jhk.pl
Observed Aug 10, 2026, 11:48 UTC (6d ago). Every field below was attested with an Ed25519 signature at scan time.
jhk.pl is on the survey sweep, which works its way across the whole catalog rather than returning to one name on a schedule. Putting jhk.pl under watch moves it to the fast lane, where DomainDrift re-checks it about every 5 minutes and signs each reading, so a change becomes a dated event within minutes instead of waiting for the sweep to come round.
Watch jhk.pl Watching a domain needs a DRM3 account. The reading above stays free and public either way.
Google Search ConsoleDomainDrift asked this domain for a TXT record at a name nobody registers, and got an answer back. A domain that answers a name that was never created is answering names in general, and that is wildcard DNS.
Wildcard DNS clusters around domain parking, dynamic DNS and catch-all hosting. It is also a real attack surface: if every invented hostname resolves, then a hostname an attacker invents resolves too, which is the ground state for subdomain takeover and for phishing hosted under a name that looks legitimate.
This is evidence of wildcard behaviour, not a proven fact. It rests on one control name: a domain could legitimately serve a TXT record at exactly that name for an unrelated reason, and a wildcard that answers address records but not TXT records would not be caught here at all. What this reading is and is not.
DNS Records
A 1
79.96.52.23
MX 1
10jhk.pl
TXT 2
google-site-verification=rvUiCWH4B-wiuwmI_GXgQtwRI0CTImMOeJuYx8IupU0v=spf1 mx a ptr ~all
NS 3
dns2.home.pldns.home.pldns3.home.pl
SOA 1
dns.home.pl admin.home.pl
MCP_RECORDS 2
v=spf1 mx a ptr ~allgoogle-site-verification=rvUiCWH4B-wiuwmI_GXgQtwRI0CTImMOeJuYx8IupU0
DMARC_RECORDS 2
v=spf1 mx a ptr ~allgoogle-site-verification=rvUiCWH4B-wiuwmI_GXgQtwRI0CTImMOeJuYx8IupU0
BIMI_RECORDS 2
v=spf1 mx a ptr ~allgoogle-site-verification=rvUiCWH4B-wiuwmI_GXgQtwRI0CTImMOeJuYx8IupU0
MTA_STS_RECORDS 2
v=spf1 mx a ptr ~allgoogle-site-verification=rvUiCWH4B-wiuwmI_GXgQtwRI0CTImMOeJuYx8IupU0
TLS Certificates (4)
| Common Name | Issuer | Expires |
|---|---|---|
jhk.pl |
C=PL, O=home.pl S.A., CN=home pl DV TLS G2 R35 CA | Thu, 01 Oct 2026 00:00:00 +0000 |
home pl DV TLS G2 R35 CA |
C=PL, O=Asseco Data Systems S.A., 2.5.4.11=Certum Certification Authority, CN=Certum Trusted Root CA | Wed, 16 May 2035 07:45:35 +0000 |
Certum Trusted Root CA |
C=PL, O=Unizeto Technologies S.A., 2.5.4.11=Certum Certification Authority, CN=Certum Trusted Network CA | Tue, 19 Sep 2028 10:00:00 +0000 |
Certum Trusted Network CA |
C=PL, O=Unizeto Technologies S.A., 2.5.4.11=Certum Certification Authority, CN=Certum Trusted Network CA | Mon, 31 Dec 2029 12:07:37 +0000 |
Subdomains (1)
Signed at scan time. Check the math yourself. Every line above is part of one signed observation. Re-hash it and check the Ed25519 signature in your own browser; the only network request the check makes is for the published public keys.
Verify this receiptEd25519 Receipt
- Receipt ID
rcpt_746505499a8702da- Output Hash
15e60677a2ebdd29599c5a6e16ab05d3ac026294f516c795ccb59ebbfaba799d- Signature
ed25519:94dbc583220654b7989932234878521c4bc27494b73cd6084d0267984ea8c9eb3aa31f2a286654c03723c4644621eec57cca3ef42893ee249d9daf0bb162fe00- Public Key
ed25519:4859bb613d650e12dd7478cc307c73a8712fabc115a9dc59f65534ed3c09a8f9- Parent
(genesis)- Plane
- fast