joitin.com
Observed Aug 11, 2026, 12:21 UTC (4d ago). Every field below was attested with an Ed25519 signature at scan time.
joitin.com is on the survey sweep, which works its way across the whole catalog rather than returning to one name on a schedule. Putting joitin.com under watch moves it to the fast lane, where DomainDrift re-checks it about every 5 minutes and signs each reading, so a change becomes a dated event within minutes instead of waiting for the sweep to come round.
Watch joitin.com Watching a domain needs a DRM3 account. The reading above stays free and public either way.
Let's Encrypt
Google Search ConsoleDomainDrift asked this domain for a TXT record at a name nobody registers, and got an answer back. A domain that answers a name that was never created is answering names in general, and that is wildcard DNS.
Wildcard DNS clusters around domain parking, dynamic DNS and catch-all hosting. It is also a real attack surface: if every invented hostname resolves, then a hostname an attacker invents resolves too, which is the ground state for subdomain takeover and for phishing hosted under a name that looks legitimate.
This is evidence of wildcard behaviour, not a proven fact. It rests on one control name: a domain could legitimately serve a TXT record at exactly that name for an unrelated reason, and a wildcard that answers address records but not TXT records would not be caught here at all. What this reading is and is not.
DNS Records
A 1
109.95.156.156
MX 2
10mx-1.dpoczta.pl10mx-2.dpoczta.pl
TXT 2
google-site-verification=ZmFM27VB3j_FojHLTP-e5w7lx5w0fBUcz9GPaBgwLZcv=spf1 include:_mail.dhosting.pl -all
NS 2
ns1.dhosting.plns2.dhosting.pl
SOA 1
ns1.dhosting.pl root.joitin.com
SRV 1
dpoczta.pl:443 p0
MCP_RECORDS 2
google-site-verification=ZmFM27VB3j_FojHLTP-e5w7lx5w0fBUcz9GPaBgwLZcv=spf1 include:_mail.dhosting.pl -all
DMARC_RECORDS 1
v=DMARC1; p=none; sp=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-raports@dhosting.pl
BIMI_RECORDS 2
google-site-verification=ZmFM27VB3j_FojHLTP-e5w7lx5w0fBUcz9GPaBgwLZcv=spf1 include:_mail.dhosting.pl -all
MTA_STS_RECORDS 2
v=spf1 include:_mail.dhosting.pl -allgoogle-site-verification=ZmFM27VB3j_FojHLTP-e5w7lx5w0fBUcz9GPaBgwLZc
TLS Certificates (6)
| Common Name | Issuer | Expires |
|---|---|---|
joitin.com |
C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=YR1 | Tue, 20 Oct 2026 01:31:04 +0000 |
R12 |
C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG Root X1 | Fri, 12 Mar 2027 23:59:59 +0000 |
R13 |
C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG Root X1 | Fri, 12 Mar 2027 23:59:59 +0000 |
YR1 |
C=US, O=ISRG, CN=Root YR | Sat, 02 Sep 2028 23:59:59 +0000 |
YR2 |
C=US, O=ISRG, CN=Root YR | Sat, 02 Sep 2028 23:59:59 +0000 |
Subdomains (1)
Signed at scan time. Check the math yourself. Every line above is part of one signed observation. Re-hash it and check the Ed25519 signature in your own browser; the only network request the check makes is for the published public keys.
Verify this receiptEd25519 Receipt
- Receipt ID
rcpt_fc656f484070819e- Output Hash
4c857c4fc74976218eb22fe0a2fcffd730961cc105483a29db7a6bbb61399e72- Signature
ed25519:dff563ab105f3a839cd529711687df5d78423cf3caff62845b6f201ebf1468d50a6fa226afc8146c1f8dec36d1d2c7b52155395caa47277263745d85227e3d04- Public Key
ed25519:4859bb613d650e12dd7478cc307c73a8712fabc115a9dc59f65534ed3c09a8f9- Parent
(genesis)- Plane
- fast