lingua-attack.com
Observed Aug 2, 2026, 10:24 UTC (6d ago). Every field below was attested with an Ed25519 signature at scan time.
lingua-attack.com is on the survey sweep, which works its way across the whole catalog rather than returning to one name on a schedule. Putting lingua-attack.com under watch moves it to the fast lane, where DomainDrift re-checks it about every 5 minutes and signs each reading, so a change becomes a dated event within minutes instead of waiting for the sweep to come round.
Watch lingua-attack.com Watching a domain needs a DRM3 account. The reading above stays free and public either way.DomainDrift asked this domain for a TXT record at a name nobody registers, and got an answer back. A domain that answers a name that was never created is answering names in general, and that is wildcard DNS.
Wildcard DNS clusters around domain parking, dynamic DNS and catch-all hosting. It is also a real attack surface: if every invented hostname resolves, then a hostname an attacker invents resolves too, which is the ground state for subdomain takeover and for phishing hosted under a name that looks legitimate.
This is evidence of wildcard behaviour, not a proven fact. It rests on one control name: a domain could legitimately serve a TXT record at exactly that name for an unrelated reason, and a wildcard that answers address records but not TXT records would not be caught here at all. What this reading is and is not.
DNS Records
A 2
52.16.196.188108.132.253.129
MX 5
1aspmx.l.google.com10alt3.aspmx.l.google.com10alt4.aspmx.l.google.com5alt1.aspmx.l.google.com5alt2.aspmx.l.google.com
TXT 2
google-site-verification=3gpf6xnzQI7AGeLeLye7DWdnXrrfz-kCrsxUsndowSkv=spf1 include:mailgun.org include:amazonses.com include:_spf.google.com include:mail.zendesk.com ~all
NS 2
brianna.ns.cloudflare.comburt.ns.cloudflare.com
SOA 1
brianna.ns.cloudflare.com dns.cloudflare.com
MCP_RECORDS 1
v=spf1 include:mailgun.org include:amazonses.com include:_spf.google.com include:mail.zendesk.com ~all
DMARC_RECORDS 1
v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:security@lingua-attack.com
BIMI_RECORDS 1
v=spf1 include:mailgun.org include:amazonses.com include:_spf.google.com include:mail.zendesk.com ~all
MTA_STS_RECORDS 1
v=spf1 include:mailgun.org include:amazonses.com include:_spf.google.com include:mail.zendesk.com ~all
TLS Certificates (3)
| Common Name | Issuer | Expires |
|---|---|---|
english-attack.com |
C=US, O=Amazon, CN=Amazon RSA 2048 M01 | Sun, 03 Jan 2027 23:59:59 +0000 |
Amazon RSA 2048 M01 |
C=US, O=Amazon, CN=Amazon Root CA 1 | Fri, 23 Aug 2030 22:21:28 +0000 |
Amazon Root CA 1 |
C=US, ST=Arizona, L=Scottsdale, O=Starfield Technologies, Inc., CN=Starfield Services Root Certificate Authority - G2 | Thu, 31 Dec 2037 01:00:00 +0000 |
Subdomains (0)
None observed.
Signed at scan time. Check the math yourself. Every line above is part of one signed observation. Re-hash it and check the Ed25519 signature in your own browser; the only network request the check makes is for the published public keys.
Verify this receiptEd25519 Receipt
- Receipt ID
rcpt_3895d9d11c5f83da- Output Hash
b9be9c480f42c083959fdae7c3ca1a8bb83fb8b26750cc9c9d1da126b11078eb- Signature
ed25519:bb6bd830ab523bc04f790bcb69f71fcbd754877fb83a4914583d2dbdc67df08855d194eaa4a13c2d8be83878d91446eb62d9a6588e9c92b57b5eb93d8aeb620b- Public Key
ed25519:4859bb613d650e12dd7478cc307c73a8712fabc115a9dc59f65534ed3c09a8f9- Parent
(genesis)- Plane
- fast