CONTINUOUS INTERNET TELEMETRY24H DRIFT25,547 material changesacross 22,819 domains · last 24hROTATION56 domains moved DNS from koaladns.com to kirklanddc.com, 54 moved backa rotation loop, not a migration · 24hEMAIL DRIFT1 domain switched email providertop destination ~NOW603 curated domains not reachablelast probe, steadySITE ERRORS33,533 sites serving errorslast probe · 5xx / 404 / TLSBOT DEFENSEbot defense observed on 118,101 sites429 rate-limit / 403 bot-block, a posture signal

droidsans.com

Observed Aug 3, 2026, 02:24 UTC (5d ago). Every field below was attested with an Ed25519 signature at scan time.

This reading of droidsans.com was taken 5d ago

droidsans.com is on the survey sweep, which works its way across the whole catalog rather than returning to one name on a schedule. Putting droidsans.com under watch moves it to the fast lane, where DomainDrift re-checks it about every 5 minutes and signs each reading, so a change becomes a dated event within minutes instead of waiting for the sweep to come round.

Watch droidsans.com Watching a domain needs a DRM3 account. The reading above stays free and public either way.
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Up right now
Runs onCloudflare
Email byGoogle Workspace
Secured byGoogle Trust Services
Also usesGoogle Search Console
IPv6 · tranco
Every line above is a signed observation. Check the math at the bottom of the page.
EVIDENCE OF WILDCARD DNSobserved 2026-08-08 07:07 UTC

DomainDrift asked this domain for a TXT record at a name nobody registers, and got an answer back. A domain that answers a name that was never created is answering names in general, and that is wildcard DNS.

Wildcard DNS clusters around domain parking, dynamic DNS and catch-all hosting. It is also a real attack surface: if every invented hostname resolves, then a hostname an attacker invents resolves too, which is the ground state for subdomain takeover and for phishing hosted under a name that looks legitimate.

This is evidence of wildcard behaviour, not a proven fact. It rests on one control name: a domain could legitimately serve a TXT record at exactly that name for an unrelated reason, and a wildcard that answers address records but not TXT records would not be caught here at all. What this reading is and is not.

INFRASTRUCTURE MAPwhat droidsans.com actually stands on - every host below is a signed observation
droidsans.com
A / AAAA
172.67.141.105104.21.33.522606:4700:3037::ac43:8d692606:4700:3037::6815:2134
Cloudflareserves the site
NS
gail.ns.cloudflare.comweston.ns.cloudflare.com
cloudflare.comanswers its DNS
MX
aspmx.l.google.comalt3.aspmx.l.google.comalt4.aspmx.l.google.comalt1.aspmx.l.google.com+1 more
Google Workspacereceives its email
TLS
droidsans.com
Google Trust Servicesissued its certificate

DNS Records

A 2

  • 172.67.141.105
  • 104.21.33.52

AAAA 2

  • 2606:4700:3037::ac43:8d69
  • 2606:4700:3037::6815:2134

MX 5

  • 1aspmx.l.google.com
  • 10alt3.aspmx.l.google.com
  • 10alt4.aspmx.l.google.com
  • 5alt1.aspmx.l.google.com
  • 5alt2.aspmx.l.google.com

TXT 4

  • google-site-verification=O-D2S13OHk6e8e6i-BIwYMctSxuE7zGhUSl8OfhObx8
  • google-site-verification=q1v5leUEjpbDEyE6RXzCbU1LtRd6iUPzUdHUjrgHWxQ
  • google-site-verification=tacFsxbkDUViPhgV3pf7eZAE19An8RvHUvfVHAzJTPw
  • v=spf1 a mx include:_spf.google.com include:_spf.applebred.net ~all.

NS 2

  • gail.ns.cloudflare.com
  • weston.ns.cloudflare.com

SOA 1

  • gail.ns.cloudflare.com dns.cloudflare.com

CAA 10

  • issue "comodoca.com"
  • issue "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
  • issue "letsencrypt.org"
  • issue "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
  • issue "ssl.com"
  • issuewild "comodoca.com"
  • issuewild "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
  • issuewild "letsencrypt.org"
  • issuewild "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
  • issuewild "ssl.com"

MCP_RECORDS 4

  • google-site-verification=O-D2S13OHk6e8e6i-BIwYMctSxuE7zGhUSl8OfhObx8
  • google-site-verification=q1v5leUEjpbDEyE6RXzCbU1LtRd6iUPzUdHUjrgHWxQ
  • google-site-verification=tacFsxbkDUViPhgV3pf7eZAE19An8RvHUvfVHAzJTPw
  • v=spf1 a mx include:_spf.google.com include:_spf.applebred.net ~all.

DMARC_RECORDS 4

  • google-site-verification=O-D2S13OHk6e8e6i-BIwYMctSxuE7zGhUSl8OfhObx8
  • google-site-verification=q1v5leUEjpbDEyE6RXzCbU1LtRd6iUPzUdHUjrgHWxQ
  • google-site-verification=tacFsxbkDUViPhgV3pf7eZAE19An8RvHUvfVHAzJTPw
  • v=spf1 a mx include:_spf.google.com include:_spf.applebred.net ~all.

BIMI_RECORDS 4

  • google-site-verification=O-D2S13OHk6e8e6i-BIwYMctSxuE7zGhUSl8OfhObx8
  • google-site-verification=q1v5leUEjpbDEyE6RXzCbU1LtRd6iUPzUdHUjrgHWxQ
  • google-site-verification=tacFsxbkDUViPhgV3pf7eZAE19An8RvHUvfVHAzJTPw
  • v=spf1 a mx include:_spf.google.com include:_spf.applebred.net ~all.

MTA_STS_RECORDS 4

  • google-site-verification=O-D2S13OHk6e8e6i-BIwYMctSxuE7zGhUSl8OfhObx8
  • google-site-verification=q1v5leUEjpbDEyE6RXzCbU1LtRd6iUPzUdHUjrgHWxQ
  • google-site-verification=tacFsxbkDUViPhgV3pf7eZAE19An8RvHUvfVHAzJTPw
  • v=spf1 a mx include:_spf.google.com include:_spf.applebred.net ~all.

TLS Certificates (3)

Common NameIssuerExpires
droidsans.com C=US, O=Google Trust Services, CN=WE1 Sat, 19 Sep 2026 02:25:23 +0000
WE1 C=US, O=Google Trust Services LLC, CN=GTS Root R4 Tue, 20 Feb 2029 14:00:00 +0000
GTS Root R4 C=BE, O=GlobalSign nv-sa, 2.5.4.11=Root CA, CN=GlobalSign Root CA Fri, 28 Jan 2028 00:00:42 +0000

Subdomains (0)

None observed.

The proof

Signed at scan time. Check the math yourself. Every line above is part of one signed observation. Re-hash it and check the Ed25519 signature in your own browser; the only network request the check makes is for the published public keys.

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Ed25519 Receipt

Receipt ID
rcpt_306f6a3b1930095d
Output Hash
773f16cb39dd5608b718088b6124a189176f186fbe481e57f2a386fb16752073
Signature
ed25519:69c7d1650c9a7260fa9f8aebcf6d508ca59c93f524d092aafbde751520da7b6337afc4af0b4e5d663fa4ea8b0c4f5305968cf0df65715d74ada53cb670c07a00
Public Key
ed25519:4859bb613d650e12dd7478cc307c73a8712fabc115a9dc59f65534ed3c09a8f9
Parent
(genesis)
Plane
fast
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