may-tree.co.kr
Observed Aug 11, 2026, 00:42 UTC (5d ago). Every field below was attested with an Ed25519 signature at scan time.
may-tree.co.kr is on the survey sweep, which works its way across the whole catalog rather than returning to one name on a schedule. Putting may-tree.co.kr under watch moves it to the fast lane, where DomainDrift re-checks it about every 5 minutes and signs each reading, so a change becomes a dated event within minutes instead of waiting for the sweep to come round.
Watch may-tree.co.kr Watching a domain needs a DRM3 account. The reading above stays free and public either way.
SectigoDomainDrift asked this domain for a TXT record at a name nobody registers, and got an answer back. A domain that answers a name that was never created is answering names in general, and that is wildcard DNS.
Wildcard DNS clusters around domain parking, dynamic DNS and catch-all hosting. It is also a real attack surface: if every invented hostname resolves, then a hostname an attacker invents resolves too, which is the ground state for subdomain takeover and for phishing hosted under a name that looks legitimate.
This is evidence of wildcard behaviour, not a proven fact. It rests on one control name: a domain could legitimately serve a TXT record at exactly that name for an unrelated reason, and a wildcard that answers address records but not TXT records would not be caught here at all. What this reading is and is not.
DNS Records
A 1
183.111.174.80
MX 2
10kr1-aspmx1.worksmobile.com20kr1-aspmx2.worksmobile.com
TXT 1
v=spf1 ip4:222.122.198.132 ~all
NS 4
ns2.may-tree.co.krns3.may-tree.co.krns.may-tree.co.krns1.may-tree.co.kr
SOA 1
may-tree.co.kr postmaster.may-tree.co.kr
MCP_RECORDS 1
v=spf1 ip4:222.122.198.132 ~all
DMARC_RECORDS 1
v=spf1 ip4:222.122.198.132 ~all
BIMI_RECORDS 1
v=spf1 ip4:222.122.198.132 ~all
MTA_STS_RECORDS 1
v=spf1 ip4:222.122.198.132 ~all
TLS Certificates (4)
| Common Name | Issuer | Expires |
|---|---|---|
may-tree.co.kr |
C=GB, ST=Greater Manchester, L=Salford, O=Sectigo Limited, CN=Sectigo RSA Domain Validation Secure Server CA | Sun, 27 Dec 2026 23:59:59 +0000 |
Sectigo RSA Domain Validation Secure Server CA |
C=US, ST=New Jersey, L=Jersey City, O=The USERTRUST Network, CN=USERTrust RSA Certification Authority | Tue, 31 Dec 2030 23:59:59 +0000 |
USERTrust RSA Certification Authority |
C=GB, ST=Greater Manchester, L=Salford, O=Comodo CA Limited, CN=AAA Certificate Services | Sun, 31 Dec 2028 23:59:59 +0000 |
AAA Certificate Services |
C=GB, ST=Greater Manchester, L=Salford, O=Comodo CA Limited, CN=AAA Certificate Services | Sun, 31 Dec 2028 23:59:59 +0000 |
Subdomains (1)
Signed at scan time. Check the math yourself. Every line above is part of one signed observation. Re-hash it and check the Ed25519 signature in your own browser; the only network request the check makes is for the published public keys.
Verify this receiptEd25519 Receipt
- Receipt ID
rcpt_850f5e9e97118eff- Output Hash
c8709dbcbca6d2de18ec8af8dc630d2f25401908896753d9e5de467115b9c61f- Signature
ed25519:bcc8e6cd47de00b590a671c200d3ba8a16ae0256c61600680f7b0c2d5797dca2e55d48195590de280e6867f5c4dd429de679e9f3d486e547d70e1dee861f160d- Public Key
ed25519:4859bb613d650e12dd7478cc307c73a8712fabc115a9dc59f65534ed3c09a8f9- Parent
(genesis)- Plane
- fast