CONTINUOUS INTERNET TELEMETRY24H DRIFT51,574 material changesacross 48,279 domains · 24h to ~3h ago · -10,502 vs yesterdayROTATION52 domains moved DNS from magpiedns.com to koaladns.com, 52 moved backa rotation loop, not a migration · 24hNOW532 curated domains not reachablelast probe, steadySITE ERRORS33,864 sites serving errorslast probe · 5xx / 404 / TLSBOT DEFENSEbot defense observed on 120,840 sites429 rate-limit / 403 bot-block, a posture signal

eduadm.dk

Observed Aug 2, 2026, 12:25 UTC (4d ago). Every field below was attested with an Ed25519 signature at scan time.

This reading of eduadm.dk was taken 4d ago

eduadm.dk is on the survey sweep, which works its way across the whole catalog rather than returning to one name on a schedule. Putting eduadm.dk under watch moves it to the fast lane, where DomainDrift re-checks it about every 5 minutes and signs each reading, so a change becomes a dated event within minutes instead of waiting for the sweep to come round.

Watch eduadm.dk Watching a domain needs a DRM3 account. The reading above stays free and public either way.
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Up right now
Email byMicrosoft 365
Secured byLet's Encrypt
35 subdomains · tranco
Every line above is a signed observation. Check the math at the bottom of the page.
EVIDENCE OF WILDCARD DNSobserved 2026-08-05 20:58 UTC

DomainDrift asked this domain for a TXT record at a name nobody registers, and got an answer back. A domain that answers a name that was never created is answering names in general, and that is wildcard DNS.

Wildcard DNS clusters around domain parking, dynamic DNS and catch-all hosting. It is also a real attack surface: if every invented hostname resolves, then a hostname an attacker invents resolves too, which is the ground state for subdomain takeover and for phishing hosted under a name that looks legitimate.

This is evidence of wildcard behaviour, not a proven fact. It rests on one control name: a domain could legitimately serve a TXT record at exactly that name for an unrelated reason, and a wildcard that answers address records but not TXT records would not be caught here at all. What this reading is and is not.

INFRASTRUCTURE MAPwhat eduadm.dk actually stands on - every host below is a signed observation
eduadm.dk
A / AAAA
185.223.27.49
unattributedserves the site
NS
ns.dandomain.dkns2.dandomain.dk
dandomain.dkanswers its DNS
MX
eduadm-dk.mail.protection.outlook.com
Microsoft 365receives its email
TLS
eduadm.dk
Let's Encryptissued its certificate

DNS Records

A 1

  • 185.223.27.49

MX 1

  • 0eduadm-dk.mail.protection.outlook.com

TXT 5

  • MS=ms82390437
  • h9ph5nb0irbm85om74lafqfq23
  • cU_8pIa1hWXE-7zVoLucjIT06oX4f-hG2TdRqI7A3xs
  • detectify-verification=ec84aa39313b3f43f0b6477d529b770d
  • v=spf1 a ip4:91.215.161.78 ip4:46.36.211.231 ip4:46.36.204.130 include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:sendgrid.net include:mail.zendesk.com ~all

NS 2

  • ns.dandomain.dk
  • ns2.dandomain.dk

SOA 1

  • ns.dandomain.dk hostmaster.dandomain.dk

MCP_RECORDS 5

  • MS=ms82390437
  • h9ph5nb0irbm85om74lafqfq23
  • cU_8pIa1hWXE-7zVoLucjIT06oX4f-hG2TdRqI7A3xs
  • detectify-verification=ec84aa39313b3f43f0b6477d529b770d
  • v=spf1 a ip4:91.215.161.78 ip4:46.36.211.231 ip4:46.36.204.130 include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:sendgrid.net include:mail.zendesk.com ~all

DMARC_RECORDS 5

  • MS=ms82390437
  • h9ph5nb0irbm85om74lafqfq23
  • cU_8pIa1hWXE-7zVoLucjIT06oX4f-hG2TdRqI7A3xs
  • detectify-verification=ec84aa39313b3f43f0b6477d529b770d
  • v=spf1 a ip4:91.215.161.78 ip4:46.36.211.231 ip4:46.36.204.130 include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:sendgrid.net include:mail.zendesk.com ~all

BIMI_RECORDS 5

  • MS=ms82390437
  • h9ph5nb0irbm85om74lafqfq23
  • cU_8pIa1hWXE-7zVoLucjIT06oX4f-hG2TdRqI7A3xs
  • detectify-verification=ec84aa39313b3f43f0b6477d529b770d
  • v=spf1 a ip4:91.215.161.78 ip4:46.36.211.231 ip4:46.36.204.130 include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:sendgrid.net include:mail.zendesk.com ~all

MTA_STS_RECORDS 5

  • MS=ms82390437
  • h9ph5nb0irbm85om74lafqfq23
  • cU_8pIa1hWXE-7zVoLucjIT06oX4f-hG2TdRqI7A3xs
  • detectify-verification=ec84aa39313b3f43f0b6477d529b770d
  • v=spf1 a ip4:91.215.161.78 ip4:46.36.211.231 ip4:46.36.204.130 include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:sendgrid.net include:mail.zendesk.com ~all

TLS Certificates (3)

Common NameIssuerExpires
eduadm.dk C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=YR2 Sat, 24 Oct 2026 09:30:56 +0000
YR2 C=US, O=ISRG, CN=Root YR Sat, 02 Sep 2028 23:59:59 +0000
Root YR C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG Root X1 Thu, 02 Sep 2032 23:59:59 +0000

Subdomains (35)

The proof

Signed at scan time. Check the math yourself. Every line above is part of one signed observation. Re-hash it and check the Ed25519 signature in your own browser; the only network request the check makes is for the published public keys.

Verify this receipt

Ed25519 Receipt

Receipt ID
rcpt_e3c3acfc5416831b
Output Hash
7067ee82a2ad1f7a13bdc19c7202dac9838b22aeb6aedb99f950d25cc358597a
Signature
ed25519:236cfffc431d09f031466dfb3736db2f4af234933c84f4e64933c122b293e87b0a27a434167ae23e1ef377b089cd36b2b54eaeab66e81b3055c6f63fe4c8780f
Public Key
ed25519:4859bb613d650e12dd7478cc307c73a8712fabc115a9dc59f65534ed3c09a8f9
Parent
(genesis)
Plane
fast
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