medwatch.dk
Observed Aug 11, 2026, 05:09 UTC (5d ago). Every field below was attested with an Ed25519 signature at scan time.
medwatch.dk is on the survey sweep, which works its way across the whole catalog rather than returning to one name on a schedule. Putting medwatch.dk under watch moves it to the fast lane, where DomainDrift re-checks it about every 5 minutes and signs each reading, so a change becomes a dated event within minutes instead of waiting for the sweep to come round.
Watch medwatch.dk Watching a domain needs a DRM3 account. The reading above stays free and public either way.
Amazon
Microsoft 365
Facebook/Meta
Google Search ConsoleDomainDrift asked this domain for a TXT record at a name nobody registers, and got an answer back. A domain that answers a name that was never created is answering names in general, and that is wildcard DNS.
Wildcard DNS clusters around domain parking, dynamic DNS and catch-all hosting. It is also a real attack surface: if every invented hostname resolves, then a hostname an attacker invents resolves too, which is the ground state for subdomain takeover and for phishing hosted under a name that looks legitimate.
This is evidence of wildcard behaviour, not a proven fact. It rests on one control name: a domain could legitimately serve a TXT record at exactly that name for an unrelated reason, and a wildcard that answers address records but not TXT records would not be caught here at all. What this reading is and is not.
DNS Records
A 4
3.167.37.173.167.37.813.167.37.1013.167.37.26
MX 3
10mx1-dk.centerasecurity.dk10mx2-dk.centerasecurity.dk20mx3-dk.centerasecurity.dk
TXT 6
MS=ms87187590facebook-domain-verification=hlc5wyr5ma2hgm3a9t5ilhzwy3a73jgoogle-site-verification=oskclpqIVHHZGTO8rVeQGyfB9FtpOe-cpSyZQU0MyMsolrh9jCmugV8NYOQ4YC45vFg0zfAHG4+MSPEDhhmK6mkO6VV5AUNuG3OZBV8JJyAfnVnEdepA8bcfyiGh7poSQ==v=spf1 include:_medwatch_dk.spf-protect.com -allxzpZ4G/6ruTLWItHS8qPo0e+WjEpLPANh7Jd+I9nx0AAwRlGoma+d3nMXa5xhq1EfuSncUlbtbmE6Ooru6f26g==
NS 4
ns-1243.awsdns-27.orgns-1551.awsdns-01.co.ukns-372.awsdns-46.comns-999.awsdns-60.net
SOA 1
ns-999.awsdns-60.net awsdns-hostmaster.amazon.com
MCP_RECORDS 1
v=spf1 redirect=medwatch.dk
DMARC_RECORDS 1
v=DMARC1; p=none; sp=none; adkim=r; aspf=r; rua=mailto:68bed34f6da5b@dmarc-dk.centerasecurity.com;
BIMI_RECORDS 1
v=spf1 redirect=medwatch.dk
MTA_STS_RECORDS 1
v=spf1 redirect=medwatch.dk
TLS Certificates (3)
| Common Name | Issuer | Expires |
|---|---|---|
advokatwatch.dk |
C=US, O=Amazon, CN=Amazon RSA 2048 M04 | Thu, 04 Feb 2027 23:59:59 +0000 |
Amazon RSA 2048 M04 |
C=US, O=Amazon, CN=Amazon Root CA 1 | Fri, 23 Aug 2030 22:26:35 +0000 |
Amazon Root CA 1 |
C=US, ST=Arizona, L=Scottsdale, O=Starfield Technologies, Inc., CN=Starfield Services Root Certificate Authority - G2 | Thu, 31 Dec 2037 01:00:00 +0000 |
Subdomains (0)
None observed.
Signed at scan time. Check the math yourself. Every line above is part of one signed observation. Re-hash it and check the Ed25519 signature in your own browser; the only network request the check makes is for the published public keys.
Verify this receiptEd25519 Receipt
- Receipt ID
rcpt_d5f99f9fd013388e- Output Hash
495cc142ec7b45ce5913c847f0e20e9276a9c8b1b305ee7e2e41ec26340bd404- Signature
ed25519:72e2fddc0bcc78d7418727398a206b7fbbf614f5ec14e02b7f0e103b8a7511e501d8161efbf6d70714307be40f1d8ccd99d1ebe4bf87a1da41f12e50db143007- Public Key
ed25519:4859bb613d650e12dd7478cc307c73a8712fabc115a9dc59f65534ed3c09a8f9- Parent
(genesis)- Plane
- fast