CONTINUOUS INTERNET TELEMETRY24H DRIFT28,782 material changesacross 26,712 domains · last 24hROTATION56 domains moved DNS from koaladns.com to kirklanddc.com, 53 moved backa rotation loop, not a migration · 24hNOW598 curated domains not reachablelast probe, steadySITE ERRORS33,529 sites serving errorslast probe · 5xx / 404 / TLSBOT DEFENSEbot defense observed on 118,415 sites429 rate-limit / 403 bot-block, a posture signal

learningcurve.gov.uk

Observed Aug 2, 2026, 18:00 UTC (6d ago). Every field below was attested with an Ed25519 signature at scan time.

This reading of learningcurve.gov.uk was taken 6d ago

learningcurve.gov.uk is on the survey sweep, which works its way across the whole catalog rather than returning to one name on a schedule. Putting learningcurve.gov.uk under watch moves it to the fast lane, where DomainDrift re-checks it about every 5 minutes and signs each reading, so a change becomes a dated event within minutes instead of waiting for the sweep to come round.

Watch learningcurve.gov.uk Watching a domain needs a DRM3 account. The reading above stays free and public either way.
Not responding
Signed observation on record.
majestic
Every line above is a signed observation. Check the math at the bottom of the page.
EVIDENCE OF WILDCARD DNSobserved 2026-08-07 18:53 UTC

DomainDrift asked this domain for a TXT record at a name nobody registers, and got an answer back. A domain that answers a name that was never created is answering names in general, and that is wildcard DNS.

Wildcard DNS clusters around domain parking, dynamic DNS and catch-all hosting. It is also a real attack surface: if every invented hostname resolves, then a hostname an attacker invents resolves too, which is the ground state for subdomain takeover and for phishing hosted under a name that looks legitimate.

This is evidence of wildcard behaviour, not a proven fact. It rests on one control name: a domain could legitimately serve a TXT record at exactly that name for an unrelated reason, and a wildcard that answers address records but not TXT records would not be caught here at all. What this reading is and is not.

DNS Records

TXT 2

  • v=spf1 ?all
  • v=DMARC1;p=reject;rua=mailto:govuk-rua@dmarc.service.gov.uk

MCP_RECORDS 2

  • v=spf1 ?all
  • v=DMARC1;p=reject;rua=mailto:govuk-rua@dmarc.service.gov.uk

DMARC_RECORDS 2

  • v=spf1 ?all
  • v=DMARC1;p=reject;rua=mailto:govuk-rua@dmarc.service.gov.uk

BIMI_RECORDS 2

  • v=spf1 ?all
  • v=DMARC1;p=reject;rua=mailto:govuk-rua@dmarc.service.gov.uk

MTA_STS_RECORDS 2

  • v=spf1 ?all
  • v=DMARC1;p=reject;rua=mailto:govuk-rua@dmarc.service.gov.uk

TLS Certificates (0)

None.

Subdomains (0)

None observed.

The proof

Signed at scan time. Check the math yourself. Every line above is part of one signed observation. Re-hash it and check the Ed25519 signature in your own browser; the only network request the check makes is for the published public keys.

Verify this receipt

Ed25519 Receipt

Receipt ID
rcpt_7dd92ed2058d3116
Output Hash
48d021d315032e60d4ff0e9062c10d1ca3db348ce901cde83c08eda6ad555679
Signature
ed25519:639cbc191bd2311b7b352a2d738512203cd9bc3cd07eba0fb1b80b6acbe93b21ef45c0cad3c82413d071cc0624d46984aff0c94967e41a998a0c1f75eb07b308
Public Key
ed25519:4859bb613d650e12dd7478cc307c73a8712fabc115a9dc59f65534ed3c09a8f9
Parent
(genesis)
Plane
fast
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