linux-live.org
Observed Aug 2, 2026, 20:27 UTC (5d ago). Every field below was attested with an Ed25519 signature at scan time.
linux-live.org is on the survey sweep, which works its way across the whole catalog rather than returning to one name on a schedule. Putting linux-live.org under watch moves it to the fast lane, where DomainDrift re-checks it about every 5 minutes and signs each reading, so a change becomes a dated event within minutes instead of waiting for the sweep to come round.
Watch linux-live.org Watching a domain needs a DRM3 account. The reading above stays free and public either way.DomainDrift asked this domain for a TXT record at a name nobody registers, and got an answer back. A domain that answers a name that was never created is answering names in general, and that is wildcard DNS.
Wildcard DNS clusters around domain parking, dynamic DNS and catch-all hosting. It is also a real attack surface: if every invented hostname resolves, then a hostname an attacker invents resolves too, which is the ground state for subdomain takeover and for phishing hosted under a name that looks legitimate.
This is evidence of wildcard behaviour, not a proven fact. It rests on one control name: a domain could legitimately serve a TXT record at exactly that name for an unrelated reason, and a wildcard that answers address records but not TXT records would not be caught here at all. What this reading is and is not.
DNS Records
A 1
37.205.8.43
MX 2
20mx1a20.thinline.cz10mx1a10.thinline.cz
TXT 1
v=spf1 a include:spf.cesky-hosting.cz ~all
NS 5
ns3.gransy.comns.gransy.comns5.gransy.comns2.gransy.comns4.gransy.com
SOA 1
ns.gransy.com root.gransy.com
MCP_RECORDS 1
v=spf1 a include:spf.cesky-hosting.cz ~all
DMARC_RECORDS 1
v=spf1 a include:spf.cesky-hosting.cz ~all
BIMI_RECORDS 1
v=spf1 a include:spf.cesky-hosting.cz ~all
MTA_STS_RECORDS 1
v=spf1 a include:spf.cesky-hosting.cz ~all
TLS Certificates (3)
| Common Name | Issuer | Expires |
|---|---|---|
linux-live.org |
C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=YR1 | Tue, 27 Oct 2026 18:14:24 +0000 |
YR1 |
C=US, O=ISRG, CN=Root YR | Sat, 02 Sep 2028 23:59:59 +0000 |
Root YR |
C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG Root X1 | Thu, 02 Sep 2032 23:59:59 +0000 |
Subdomains (1)
Signed at scan time. Check the math yourself. Every line above is part of one signed observation. Re-hash it and check the Ed25519 signature in your own browser; the only network request the check makes is for the published public keys.
Verify this receiptEd25519 Receipt
- Receipt ID
rcpt_240a99b87f465aa9- Output Hash
7afc36940bd0e4b90c586b515f9daae00fbfbc2a32133444530dc5097079b7e2- Signature
ed25519:242a43572670ee47ca25435a6a776a5fd629a3581e72de9da8af207ed3ca507653eeaef0830d0028bab4120f44d99dc8804bcaae97b666b3794a6d80753c2405- Public Key
ed25519:4859bb613d650e12dd7478cc307c73a8712fabc115a9dc59f65534ed3c09a8f9- Parent
(genesis)- Plane
- fast