CONTINUOUS INTERNET TELEMETRY24H DRIFT54,263 material changesacross 48,164 domains · 24h to ~40m ago · +19,857 vs yesterdayROTATION50 domains moved DNS from magpiedns.com to koaladns.com, 45 moved backa rotation loop, not a migration · 24hEMAIL DRIFT1 domain switched email provider24hREGISTRAR DRIFT1 changed registrar24hNOW603 curated domains not reachablelast probe, steadySITE ERRORS34,019 sites serving errorslast probe · 5xx / 404 / TLSBOT DEFENSEbot defense observed on 117,594 sites429 rate-limit / 403 bot-block, a posture signal

domeny.host

Observed Aug 3, 2026, 01:55 UTC (6d ago). Every field below was attested with an Ed25519 signature at scan time.

This reading of domeny.host was taken 6d ago

domeny.host is on the survey sweep, which works its way across the whole catalog rather than returning to one name on a schedule. Putting domeny.host under watch moves it to the fast lane, where DomainDrift re-checks it about every 5 minutes and signs each reading, so a change becomes a dated event within minutes instead of waiting for the sweep to come round.

Watch domeny.host Watching a domain needs a DRM3 account. The reading above stays free and public either way.
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Up right now
Runs onCyber_Folks S.A
Secured bycyber_Folks S.A.
Registered withPDR Ltd. d/b/a PublicDomainRegistry.com
1 subdomain · tranco_100k
Every line above is a signed observation. Check the math at the bottom of the page.
EVIDENCE OF WILDCARD DNSobserved 2026-08-08 23:45 UTC

DomainDrift asked this domain for a TXT record at a name nobody registers, and got an answer back. A domain that answers a name that was never created is answering names in general, and that is wildcard DNS.

Wildcard DNS clusters around domain parking, dynamic DNS and catch-all hosting. It is also a real attack surface: if every invented hostname resolves, then a hostname an attacker invents resolves too, which is the ground state for subdomain takeover and for phishing hosted under a name that looks legitimate.

This is evidence of wildcard behaviour, not a proven fact. It rests on one control name: a domain could legitimately serve a TXT record at exactly that name for an unrelated reason, and a wildcard that answers address records but not TXT records would not be caught here at all. What this reading is and is not.

INFRASTRUCTURE MAPwhat domeny.host actually stands on - every host below is a signed observation
domeny.host
A / AAAA
94.152.11.0
Cyber_Folks S.Aserves the site
NS
ns2.domeny.hostns1.domeny.host
domeny.hostanswers its DNS
MX
poczta.domeny.host
domeny.hostreceives its email
TLS
domeny.host
cyber_Folks S.A.issued its certificate

DNS Records

A 1

  • 94.152.11.0

MX 1

  • 10poczta.domeny.host

TXT 1

  • v=spf1 a mx include:spf.tld.pl -all

NS 2

  • ns2.domeny.host
  • ns1.domeny.host

SOA 1

  • ns1.domeny.host admin.domeny.host

MCP_RECORDS 1

  • v=spf1 a mx include:spf.tld.pl -all

DMARC_RECORDS 1

  • v=spf1 a mx include:spf.tld.pl -all

BIMI_RECORDS 1

  • v=spf1 a mx include:spf.tld.pl -all

MTA_STS_RECORDS 1

  • v=spf1 a mx include:spf.tld.pl -all

TLS Certificates (0)

None.

Subdomains (0)

None observed.

The proof

Signed at scan time. Check the math yourself. Every line above is part of one signed observation. Re-hash it and check the Ed25519 signature in your own browser; the only network request the check makes is for the published public keys.

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Ed25519 Receipt

Receipt ID
rcpt_77c7113a70e863be
Output Hash
d014cfaf9ce7a575d85e629e0be39da82fcf54a99e05a5ff4030645e8cbca59f
Signature
ed25519:cfdb9ecd2fcbc3e9254fc26795ac653eea768f962a2740e7d00e46daafa16956dfbd20cce7712ad65d91ce979ea691b7c29b25a27d3810dd64bc87e46c0cbf08
Public Key
ed25519:4859bb613d650e12dd7478cc307c73a8712fabc115a9dc59f65534ed3c09a8f9
Parent
(genesis)
Plane
fast
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