dpstele.com
Observed Jul 26, 2026, 00:55 UTC (13d ago). Every field below was attested with an Ed25519 signature at scan time.
dpstele.com is on the survey sweep, which works its way across the whole catalog rather than returning to one name on a schedule. Putting dpstele.com under watch moves it to the fast lane, where DomainDrift re-checks it about every 5 minutes and signs each reading, so a change becomes a dated event within minutes instead of waiting for the sweep to come round.
Watch dpstele.com Watching a domain needs a DRM3 account. The reading above stays free and public either way.DomainDrift asked this domain for a TXT record at a name nobody registers, and got an answer back. A domain that answers a name that was never created is answering names in general, and that is wildcard DNS.
Wildcard DNS clusters around domain parking, dynamic DNS and catch-all hosting. It is also a real attack surface: if every invented hostname resolves, then a hostname an attacker invents resolves too, which is the ground state for subdomain takeover and for phishing hosted under a name that looks legitimate.
This is evidence of wildcard behaviour, not a proven fact. It rests on one control name: a domain could legitimately serve a TXT record at exactly that name for an unrelated reason, and a wildcard that answers address records but not TXT records would not be caught here at all. What this reading is and is not.
DNS Records
A 1
206.169.87.179
MX 3
10mx1.dpstele.com50mailer.dpstele.com60dpstele-com.mail.protection.outlook.com
TXT 13
v=spf1 a a:mail.dpstele.com ip4:207.114.171.134 ip4:206.169.87.177/28 include:spf.protection.outlook.com ~allv=verifydomain MS=7431425MS=29F38E6FAC81D0E4587D3ECFFE29927DD6648932v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:dmarc@dpstele.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc@dpstele.com; sp=quarantinev=spf1 a a:mail.dpstele.com ip4:207.114.171.134 ip4:206.169.87.177/28 include:spf.protection.outlook.com ~allv=verifydomain MS=7431425MS=29F38E6FAC81D0E4587D3ECFFE29927DD6648932v=spf1 a a:mail.dpstele.com ip4:207.114.171.134 ip4:206.169.87.177/28 include:spf.protection.outlook.com ~allv=verifydomain MS=7431425MS=29F38E6FAC81D0E4587D3ECFFE29927DD6648932
NS 2
ns65.domaincontrol.comns66.domaincontrol.com
SOA 1
ns65.domaincontrol.com dns.jomax.net
TLS Certificates (4)
| Common Name | Issuer | Expires |
|---|---|---|
*.dpstele.com |
C=US, O=GoDaddy.com, CN=GoDaddy TLS Intermediate CA DV - R1v1 | Wed, 27 Jan 2027 14:08:58 +0000 |
GoDaddy TLS Intermediate CA DV - R1v1 |
C=US, O=GoDaddy.com, CN=GoDaddy TLS Root CA - R1 | Fri, 24 Aug 2040 11:59:59 +0000 |
GoDaddy TLS Root CA - R1 |
C=US, ST=Arizona, L=Scottsdale, O=GoDaddy.com, Inc., CN=Go Daddy Root Certificate Authority - G2 | Thu, 31 Dec 2037 23:59:59 +0000 |
Go Daddy Root Certificate Authority - G2 |
C=US, ST=Arizona, L=Scottsdale, O=GoDaddy.com, Inc., CN=Go Daddy Root Certificate Authority - G2 | Thu, 31 Dec 2037 23:59:59 +0000 |
Subdomains (0)
None observed.
Signed at scan time. Check the math yourself. Every line above is part of one signed observation. Re-hash it and check the Ed25519 signature in your own browser; the only network request the check makes is for the published public keys.
Verify this receiptEd25519 Receipt
- Receipt ID
- Output Hash
041aed742c14b70b48c630470d1a92423f0595f6f8b0e50a2eb5d5ad16a56243- Signature
(receipt not held at this host)- Public Key
connor-fast-v0.13.0- Parent
(genesis)- Plane
- fast