. What this reading is and is not.
DNS Records
A 3
213.181.220.93213.181.220.94213.181.220.95
TXT 2
v=spf1 -allmicrosec-verification=68ceac9f-689e-47f2-8c58-49d312261ee7-2025-08-13
NS 3
dns1.hudns2.hudns3.hu
SOA 1
dns1.hu hostmaster.dns1.hu
MCP_RECORDS 1
microsec-verification=68ceac9f-689e-47f2-8c58-49d312261ee7-2025-08-13
DMARC_RECORDS 1
microsec-verification=68ceac9f-689e-47f2-8c58-49d312261ee7-2025-08-13
BIMI_RECORDS 1
microsec-verification=68ceac9f-689e-47f2-8c58-49d312261ee7-2025-08-13
MTA_STS_RECORDS 1
microsec-verification=68ceac9f-689e-47f2-8c58-49d312261ee7-2025-08-13
TLS Certificates (2)
| Common Name | Issuer | Expires |
|---|---|---|
*.bookline.hu |
C=HU, L=Budapest, O=Microsec Ltd., CN=e-Szigno SSL CA 2014, 1.2.840.113549.1.9.1=info@e-szigno.hu | Tue, 22 Sep 2026 06:46:03 +0000 |
e-Szigno SSL CA 2014 |
C=HU, L=Budapest, O=Microsec Ltd., CN=Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009, 1.2.840.113549.1.9.1=info@e-szigno.hu | Sat, 29 Dec 2029 14:35:21 +0000 |
Subdomains (1)
Signed at scan time. Check the math yourself. Every line above is part of one signed observation. Re-hash it and check the Ed25519 signature in your own browser; the only network request the check makes is for the published public keys.
Verify this receiptEd25519 Receipt
- Receipt ID
rcpt_c2f31b07bdb1a235- Output Hash
924e778823be9afe4439e4972bbb1827063542ecf7c7c2d40ac65a8d408164d2- Signature
ed25519:31e473ae7c92a3b3ac4c2fca003300e11ff4c9c0315cb91adee71536d93f685226a32b56b4798fe943cfaf0312c4920c91136af3a78f6416ebaeae25c5adb809- Public Key
ed25519:4859bb613d650e12dd7478cc307c73a8712fabc115a9dc59f65534ed3c09a8f9- Parent
(genesis)- Plane
- fast