mera-sp.pl
Observed Aug 11, 2026, 04:58 UTC (5d ago). Every field below was attested with an Ed25519 signature at scan time.
mera-sp.pl is on the survey sweep, which works its way across the whole catalog rather than returning to one name on a schedule. Putting mera-sp.pl under watch moves it to the fast lane, where DomainDrift re-checks it about every 5 minutes and signs each reading, so a change becomes a dated event within minutes instead of waiting for the sweep to come round.
Watch mera-sp.pl Watching a domain needs a DRM3 account. The reading above stays free and public either way.
Google Search ConsoleDomainDrift asked this domain for a TXT record at a name nobody registers, and got an answer back. A domain that answers a name that was never created is answering names in general, and that is wildcard DNS.
Wildcard DNS clusters around domain parking, dynamic DNS and catch-all hosting. It is also a real attack surface: if every invented hostname resolves, then a hostname an attacker invents resolves too, which is the ground state for subdomain takeover and for phishing hosted under a name that looks legitimate.
This is evidence of wildcard behaviour, not a proven fact. It rests on one control name: a domain could legitimately serve a TXT record at exactly that name for an unrelated reason, and a wildcard that answers address records but not TXT records would not be caught here at all. What this reading is and is not.
DNS Records
A 1
46.242.227.250
MX 1
10mera-sp.pl
TXT 2
google-site-verification=IolZQjHfIvVoXthwxib9jnGqM-WkVsLpMWubCJDPImcv=spf1 a mx ~all
NS 3
dns.home.pldns2.home.pldns3.home.pl
SOA 1
dns.home.pl admin.home.pl
MCP_RECORDS 2
google-site-verification=IolZQjHfIvVoXthwxib9jnGqM-WkVsLpMWubCJDPImcv=spf1 a mx ~all
DMARC_RECORDS 1
v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; ; rua=mailto:dmarc@mera-sp.pl; ruf=mailto:dmarc@mera-sp.pl; rf=afrf
BIMI_RECORDS 2
google-site-verification=IolZQjHfIvVoXthwxib9jnGqM-WkVsLpMWubCJDPImcv=spf1 a mx ~all
MTA_STS_RECORDS 2
v=spf1 a mx ~allgoogle-site-verification=IolZQjHfIvVoXthwxib9jnGqM-WkVsLpMWubCJDPImc
TLS Certificates (4)
| Common Name | Issuer | Expires |
|---|---|---|
mera-sp.pl |
C=PL, O=home.pl S.A., CN=home pl DV TLS G2 R35 CA | Mon, 18 Jan 2027 06:43:55 +0000 |
home pl DV TLS G2 R35 CA |
C=PL, O=Asseco Data Systems S.A., 2.5.4.11=Certum Certification Authority, CN=Certum Trusted Root CA | Wed, 16 May 2035 07:45:35 +0000 |
Certum Trusted Root CA |
C=PL, O=Unizeto Technologies S.A., 2.5.4.11=Certum Certification Authority, CN=Certum Trusted Network CA | Tue, 19 Sep 2028 10:00:00 +0000 |
Certum Trusted Network CA |
C=PL, O=Unizeto Technologies S.A., 2.5.4.11=Certum Certification Authority, CN=Certum Trusted Network CA | Mon, 31 Dec 2029 12:07:37 +0000 |
Subdomains (1)
Signed at scan time. Check the math yourself. Every line above is part of one signed observation. Re-hash it and check the Ed25519 signature in your own browser; the only network request the check makes is for the published public keys.
Verify this receiptEd25519 Receipt
- Receipt ID
rcpt_7a29bb160c4102a5- Output Hash
8c1ee1664a626b5894f797e65459e7066507c7d38979dc094d6c55f08eec43ab- Signature
ed25519:356999a66f58be7413922552812883e52d34ec196be90cc3638ef8dadfaa05613863ac8983e5930c73fa3f09a04b5d91940075d182ae948ffce3e05ad5286e0d- Public Key
ed25519:4859bb613d650e12dd7478cc307c73a8712fabc115a9dc59f65534ed3c09a8f9- Parent
(genesis)- Plane
- fast