borja.io
Observed Aug 2, 2026, 08:04 UTC (12d ago). Every field below was attested with an Ed25519 signature at scan time.
borja.io is on the survey sweep, which works its way across the whole catalog rather than returning to one name on a schedule. Putting borja.io under watch moves it to the fast lane, where DomainDrift re-checks it about every 5 minutes and signs each reading, so a change becomes a dated event within minutes instead of waiting for the sweep to come round.
Watch borja.io Watching a domain needs a DRM3 account. The reading above stays free and public either way.
Google
Let's Encrypt
Google Search ConsoleDomainDrift asked this domain for a TXT record at a name nobody registers, and got an answer back. A domain that answers a name that was never created is answering names in general, and that is wildcard DNS.
Wildcard DNS clusters around domain parking, dynamic DNS and catch-all hosting. It is also a real attack surface: if every invented hostname resolves, then a hostname an attacker invents resolves too, which is the ground state for subdomain takeover and for phishing hosted under a name that looks legitimate.
This is evidence of wildcard behaviour, not a proven fact. It rests on one control name: a domain could legitimately serve a TXT record at exactly that name for an unrelated reason, and a wildcard that answers address records but not TXT records would not be caught here at all. What this reading is and is not.
DNS Records
A 1
34.67.101.233
MX 3
35route3.mx.cloudflare.net54route2.mx.cloudflare.net77route1.mx.cloudflare.net
TXT 2
v=spf1 include:_spf.mx.cloudflare.net ~allgoogle-site-verification=M0T_TOeAjK8s-YJ3wO0SAK6gqdNtNz8ayKv8t2bp4Qg
NS 2
elma.ns.cloudflare.commarvin.ns.cloudflare.com
SOA 1
elma.ns.cloudflare.com dns.cloudflare.com
CAA 10
issue "comodoca.com"issue "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"issue "letsencrypt.org"issue "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"issue "ssl.com"issuewild "comodoca.com"issuewild "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"issuewild "letsencrypt.org"issuewild "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"issuewild "ssl.com"
MCP_RECORDS 2
v=spf1 include:_spf.mx.cloudflare.net ~allgoogle-site-verification=M0T_TOeAjK8s-YJ3wO0SAK6gqdNtNz8ayKv8t2bp4Qg
DMARC_RECORDS 2
v=spf1 include:_spf.mx.cloudflare.net ~allgoogle-site-verification=M0T_TOeAjK8s-YJ3wO0SAK6gqdNtNz8ayKv8t2bp4Qg
BIMI_RECORDS 2
v=spf1 include:_spf.mx.cloudflare.net ~allgoogle-site-verification=M0T_TOeAjK8s-YJ3wO0SAK6gqdNtNz8ayKv8t2bp4Qg
MTA_STS_RECORDS 2
v=spf1 include:_spf.mx.cloudflare.net ~allgoogle-site-verification=M0T_TOeAjK8s-YJ3wO0SAK6gqdNtNz8ayKv8t2bp4Qg
TLS Certificates (3)
| Common Name | Issuer | Expires |
|---|---|---|
borja.io |
C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=YR2 | Tue, 01 Sep 2026 23:26:05 +0000 |
YR2 |
C=US, O=ISRG, CN=Root YR | Sat, 02 Sep 2028 23:59:59 +0000 |
Root YR |
C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG Root X1 | Thu, 02 Sep 2032 23:59:59 +0000 |
Subdomains (0)
None observed.
Signed at scan time. Check the math yourself. Every line above is part of one signed observation. Re-hash it and check the Ed25519 signature in your own browser; the only network request the check makes is for the published public keys.
Verify this receiptEd25519 Receipt
- Receipt ID
rcpt_8af3a26874cc87ef- Output Hash
e941914029be63faaa09e4bfa7d3de648ebf0ffbd01ff3b3fc6cc1e40687324b- Signature
ed25519:587a460b6778f3e90fba7a9fd9a15f1bfe6968342f46f6e2ac5f093c22ebd3152222d37d1b2c4fa0b1cbf961ce15505ce7a4410ea9dbf5cb45a1a33ab1f6950e- Public Key
ed25519:4859bb613d650e12dd7478cc307c73a8712fabc115a9dc59f65534ed3c09a8f9- Parent
(genesis)- Plane
- fast