megasad.net
Observed Aug 11, 2026, 04:47 UTC (5d ago). Every field below was attested with an Ed25519 signature at scan time.
megasad.net is on the survey sweep, which works its way across the whole catalog rather than returning to one name on a schedule. Putting megasad.net under watch moves it to the fast lane, where DomainDrift re-checks it about every 5 minutes and signs each reading, so a change becomes a dated event within minutes instead of waiting for the sweep to come round.
Watch megasad.net Watching a domain needs a DRM3 account. The reading above stays free and public either way.
SectigoDomainDrift asked this domain for a TXT record at a name nobody registers, and got an answer back. A domain that answers a name that was never created is answering names in general, and that is wildcard DNS.
Wildcard DNS clusters around domain parking, dynamic DNS and catch-all hosting. It is also a real attack surface: if every invented hostname resolves, then a hostname an attacker invents resolves too, which is the ground state for subdomain takeover and for phishing hosted under a name that looks legitimate.
This is evidence of wildcard behaviour, not a proven fact. It rests on one control name: a domain could legitimately serve a TXT record at exactly that name for an unrelated reason, and a wildcard that answers address records but not TXT records would not be caught here at all. What this reading is and is not.
DNS Records
A 1
89.184.75.164
MX 1
10mx1.mirohost.net
TXT 2
v=spf1 include:mxsspf.sendpulse.com +a +mx include:spf2.esputnik.com ~allesputnik-verification=RVNQX0RWS19WMQAAPWUAAAF7Xr0oFiskHmYM1fur
NS 12
nsd1.srv53.orgnsc1.srv53.comnsb3.srv53.orgnsa2.srv53.netnsa1.srv53.comnsc1.srv53.orgnsb2.srv53.netnsd2.srv53.comnsb2.srv53.comnsc2.srv53.net
SOA 1
nsa2.srv53.net support.dnshosting.org
MCP_RECORDS 1
esputnik-verification=RVNQX0RWS19WMQAAPWUAAAF7Xr0oFiskHmYM1fur
DMARC_RECORDS 1
v=DMARC1; p=quarantine;
BIMI_RECORDS 1
esputnik-verification=RVNQX0RWS19WMQAAPWUAAAF7Xr0oFiskHmYM1fur
MTA_STS_RECORDS 1
esputnik-verification=RVNQX0RWS19WMQAAPWUAAAF7Xr0oFiskHmYM1fur
TLS Certificates (4)
| Common Name | Issuer | Expires |
|---|---|---|
megasad.net |
C=GB, O=Sectigo Limited, CN=Sectigo Public Server Authentication CA DV R36 | Sat, 12 Sep 2026 23:59:59 +0000 |
Sectigo Public Server Authentication CA DV R36 |
C=GB, O=Sectigo Limited, CN=Sectigo Public Server Authentication Root R46 | Fri, 21 Mar 2036 23:59:59 +0000 |
Sectigo Public Server Authentication Root R46 |
C=US, ST=New Jersey, L=Jersey City, O=The USERTRUST Network, CN=USERTrust RSA Certification Authority | Mon, 18 Jan 2038 23:59:59 +0000 |
USERTrust RSA Certification Authority |
C=US, ST=New Jersey, L=Jersey City, O=The USERTRUST Network, CN=USERTrust RSA Certification Authority | Mon, 18 Jan 2038 23:59:59 +0000 |
Subdomains (1)
Signed at scan time. Check the math yourself. Every line above is part of one signed observation. Re-hash it and check the Ed25519 signature in your own browser; the only network request the check makes is for the published public keys.
Verify this receiptEd25519 Receipt
- Receipt ID
rcpt_906f5f49159f8cd8- Output Hash
b9bb57318651f0ea5768b1ac678d5afe3f7234907766e28be37cb37a60b6b1e0- Signature
ed25519:020dcf63b9aa189bd3d590cd799fab04db5617a8f0387aa24267798fd2f8d0975587184aec758a7d5486539bc48e5af174905a6a825650611adaa59a24cbc00e- Public Key
ed25519:4859bb613d650e12dd7478cc307c73a8712fabc115a9dc59f65534ed3c09a8f9- Parent
(genesis)- Plane
- fast