CONTINUOUS INTERNET TELEMETRY24H DRIFT48,392 material changesacross 43,424 domains · 24h to ~60m ago · +13,986 vs yesterdayROTATION55 domains moved DNS from koaladns.com to magpiedns.com, 54 moved backa rotation loop, not a migration · 24hNOW611 curated domains not reachablelast probe, steadySITE ERRORS34,178 sites serving errorslast probe · 5xx / 404 / TLSBOT DEFENSEbot defense observed on 116,838 sites429 rate-limit / 403 bot-block, a posture signal

droneregler.dk

Observed Aug 2, 2026, 17:48 UTC (7d ago). Every field below was attested with an Ed25519 signature at scan time.

This reading of droneregler.dk was taken 7d ago

droneregler.dk is on the survey sweep, which works its way across the whole catalog rather than returning to one name on a schedule. Putting droneregler.dk under watch moves it to the fast lane, where DomainDrift re-checks it about every 5 minutes and signs each reading, so a change becomes a dated event within minutes instead of waiting for the sweep to come round.

Watch droneregler.dk Watching a domain needs a DRM3 account. The reading above stays free and public either way.
Up right now
Secured byLet's Encrypt
Also usesGoogle Search Console
IPv6 · majestic
Every line above is a signed observation. Check the math at the bottom of the page.
EVIDENCE OF WILDCARD DNSobserved 2026-08-09 16:16 UTC

DomainDrift asked this domain for a TXT record at a name nobody registers, and got an answer back. A domain that answers a name that was never created is answering names in general, and that is wildcard DNS.

Wildcard DNS clusters around domain parking, dynamic DNS and catch-all hosting. It is also a real attack surface: if every invented hostname resolves, then a hostname an attacker invents resolves too, which is the ground state for subdomain takeover and for phishing hosted under a name that looks legitimate.

This is evidence of wildcard behaviour, not a proven fact. It rests on one control name: a domain could legitimately serve a TXT record at exactly that name for an unrelated reason, and a wildcard that answers address records but not TXT records would not be caught here at all. What this reading is and is not.

INFRASTRUCTURE MAPwhat droneregler.dk actually stands on - every host below is a signed observation
droneregler.dk
A / AAAA
172.232.147.252172.233.57.172600:3c09::f03c:94ff:fed1:f1bb2600:3c0e::f03c:94ff:fed1:4ea
2600serves the site
NS
ns6.sitnet.dkns7.sitnet.dk
sitnet.dkanswers its DNS
TLS
droneregler.dk
Let's Encryptissued its certificate

DNS Records

A 2

  • 172.232.147.252
  • 172.233.57.17

AAAA 2

  • 2600:3c09::f03c:94ff:fed1:f1bb
  • 2600:3c0e::f03c:94ff:fed1:4ea

TXT 3

  • v=spf1 -all
  • kzlt6lhfxbkxb1zphg0k3qvqsbbhzkft
  • google-site-verification=3glvPl8QxIDcnXAE8NMd9xfwUUXZgedN00GEk2-HwTg

NS 2

  • ns6.sitnet.dk
  • ns7.sitnet.dk

SOA 1

  • ns6.sitnet.dk hostmaster.statens-it.dk

MCP_RECORDS 1

  • v=spf1 -all

DMARC_RECORDS 1

  • v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; rua=mailto:tcod1eh2@ag.eu.dmarcadvisor.com;

BIMI_RECORDS 1

  • v=spf1 -all

MTA_STS_RECORDS 1

  • v=spf1 -all

TLS Certificates (3)

Common NameIssuerExpires
droneregler.dk C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=YR2 Sun, 04 Oct 2026 23:24:06 +0000
YR2 C=US, O=ISRG, CN=Root YR Sat, 02 Sep 2028 23:59:59 +0000
Root YR C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG Root X1 Thu, 02 Sep 2032 23:59:59 +0000

Subdomains (0)

None observed.

The proof

Signed at scan time. Check the math yourself. Every line above is part of one signed observation. Re-hash it and check the Ed25519 signature in your own browser; the only network request the check makes is for the published public keys.

Verify this receipt

Ed25519 Receipt

Receipt ID
rcpt_b3d14e27d9d39910
Output Hash
657c8abe9af5c2911b4313a265006c01db377fce1ee095a35025b5daaf462fda
Signature
ed25519:7b509e8a0356307a08e6d28fbd3af95f5f86721470a9af651db6d44498c13e32563c2745ef557b23410b5207e27b0e14d117a3556fa80ce578fa7ff0c482ae0f
Public Key
ed25519:4859bb613d650e12dd7478cc307c73a8712fabc115a9dc59f65534ed3c09a8f9
Parent
(genesis)
Plane
fast
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