jh.cz
Observed Aug 10, 2026, 22:42 UTC (5d ago). Every field below was attested with an Ed25519 signature at scan time.
jh.cz is on the survey sweep, which works its way across the whole catalog rather than returning to one name on a schedule. Putting jh.cz under watch moves it to the fast lane, where DomainDrift re-checks it about every 5 minutes and signs each reading, so a change becomes a dated event within minutes instead of waiting for the sweep to come round.
Watch jh.cz Watching a domain needs a DRM3 account. The reading above stays free and public either way.
Microsoft 365
DigiCertDomainDrift asked this domain for a TXT record at a name nobody registers, and got an answer back. A domain that answers a name that was never created is answering names in general, and that is wildcard DNS.
Wildcard DNS clusters around domain parking, dynamic DNS and catch-all hosting. It is also a real attack surface: if every invented hostname resolves, then a hostname an attacker invents resolves too, which is the ground state for subdomain takeover and for phishing hosted under a name that looks legitimate.
This is evidence of wildcard behaviour, not a proven fact. It rests on one control name: a domain could legitimately serve a TXT record at exactly that name for an unrelated reason, and a wildcard that answers address records but not TXT records would not be caught here at all. What this reading is and is not.
DNS Records
A 1
88.86.100.195
MX 1
0jh-cz.mail.protection.outlook.com
TXT 2
v=spf1 ip4:193.165.74.152/30 ip4:193.165.74.176/28 include:spf.protection.outlook.com -allMS=ms42444812
NS 3
ns3.poda.czns2.poda.czns1.poda.cz
SOA 1
ns1.poda.cz hostmaster.poda.cz
CAA 1
issue "digicert.com"
MCP_RECORDS 2
google-site-verification=iY5smOkRtqbtBcjVImivHp9wfkPAoN3FnQDgdF6FvZUv=spf1 include:_spf.as4u.org ~all
DMARC_RECORDS 2
v=spf1 include:_spf.as4u.org ~allgoogle-site-verification=iY5smOkRtqbtBcjVImivHp9wfkPAoN3FnQDgdF6FvZU
BIMI_RECORDS 2
v=spf1 include:_spf.as4u.org ~allgoogle-site-verification=iY5smOkRtqbtBcjVImivHp9wfkPAoN3FnQDgdF6FvZU
MTA_STS_RECORDS 2
v=spf1 include:_spf.as4u.org ~allgoogle-site-verification=iY5smOkRtqbtBcjVImivHp9wfkPAoN3FnQDgdF6FvZU
TLS Certificates (2)
| Common Name | Issuer | Expires |
|---|---|---|
*.jh.cz |
C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, 2.5.4.11=www.digicert.com, CN=RapidSSL TLS RSA CA G1 | Fri, 25 Sep 2026 23:59:59 +0000 |
RapidSSL TLS RSA CA G1 |
C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, 2.5.4.11=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert Global Root G2 | Tue, 02 Nov 2027 12:24:33 +0000 |
Subdomains (0)
None observed.
Signed at scan time. Check the math yourself. Every line above is part of one signed observation. Re-hash it and check the Ed25519 signature in your own browser; the only network request the check makes is for the published public keys.
Verify this receiptEd25519 Receipt
- Receipt ID
rcpt_d70eb57bf6c71ab1- Output Hash
f9b0ee79ec5f13db860f36d16cefae85e4eb31e70d1ab2548c70adfbcc618ba6- Signature
ed25519:9e310d89def3c4219a19ce2c719b252c598efd32a9e8402747bd509db7e831b0d7872b2a1acfd19e8d278532b0a75bc5e9283bbd30dccfef566c76ee0debf300- Public Key
ed25519:4859bb613d650e12dd7478cc307c73a8712fabc115a9dc59f65534ed3c09a8f9- Parent
(genesis)- Plane
- fast