CONTINUOUS INTERNET TELEMETRY24H DRIFT31,235 material changesacross 30,192 domains · 24h to ~12h ago · -6,787 vs yesterdayROTATION59 domains moved DNS from kirklanddc.com to koaladns.com, 57 moved backa rotation loop, not a migration · 24hREGISTRAR DRIFT1 changed registrar24hNOW556 curated domains not reachable+25 vs yesterdaySITE ERRORS33,775 sites serving errorslast probe · 5xx / 404 / TLSBOT DEFENSEbot defense observed on 117,602 sites429 rate-limit / 403 bot-block, a posture signal

linkgenie.net

Observed Aug 2, 2026, 15:26 UTC (4d ago). Every field below was attested with an Ed25519 signature at scan time.

This reading of linkgenie.net was taken 4d ago

linkgenie.net is on the survey sweep, which works its way across the whole catalog rather than returning to one name on a schedule. Putting linkgenie.net under watch moves it to the fast lane, where DomainDrift re-checks it about every 5 minutes and signs each reading, so a change becomes a dated event within minutes instead of waiting for the sweep to come round.

Watch linkgenie.net Watching a domain needs a DRM3 account. The reading above stays free and public either way.
Up right now
Email byGoogle Workspace
Secured byLet's Encrypt
Also usesFacebook/MetaGoogle Search Console
1 subdomain · tranco
Every line above is a signed observation. Check the math at the bottom of the page.
EVIDENCE OF WILDCARD DNSobserved 2026-08-06 20:00 UTC

DomainDrift asked this domain for a TXT record at a name nobody registers, and got an answer back. A domain that answers a name that was never created is answering names in general, and that is wildcard DNS.

Wildcard DNS clusters around domain parking, dynamic DNS and catch-all hosting. It is also a real attack surface: if every invented hostname resolves, then a hostname an attacker invents resolves too, which is the ground state for subdomain takeover and for phishing hosted under a name that looks legitimate.

This is evidence of wildcard behaviour, not a proven fact. It rests on one control name: a domain could legitimately serve a TXT record at exactly that name for an unrelated reason, and a wildcard that answers address records but not TXT records would not be caught here at all. What this reading is and is not.

INFRASTRUCTURE MAPwhat linkgenie.net actually stands on - every host below is a signed observation
linkgenie.net
A / AAAA
165.227.199.230
unattributedserves the site
NS
ns2.digitalocean.comns1.digitalocean.comns3.digitalocean.com
digitalocean.comanswers its DNS
MX
alt3.aspmx.l.google.comalt4.aspmx.l.google.comaspmx.l.google.comalt1.aspmx.l.google.com+1 more
Google Workspacereceives its email
TLS
linkgenie.net
Let's Encryptissued its certificate

DNS Records

A 1

  • 165.227.199.230

MX 5

  • 10alt3.aspmx.l.google.com
  • 10alt4.aspmx.l.google.com
  • 1aspmx.l.google.com
  • 5alt1.aspmx.l.google.com
  • 5alt2.aspmx.l.google.com

TXT 3

  • facebook-domain-verification=0eeusbqjuxbjzgvzdmmi8zs811ulvv
  • google-site-verification=zaifCZCcMoUh4WPPO6YRHkHmudj57E11qCieYm2vVD0
  • v=spf1 +include:_spf.mailersend.net +include:sendgrid.net +include:_spf.google.com ~all

NS 3

  • ns2.digitalocean.com
  • ns1.digitalocean.com
  • ns3.digitalocean.com

SOA 1

  • ns1.digitalocean.com hostmaster.linkgenie.net

MCP_RECORDS 3

  • facebook-domain-verification=0eeusbqjuxbjzgvzdmmi8zs811ulvv
  • google-site-verification=zaifCZCcMoUh4WPPO6YRHkHmudj57E11qCieYm2vVD0
  • v=spf1 +include:_spf.mailersend.net +include:sendgrid.net +include:_spf.google.com ~all

DMARC_RECORDS 1

  • v=DMARC1; p=none;

BIMI_RECORDS 3

  • facebook-domain-verification=0eeusbqjuxbjzgvzdmmi8zs811ulvv
  • google-site-verification=zaifCZCcMoUh4WPPO6YRHkHmudj57E11qCieYm2vVD0
  • v=spf1 +include:_spf.mailersend.net +include:sendgrid.net +include:_spf.google.com ~all

MTA_STS_RECORDS 3

  • facebook-domain-verification=0eeusbqjuxbjzgvzdmmi8zs811ulvv
  • google-site-verification=zaifCZCcMoUh4WPPO6YRHkHmudj57E11qCieYm2vVD0
  • v=spf1 +include:_spf.mailersend.net +include:sendgrid.net +include:_spf.google.com ~all

TLS Certificates (3)

Common NameIssuerExpires
linkgenie.net C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=YR2 Wed, 23 Sep 2026 09:15:21 +0000
YR2 C=US, O=ISRG, CN=Root YR Sat, 02 Sep 2028 23:59:59 +0000
Root YR C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG Root X1 Thu, 02 Sep 2032 23:59:59 +0000

Subdomains (1)

The proof

Signed at scan time. Check the math yourself. Every line above is part of one signed observation. Re-hash it and check the Ed25519 signature in your own browser; the only network request the check makes is for the published public keys.

Verify this receipt

Ed25519 Receipt

Receipt ID
rcpt_306ce7559c9dcc6e
Output Hash
df83f83b571a45f2520cd0877719de97df1ab2b65e812cac44f6c85a79805cfe
Signature
ed25519:c8f75e5a40ddf29cf4d857f47e93359d2090e9700887fbdf9c20ab8e3daf09390ae7f71235a031c1f73289e79d43badfe98ad796e7e30710f412676e344fc903
Public Key
ed25519:4859bb613d650e12dd7478cc307c73a8712fabc115a9dc59f65534ed3c09a8f9
Parent
(genesis)
Plane
fast
Verify this in your browser