kapitan.pl
Observed Aug 11, 2026, 05:49 UTC (4d ago). Every field below was attested with an Ed25519 signature at scan time.
kapitan.pl is on the survey sweep, which works its way across the whole catalog rather than returning to one name on a schedule. Putting kapitan.pl under watch moves it to the fast lane, where DomainDrift re-checks it about every 5 minutes and signs each reading, so a change becomes a dated event within minutes instead of waiting for the sweep to come round.
Watch kapitan.pl Watching a domain needs a DRM3 account. The reading above stays free and public either way.
Google (SPF sender)
Google Search Console
KlaviyoDomainDrift asked this domain for a TXT record at a name nobody registers, and got an answer back. A domain that answers a name that was never created is answering names in general, and that is wildcard DNS.
Wildcard DNS clusters around domain parking, dynamic DNS and catch-all hosting. It is also a real attack surface: if every invented hostname resolves, then a hostname an attacker invents resolves too, which is the ground state for subdomain takeover and for phishing hosted under a name that looks legitimate.
This is evidence of wildcard behaviour, not a proven fact. It rests on one control name: a domain could legitimately serve a TXT record at exactly that name for an unrelated reason, and a wildcard that answers address records but not TXT records would not be caught here at all. What this reading is and is not.
DNS Records
A 1
146.59.118.210
MX 1
10mail2.kapitanbomba.pl
TXT 5
dae8129b3c35779988c19f5a72636738bf2e8684eade04cdb9fc7eaead2ececgoogle-site-verification=HzFG1QDjd9j0GJlBlNivkXjHPLDkiJkKOftFTju1NTwklaviyo-site-verification=SFdKjJmojecertpl-site-verification-9clwp4gl62cQMvEmfVV1Mz3OooYWMjuJv=spf1 mx include:_spf.google.com ip4:146.59.118.210 ~all
NS 2
kristin.ns.cloudflare.comthomas.ns.cloudflare.com
SOA 1
kristin.ns.cloudflare.com dns.cloudflare.com
MCP_RECORDS 1
dae8129b3c35779988c19f5a72636738bf2e8684eade04cdb9fc7eaead2ecec
DMARC_RECORDS 1
v=DMARC1; p=none
BIMI_RECORDS 1
dae8129b3c35779988c19f5a72636738bf2e8684eade04cdb9fc7eaead2ecec
MTA_STS_RECORDS 1
dae8129b3c35779988c19f5a72636738bf2e8684eade04cdb9fc7eaead2ecec
TLS Certificates (4)
| Common Name | Issuer | Expires |
|---|---|---|
*.kapitan.pl |
C=PL, O=cyber_Folks S.A., CN=cyber_Folks | Thu, 08 Oct 2026 10:58:44 +0000 |
cyber_Folks |
C=PL, O=Unizeto Technologies S.A., 2.5.4.11=Certum Certification Authority, CN=Certum Global Services CA SHA2 | Thu, 20 May 2027 07:59:19 +0000 |
Certum Trusted Network CA |
C=PL, O=Unizeto Technologies S.A., 2.5.4.11=Certum Certification Authority, CN=Certum Trusted Network CA | Mon, 31 Dec 2029 12:07:37 +0000 |
Certum Global Services CA SHA2 |
C=PL, O=Unizeto Technologies S.A., 2.5.4.11=Certum Certification Authority, CN=Certum Trusted Network CA | Wed, 09 Jun 2027 10:46:39 +0000 |
Subdomains (0)
None observed.
Signed at scan time. Check the math yourself. Every line above is part of one signed observation. Re-hash it and check the Ed25519 signature in your own browser; the only network request the check makes is for the published public keys.
Verify this receiptEd25519 Receipt
- Receipt ID
rcpt_5ef553bf9ce7f653- Output Hash
a89d05c01f432f70beff1f4a038195561cc790456020677c040afa5632dd6c73- Signature
ed25519:ce29b852a51b4f50ee02e18502f2389ae1fac8f2d843f964d8d74bb56d800a4f846e02d2983d607a93dcd8f855d726a535456977d9b8f391b47af0f8be854805- Public Key
ed25519:4859bb613d650e12dd7478cc307c73a8712fabc115a9dc59f65534ed3c09a8f9- Parent
(genesis)- Plane
- fast