marc-bolan.org
Observed Aug 11, 2026, 00:26 UTC (5d ago). Every field below was attested with an Ed25519 signature at scan time.
marc-bolan.org is on the survey sweep, which works its way across the whole catalog rather than returning to one name on a schedule. Putting marc-bolan.org under watch moves it to the fast lane, where DomainDrift re-checks it about every 5 minutes and signs each reading, so a change becomes a dated event within minutes instead of waiting for the sweep to come round.
Watch marc-bolan.org Watching a domain needs a DRM3 account. The reading above stays free and public either way.DomainDrift asked this domain for a TXT record at a name nobody registers, and got an answer back. A domain that answers a name that was never created is answering names in general, and that is wildcard DNS.
Wildcard DNS clusters around domain parking, dynamic DNS and catch-all hosting. It is also a real attack surface: if every invented hostname resolves, then a hostname an attacker invents resolves too, which is the ground state for subdomain takeover and for phishing hosted under a name that looks legitimate.
This is evidence of wildcard behaviour, not a proven fact. It rests on one control name: a domain could legitimately serve a TXT record at exactly that name for an unrelated reason, and a wildcard that answers address records but not TXT records would not be caught here at all. What this reading is and is not.
DNS Records
A 1
213.155.0.230
MX 1
0mx.marc-bolan.org.cust.a.hostedemail.com
TXT 1
v=spf1 include:_spf.hostedemail.com ~all
NS 2
dns2.uk2.netdns1.uk2.net
SOA 1
ultra101.uk2.net hostmaster\@marc-bolan.org
MCP_RECORDS 1
v=spf1 include:_spf.hostedemail.com ~all
DMARC_RECORDS 1
v=spf1 include:_spf.hostedemail.com ~all
BIMI_RECORDS 1
v=spf1 include:_spf.hostedemail.com ~all
MTA_STS_RECORDS 1
v=spf1 include:_spf.hostedemail.com ~all
TLS Certificates (3)
| Common Name | Issuer | Expires |
|---|---|---|
marc-bolan.org |
C=AT, O=ZeroSSL GmbH, CN=ZeroSSL ECC DV SSL CA 2 | Wed, 16 Sep 2026 23:59:59 +0000 |
ZeroSSL ECC DV SSL CA 2 |
C=GB, O=Sectigo Limited, CN=Sectigo Public Server Authentication Root E46 | Sun, 23 Sep 2035 23:59:59 +0000 |
Sectigo Public Server Authentication Root E46 |
C=US, ST=New Jersey, L=Jersey City, O=The USERTRUST Network, CN=USERTrust ECC Certification Authority | Mon, 18 Jan 2038 23:59:59 +0000 |
Subdomains (0)
None observed.
Signed at scan time. Check the math yourself. Every line above is part of one signed observation. Re-hash it and check the Ed25519 signature in your own browser; the only network request the check makes is for the published public keys.
Verify this receiptEd25519 Receipt
- Receipt ID
rcpt_f735c401e4cce8c6- Output Hash
07eff49664ec01d5caa02fbe21ca666258569a778514bafaf61ebbdfd708889a- Signature
ed25519:38c85beca551f471c72927725fc4396b99ca7d9539bc63d87c6e0eb2a759b5fbfc535247d0cfa57a553d90f347efeac2990a8f60039bc7878024f4fe02e53803- Public Key
ed25519:4859bb613d650e12dd7478cc307c73a8712fabc115a9dc59f65534ed3c09a8f9- Parent
(genesis)- Plane
- fast