CONTINUOUS INTERNET TELEMETRY24H DRIFT24,136 material changesacross 23,195 domains · 24h to ~5h ago · -13,886 vs yesterdayROTATION52 domains moved DNS from kirklanddc.com to koaladns.com, 52 moved backa rotation loop, not a migration · 24hNOW584 curated domains not reachable+53 vs yesterdaySITE ERRORS33,580 sites serving errorslast probe · 5xx / 404 / TLSBOT DEFENSEbot defense observed on 118,562 sites429 rate-limit / 403 bot-block, a posture signal

larson.ru

Observed Jul 26, 2026, 11:58 UTC (12d ago). Every field below was attested with an Ed25519 signature at scan time.

This reading of larson.ru was taken 12d ago

larson.ru is on the survey sweep, which works its way across the whole catalog rather than returning to one name on a schedule. Putting larson.ru under watch moves it to the fast lane, where DomainDrift re-checks it about every 5 minutes and signs each reading, so a change becomes a dated event within minutes instead of waiting for the sweep to come round.

Watch larson.ru Watching a domain needs a DRM3 account. The reading above stays free and public either way.
Up right now
Secured byLet's Encrypt
1 subdomain · domcop
Every line above is a signed observation. Check the math at the bottom of the page.
EVIDENCE OF WILDCARD DNSobserved 2026-08-07 10:46 UTC

DomainDrift asked this domain for a TXT record at a name nobody registers, and got an answer back. A domain that answers a name that was never created is answering names in general, and that is wildcard DNS.

Wildcard DNS clusters around domain parking, dynamic DNS and catch-all hosting. It is also a real attack surface: if every invented hostname resolves, then a hostname an attacker invents resolves too, which is the ground state for subdomain takeover and for phishing hosted under a name that looks legitimate.

This is evidence of wildcard behaviour, not a proven fact. It rests on one control name: a domain could legitimately serve a TXT record at exactly that name for an unrelated reason, and a wildcard that answers address records but not TXT records would not be caught here at all. What this reading is and is not.

INFRASTRUCTURE MAPwhat larson.ru actually stands on - every host below is a signed observation
larson.ru
A / AAAA
91.228.152.114
unattributedserves the site
NS
ns1.timeweb.runs2.timeweb.runs4.timeweb.orgns3.timeweb.org
timeweb.ru + timeweb.organswers its DNS
MX
mx1.timeweb.rumx2.timeweb.ru
timeweb.rureceives its email
TLS
larson.ru
Let's Encryptissued its certificate

DNS Records

A 1

  • 91.228.152.114

MX 2

  • 10mx1.timeweb.ru
  • 20mx2.timeweb.ru

TXT 6

  • v=spf1 include:_spf.timeweb.ru ~all
  • v=DMARC1; p=none; aspf=r; sp=none
  • v=DMARC1; p=none;
  • v=spf1 include:_spf.timeweb.ru ~all
  • v=spf1 include:_spf.timeweb.ru ~all
  • v=spf1 include:_spf.timeweb.ru ~all

NS 4

  • ns1.timeweb.ru
  • ns2.timeweb.ru
  • ns4.timeweb.org
  • ns3.timeweb.org

SOA 1

  • ns1.timeweb.ru dns.timeweb.ru

TLS Certificates (3)

Common NameIssuerExpires
larson.ru C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=YR1 Fri, 23 Oct 2026 03:20:18 +0000
YR1 C=US, O=ISRG, CN=Root YR Sat, 02 Sep 2028 23:59:59 +0000
Root YR C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG Root X1 Thu, 02 Sep 2032 23:59:59 +0000

Subdomains (1)

The proof

Signed at scan time. Check the math yourself. Every line above is part of one signed observation. Re-hash it and check the Ed25519 signature in your own browser; the only network request the check makes is for the published public keys.

Verify this receipt

Ed25519 Receipt

Receipt ID
rcpt_29de0873e3715fe4
Output Hash
1c320c38b080cb51d445b12ad2fbf045623d9ca78be8648da87913417778d4ea
Signature
ed25519:98eaa96e722422a45f12fed9de607bd0e089f35d15f97670632d7c288cc5f24539ca0fc0f8e2af7e21e7bfbf18dc1de4cfdc976f4990375ad67e5cc43632bb0d
Public Key
ed25519:4859bb613d650e12dd7478cc307c73a8712fabc115a9dc59f65534ed3c09a8f9
Parent
(genesis)
Plane
fast
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