bmisurplus.com
Observed Aug 2, 2026, 08:05 UTC (12d ago). Every field below was attested with an Ed25519 signature at scan time.
bmisurplus.com is on the survey sweep, which works its way across the whole catalog rather than returning to one name on a schedule. Putting bmisurplus.com under watch moves it to the fast lane, where DomainDrift re-checks it about every 5 minutes and signs each reading, so a change becomes a dated event within minutes instead of waiting for the sweep to come round.
Watch bmisurplus.com Watching a domain needs a DRM3 account. The reading above stays free and public either way.DomainDrift asked this domain for a TXT record at a name nobody registers, and got an answer back. A domain that answers a name that was never created is answering names in general, and that is wildcard DNS.
Wildcard DNS clusters around domain parking, dynamic DNS and catch-all hosting. It is also a real attack surface: if every invented hostname resolves, then a hostname an attacker invents resolves too, which is the ground state for subdomain takeover and for phishing hosted under a name that looks legitimate.
This is evidence of wildcard behaviour, not a proven fact. It rests on one control name: a domain could legitimately serve a TXT record at exactly that name for an unrelated reason, and a wildcard that answers address records but not TXT records would not be caught here at all. What this reading is and is not.
DNS Records
A 2
172.66.171.240104.20.40.95
AAAA 2
2606:4700:10::6814:285f2606:4700:10::ac42:abf0
MX 1
10mta1.voonami.com
TXT 6
brevo-code:4c023641d75a67d49248f13a21671d8fgoogle-site-verification=5lBdR-ViQX1QapiNY8nFT1U4JhSIbt88XJ5f19ezO7Ugoogle-site-verification=CBX8zEiqox3Z7knhsWQLcjJy_GOgNxzi8TE9PXdTBBgklaviyo-site-verification=TdvBnFv=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com ip4:208.97.62.64/27 ip4:208.97.48.0/24 ip4:208.97.49.0/24 -allzone-ownership-verification-b18122a67ebc9b1cbefa9260428c673fd12af4bb424a1e84813226a1211c4af7
NS 2
sid.ns.cloudflare.comziggy.ns.cloudflare.com
SOA 1
sid.ns.cloudflare.com dns.cloudflare.com
CAA 10
issue "comodoca.com"issue "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"issue "letsencrypt.org"issue "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"issue "ssl.com"issuewild "comodoca.com"issuewild "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"issuewild "letsencrypt.org"issuewild "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"issuewild "ssl.com"
MCP_RECORDS 3
MS=ms39955501google-site-verification=5lBdR-ViQX1QapiNY8nFT1U4JhSIbt88XJ5f19ezO7U3v=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com -all
DMARC_RECORDS 1
v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:admin@bmisurplus.com
BIMI_RECORDS 3
MS=ms39955501google-site-verification=5lBdR-ViQX1QapiNY8nFT1U4JhSIbt88XJ5f19ezO7U3v=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com -all
MTA_STS_RECORDS 3
MS=ms39955501google-site-verification=5lBdR-ViQX1QapiNY8nFT1U4JhSIbt88XJ5f19ezO7U3v=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com -all
TLS Certificates (3)
| Common Name | Issuer | Expires |
|---|---|---|
bmisurplus.com |
C=US, O=Google Trust Services, CN=WE1 | Sat, 03 Oct 2026 08:35:20 +0000 |
WE1 |
C=US, O=Google Trust Services LLC, CN=GTS Root R4 | Tue, 20 Feb 2029 14:00:00 +0000 |
GTS Root R4 |
C=BE, O=GlobalSign nv-sa, 2.5.4.11=Root CA, CN=GlobalSign Root CA | Fri, 28 Jan 2028 00:00:42 +0000 |
Subdomains (0)
None observed.
Signed at scan time. Check the math yourself. Every line above is part of one signed observation. Re-hash it and check the Ed25519 signature in your own browser; the only network request the check makes is for the published public keys.
Verify this receiptEd25519 Receipt
- Receipt ID
rcpt_827e8cae9f92df8f- Output Hash
f6854c79827257af1a0bed44959a44369521982f8f5211ccd27e3ed4c3fa3c67- Signature
ed25519:64a9aa85513b80ab24faec24e864bb751756c05e91aef6834c9399138500fb724b57300d01e177439dc9ff38fea0ad280b0ff303c633c47654f3cd256a2e6e03- Public Key
ed25519:4859bb613d650e12dd7478cc307c73a8712fabc115a9dc59f65534ed3c09a8f9- Parent
(genesis)- Plane
- fast