CONTINUOUS INTERNET TELEMETRY24H DRIFT23,583 material changesacross 21,757 domains · 24h to ~2h agoROTATION57 domains moved DNS from koaladns.com to kirklanddc.com, 55 moved backa rotation loop, not a migration · 24hEMAIL DRIFT1 domain switched email providertop destination ~NOW605 curated domains not reachablelast probe, steadySITE ERRORS33,518 sites serving errorslast probe · 5xx / 404 / TLSBOT DEFENSEbot defense observed on 118,266 sites429 rate-limit / 403 bot-block, a posture signal

law.blog

Observed Aug 2, 2026, 20:12 UTC (6d ago). Every field below was attested with an Ed25519 signature at scan time.

This reading of law.blog was taken 6d ago

law.blog is on the survey sweep, which works its way across the whole catalog rather than returning to one name on a schedule. Putting law.blog under watch moves it to the fast lane, where DomainDrift re-checks it about every 5 minutes and signs each reading, so a change becomes a dated event within minutes instead of waiting for the sweep to come round.

Watch law.blog Watching a domain needs a DRM3 account. The reading above stays free and public either way.
Up right now
Secured byLet's Encrypt
tranco_100k
Every line above is a signed observation. Check the math at the bottom of the page.
EVIDENCE OF WILDCARD DNSobserved 2026-08-07 20:16 UTC

DomainDrift asked this domain for a TXT record at a name nobody registers, and got an answer back. A domain that answers a name that was never created is answering names in general, and that is wildcard DNS.

Wildcard DNS clusters around domain parking, dynamic DNS and catch-all hosting. It is also a real attack surface: if every invented hostname resolves, then a hostname an attacker invents resolves too, which is the ground state for subdomain takeover and for phishing hosted under a name that looks legitimate.

This is evidence of wildcard behaviour, not a proven fact. It rests on one control name: a domain could legitimately serve a TXT record at exactly that name for an unrelated reason, and a wildcard that answers address records but not TXT records would not be caught here at all. What this reading is and is not.

INFRASTRUCTURE MAPwhat law.blog actually stands on - every host below is a signed observation
law.blog
A / AAAA
192.0.78.30192.0.78.31
unattributedserves the site
NS
ns3.automattic.comns4.automattic.comns2.automattic.comns1.automattic.com
automattic.comanswers its DNS
TLS
law.blog
Let's Encryptissued its certificate

DNS Records

A 2

  • 192.0.78.30
  • 192.0.78.31

TXT 1

  • v=spf1 -all

NS 4

  • ns3.automattic.com
  • ns4.automattic.com
  • ns2.automattic.com
  • ns1.automattic.com

SOA 1

  • ns1.automattic.com hostmaster.automattic.com

MCP_RECORDS 1

  • v=spf1 -all

DMARC_RECORDS 1

  • v=spf1 -all

BIMI_RECORDS 1

  • v=spf1 -all

MTA_STS_RECORDS 1

  • v=spf1 -all

TLS Certificates (4)

Common NameIssuerExpires
law.blog C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=YE2 Wed, 21 Oct 2026 19:47:01 +0000
YE2 C=US, O=ISRG, CN=Root YE Sat, 02 Sep 2028 23:59:59 +0000
Root YE C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG Root X2 Thu, 02 Sep 2032 23:59:59 +0000
ISRG Root X2 C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG Root X1 Thu, 02 Sep 2032 23:59:59 +0000

Subdomains (0)

None observed.

The proof

Signed at scan time. Check the math yourself. Every line above is part of one signed observation. Re-hash it and check the Ed25519 signature in your own browser; the only network request the check makes is for the published public keys.

Verify this receipt

Ed25519 Receipt

Receipt ID
rcpt_cffdaffa45aa2677
Output Hash
677187f487e32c020b7843bdc745852c88c3ff3b80d332368e214365560aae5e
Signature
ed25519:b59e40c3b388d1de2e04ffbae841d5a659f0b50b6a22de3e210d124f9c017d676fb0bdbf72b467ae8977d3f2a7b18fd9b8937f094679f6fa37acb11c4c180100
Public Key
ed25519:4859bb613d650e12dd7478cc307c73a8712fabc115a9dc59f65534ed3c09a8f9
Parent
(genesis)
Plane
fast
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