e-mostecko.cz
Observed Aug 2, 2026, 12:15 UTC (3d ago). Every field below was attested with an Ed25519 signature at scan time.
e-mostecko.cz is on the survey sweep, which works its way across the whole catalog rather than returning to one name on a schedule. Putting e-mostecko.cz under watch moves it to the fast lane, where DomainDrift re-checks it about every 5 minutes and signs each reading, so a change becomes a dated event within minutes instead of waiting for the sweep to come round.
Watch e-mostecko.cz Watching a domain needs a DRM3 account. The reading above stays free and public either way.DomainDrift asked this domain for a TXT record at a name nobody registers, and got an answer back. A domain that answers a name that was never created is answering names in general, and that is wildcard DNS.
Wildcard DNS clusters around domain parking, dynamic DNS and catch-all hosting. It is also a real attack surface: if every invented hostname resolves, then a hostname an attacker invents resolves too, which is the ground state for subdomain takeover and for phishing hosted under a name that looks legitimate.
This is evidence of wildcard behaviour, not a proven fact. It rests on one control name: a domain could legitimately serve a TXT record at exactly that name for an unrelated reason, and a wildcard that answers address records but not TXT records would not be caught here at all. What this reading is and is not.
DNS Records
A 1
81.0.226.126
MX 2
20sns.nethost.sk10edenikyvps.hostime.cz
TXT 1
v=spf1 a mx include:spf.nethost.cz -all
NS 3
sns.hostime.cztns.hostime.czdns.hostime.cz
SOA 1
dns.hostime.cz hostmaster.hostime.cz
MCP_RECORDS 1
v=spf1 a mx include:spf.nethost.cz -all
DMARC_RECORDS 1
v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; pct=100;
BIMI_RECORDS 1
v=spf1 a mx include:spf.nethost.cz -all
MTA_STS_RECORDS 1
v=spf1 a mx include:spf.nethost.cz -all
TLS Certificates (3)
| Common Name | Issuer | Expires |
|---|---|---|
e-mostecko.cz |
C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=YR1 | Mon, 14 Sep 2026 05:52:03 +0000 |
YR1 |
C=US, O=ISRG, CN=Root YR | Sat, 02 Sep 2028 23:59:59 +0000 |
Root YR |
C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG Root X1 | Thu, 02 Sep 2032 23:59:59 +0000 |
Subdomains (1)
Signed at scan time. Check the math yourself. Every line above is part of one signed observation. Re-hash it and check the Ed25519 signature in your own browser; the only network request the check makes is for the published public keys.
Verify this receiptEd25519 Receipt
- Receipt ID
rcpt_12165ed5c2fb9cc2- Output Hash
c92503d99c293f7eeb2553c5205c1163b199d0cb15c5236be7a6c2e41179613e- Signature
ed25519:c642cb182e5ed2cfec1fce5670df8509486d6c29f1465207740f6e73aee516fd1e310c1dbf1ed95b6094e337271985d1e0e656142ed05e87f9012b14d0b9480d- Public Key
ed25519:4859bb613d650e12dd7478cc307c73a8712fabc115a9dc59f65534ed3c09a8f9- Parent
(genesis)- Plane
- fast