CONTINUOUS INTERNET TELEMETRY24H DRIFT49,510 material changesacross 45,538 domains · 24h to ~65m ago · +15,104 vs yesterdayROTATION49 domains moved DNS from magpiedns.com to koaladns.com, 44 moved backa rotation loop, not a migration · 24hEMAIL DRIFT1 domain switched email provider24hREGISTRAR DRIFT1 changed registrar24hNOW609 curated domains not reachablelast probe, steadySITE ERRORS33,995 sites serving errorslast probe · 5xx / 404 / TLSBOT DEFENSEbot defense observed on 117,571 sites429 rate-limit / 403 bot-block, a posture signal

donic.cz

Observed Aug 2, 2026, 11:58 UTC (7d ago). Every field below was attested with an Ed25519 signature at scan time.

This reading of donic.cz was taken 7d ago

donic.cz is on the survey sweep, which works its way across the whole catalog rather than returning to one name on a schedule. Putting donic.cz under watch moves it to the fast lane, where DomainDrift re-checks it about every 5 minutes and signs each reading, so a change becomes a dated event within minutes instead of waiting for the sweep to come round.

Watch donic.cz Watching a domain needs a DRM3 account. The reading above stays free and public either way.
Up right now
Secured byLet's Encrypt
tranco
Every line above is a signed observation. Check the math at the bottom of the page.
EVIDENCE OF WILDCARD DNSobserved 2026-08-08 09:52 UTC

DomainDrift asked this domain for a TXT record at a name nobody registers, and got an answer back. A domain that answers a name that was never created is answering names in general, and that is wildcard DNS.

Wildcard DNS clusters around domain parking, dynamic DNS and catch-all hosting. It is also a real attack surface: if every invented hostname resolves, then a hostname an attacker invents resolves too, which is the ground state for subdomain takeover and for phishing hosted under a name that looks legitimate.

This is evidence of wildcard behaviour, not a proven fact. It rests on one control name: a domain could legitimately serve a TXT record at exactly that name for an unrelated reason, and a wildcard that answers address records but not TXT records would not be caught here at all. What this reading is and is not.

INFRASTRUCTURE MAPwhat donic.cz actually stands on - every host below is a signed observation
donic.cz
A / AAAA
178.217.242.29
unattributedserves the site
NS
ns.kraxnet.czns.kraxnet.com
kraxnet.cz + kraxnet.comanswers its DNS
TLS
donic.cz
Let's Encryptissued its certificate

DNS Records

A 1

  • 178.217.242.29

TXT 1

  • redir.cz=https://www.vsenastolnitenis.cz/cz/donic

NS 2

  • ns.kraxnet.cz
  • ns.kraxnet.com

SOA 1

  • ns.kraxnet.cz admin.kraxnet.cz

MCP_RECORDS 1

  • redir.cz=https://www.vsenastolnitenis.cz/cz/donic

DMARC_RECORDS 1

  • redir.cz=https://www.vsenastolnitenis.cz/cz/donic

BIMI_RECORDS 1

  • redir.cz=https://www.vsenastolnitenis.cz/cz/donic

MTA_STS_RECORDS 1

  • redir.cz=https://www.vsenastolnitenis.cz/cz/donic

TLS Certificates (2)

Common NameIssuerExpires
donic.cz C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=E7 Wed, 26 Aug 2026 13:10:31 +0000
E7 C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG Root X1 Fri, 12 Mar 2027 23:59:59 +0000

Subdomains (0)

None observed.

The proof

Signed at scan time. Check the math yourself. Every line above is part of one signed observation. Re-hash it and check the Ed25519 signature in your own browser; the only network request the check makes is for the published public keys.

Verify this receipt

Ed25519 Receipt

Receipt ID
rcpt_48d128dd233b7175
Output Hash
5840b9e69d3d5656393250ed81ce98cd72f7ee904f3b18d2030f9f33e9bfd5d3
Signature
ed25519:ce77f51fd5a764113fb7c46aab613cc01fdd5ac14c743ae71b836758a311e48d81fa1ee5f9a3c1cd8eee4fd834a3353eebb34e6500fb76e504b5647ddc3f2404
Public Key
ed25519:4859bb613d650e12dd7478cc307c73a8712fabc115a9dc59f65534ed3c09a8f9
Parent
(genesis)
Plane
fast
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