dsw.nl
Observed Aug 2, 2026, 10:00 UTC (18h ago). Every field below was attested with an Ed25519 signature at scan time. Catalog observation, re-checked on rotation - watch it for 5-minute checks.
DomainDrift asked this domain for a TXT record at a name nobody registers, and got an answer back. A domain that answers a name that was never created is answering names in general, and that is wildcard DNS.
Wildcard DNS clusters around domain parking, dynamic DNS and catch-all hosting. It is also a real attack surface: if every invented hostname resolves, then a hostname an attacker invents resolves too, which is the ground state for subdomain takeover and for phishing hosted under a name that looks legitimate.
This is evidence of wildcard behaviour, not a proven fact. It rests on one control name: a domain could legitimately serve a TXT record at exactly that name for an unrelated reason, and a wildcard that answers address records but not TXT records would not be caught here at all. What this reading is and is not.
DNS Records
A 2
23.53.11.16423.53.11.167
AAAA 2
2600:1408:ec00:2e::1735:ba42600:1408:ec00:2e::1735:ba7
MX 5
1aspmx.l.google.com5alt1.aspmx.l.google.com5alt2.aspmx.l.google.com10alt3.aspmx.l.google.com10alt4.aspmx.l.google.com
TXT 9
apple-domain-verification=mCi90WerW0atmeV5MS=F7D9B6D87EE3B1D506C73C24FFD6E783E1EEE822QuoVadis=d5b08e1a-4978-4b19-a540-2d16ef39f3bagoogle-site-verification=4jdtjrlab4ElzbDlYO0PrbNn8BOhx3vSN0OdTLeQqHMgoogle-site-verification=DLWcb6d2vvXe-6-i21vMuNUVQmabvggRi62f-k_CZMMgoogle-site-verification=q7neJ4rZdqMx6Xy9d9OTioDec80Whn1Ogvjd3ncxJkwv=NTA7516-1;startdate=2025-12;enddate=2028-12;provider=zorgmail;ntamx=10 relay.zorgmail.nlDynatrace-site-verification=26621baf-9206-4576-8848-a335058ccd2a__iil9ujrpfm6fvbpqd40ifvk4lgv=spf1 ip4:83.98.228.0/24 ip4:80.248.34.59 include:spf.simplemailservice.eu include:_spf.google.com include:_spf.zorgmail.nl include:spf.afas.online a ~all
NS 6
a7-64.akam.neta1-179.akam.neta12-66.akam.neta13-65.akam.neta20-66.akam.neta26-65.akam.net
SOA 1
a1-179.akam.net hostmaster.dsw.nl
CAA 7
iodef "mailto:administrators_alert@dsw.nl"issue "digicert.com"issue "letsencrypt.org"issue "pkioverheid.nl"issue "quovadisglobal.com"issue "sectigo.com"issue "www.pkioverheid.nl"
MCP_RECORDS 1
v=spf1 -all
DMARC_RECORDS 1
v=DMARC1;p=reject;pct=100;rua=mailto:dmarc@03ebb6a7.uriports.com; sp=reject
BIMI_RECORDS 1
v=spf1 -all
MTA_STS_RECORDS 1
v=STSv1; id=20240304122153Z;
TLS Certificates (3)
| Common Name | Issuer | Expires |
|---|---|---|
www.mijndsw.nl |
C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=YR1 | Mon, 07 Sep 2026 09:04:42 +0000 |
YR1 |
C=US, O=ISRG, CN=Root YR | Sat, 02 Sep 2028 23:59:59 +0000 |
Root YR |
C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG Root X1 | Thu, 02 Sep 2032 23:59:59 +0000 |
Subdomains (22)
- aanmelden.dsw.nl
- apps.dsw.nl
- appservice.dsw.nl
- content.dsw.nl
- dswwebcrl.dsw.nl
- ideal.dsw.nl
- idsrvinterneapplicaties.dsw.nl
- interactionsupport.dsw.nl
- intwente.dsw.nl
- klantbeeld.dsw.nl
- mijnzorgverlener.dsw.nl
- new.aanmelden.dsw.nl
- new.intwente.dsw.nl
- poliswebportaal.dsw.nl
- rasaservice.dsw.nl
- rasaservice.prod.cloud.dsw.nl
- rasaservicesh.dsw.nl
- ticketserviceexternalapi.dsw.nl
- ticketservicerestful.dsw.nl
- web.dsw.nl
- webhookgateway.dsw.nl
- www.dsw.nl
Signed at scan time. Check the math yourself. Every line above is part of one signed observation. Re-hash it and check the Ed25519 signature in your own browser; nothing leaves your machine.
Verify this receiptEd25519 Receipt
- Receipt ID
rcpt_add08580c6f266b8- Output Hash
c1302867ab4626b727ef4de24e8cf9a98e05e0b37dcca544a25cac6eab4ea3d6- Signature
ed25519:7eb8c36dc17ef5d4c2858df0b506e685409f1bd68026944138370ebd97161cf49ac183b746b8a2d16a47d1f689ba4372e6563ba693981e8a4bd617a1e640dc0c- Public Key
ed25519:4859bb613d650e12dd7478cc307c73a8712fabc115a9dc59f65534ed3c09a8f9- Parent
(genesis)- Plane
- fast