jjins.com
Observed Aug 10, 2026, 20:53 UTC (4d ago). Every field below was attested with an Ed25519 signature at scan time.
jjins.com is on the survey sweep, which works its way across the whole catalog rather than returning to one name on a schedule. Putting jjins.com under watch moves it to the fast lane, where DomainDrift re-checks it about every 5 minutes and signs each reading, so a change becomes a dated event within minutes instead of waiting for the sweep to come round.
Watch jjins.com Watching a domain needs a DRM3 account. The reading above stays free and public either way.
Proofpoint
Let's Encrypt
Atlassian
Microsoft 365
CiscoDomainDrift asked this domain for a TXT record at a name nobody registers, and got an answer back. A domain that answers a name that was never created is answering names in general, and that is wildcard DNS.
Wildcard DNS clusters around domain parking, dynamic DNS and catch-all hosting. It is also a real attack surface: if every invented hostname resolves, then a hostname an attacker invents resolves too, which is the ground state for subdomain takeover and for phishing hosted under a name that looks legitimate.
This is evidence of wildcard behaviour, not a proven fact. It rests on one control name: a domain could legitimately serve a TXT record at exactly that name for an unrelated reason, and a wildcard that answers address records but not TXT records would not be caught here at all. What this reading is and is not.
DNS Records
A 1
209.87.159.198
MX 2
10mxb-0097e801.gslb.pphosted.com10mxa-0097e801.gslb.pphosted.com
TXT 11
wombat-verification=3KwxVCQV1HEp-aRXRTKKaZ5G0frhkcisco-ci-domain-verification=417a62e3a3ff8a4584d09c7a793cd76fc628ef76b1c422a5898a5862a758cbd11359643C9BlRY7o2gxueGC44v5c4bC6Brfn3pa/gf8AW/m1YoUc5y=v=spf1 include:sendgrid.net include:spf-0097e801.pphosted.com include:spf.constantcontact.com ~allatlassian-domain-verification=vKRlZ/Jm7WQ9saL0p7eqLBnAaakghWI5MFj7p7jU085tJIuTVBuCCsBrejgjn1RUNDS036IOHRF0ADQ96V9JMREQS8anthropic-domain-verification-adfxgb=yi62x1bzCRbyaAplqUs2hYP2kgoogle-site-verification: google0d9ae595a30bc8a7.htmlMS=ms98680188
NS 2
ns16.worldnic.comns15.worldnic.com
SOA 1
NS15.WORLDNIC.com namehost.WORLDNIC.com
MCP_RECORDS 1
322ECBD7A9E15B963F4EE8B0D60EB2288F0ED16E73968BFA3FE2F10CCF945B3C
DMARC_RECORDS 1
v=DMARC1; p=none; fo=1; rua=mailto:bdf73bcf@mxtoolbox.dmarc-report.com; ruf=mailto:bdf73bcf@forensics.dmarc-report.com;
BIMI_RECORDS 1
322ECBD7A9E15B963F4EE8B0D60EB2288F0ED16E73968BFA3FE2F10CCF945B3C
MTA_STS_RECORDS 1
322ECBD7A9E15B963F4EE8B0D60EB2288F0ED16E73968BFA3FE2F10CCF945B3C
TLS Certificates (3)
| Common Name | Issuer | Expires |
|---|---|---|
5babc2d045.nxcli.net |
C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=YR1 | Fri, 06 Nov 2026 05:05:50 +0000 |
YR1 |
C=US, O=ISRG, CN=Root YR | Sat, 02 Sep 2028 23:59:59 +0000 |
Root YR |
C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG Root X1 | Thu, 02 Sep 2032 23:59:59 +0000 |
Subdomains (2)
Signed at scan time. Check the math yourself. Every line above is part of one signed observation. Re-hash it and check the Ed25519 signature in your own browser; the only network request the check makes is for the published public keys.
Verify this receiptEd25519 Receipt
- Receipt ID
rcpt_2a71fd296ebcf1d8- Output Hash
230d324b736c32838af7aecbb41a64a210eba9c851f14e58ab2296205f5b06db- Signature
ed25519:82508bc2211fa9d977af9460a54caed5833afe7c1427a6cf4bd51d213264492631bb3cc6b403fa0d15ed6aaad6ebb528cda68ec1590cd32dc7ed6183ea2a4102- Public Key
ed25519:4859bb613d650e12dd7478cc307c73a8712fabc115a9dc59f65534ed3c09a8f9- Parent
(genesis)- Plane
- fast