rdc.nl
Observed Aug 16, 2026, 14:30 UTC (7h ago). Every field below was attested with an Ed25519 signature at scan time. Catalog observation, re-checked on rotation - watch it for 5-minute checks.
DomainDrift asked this domain for a TXT record at a name nobody registers, and got an answer back. A domain that answers a name that was never created is answering names in general, and that is wildcard DNS.
Wildcard DNS clusters around domain parking, dynamic DNS and catch-all hosting. It is also a real attack surface: if every invented hostname resolves, then a hostname an attacker invents resolves too, which is the ground state for subdomain takeover and for phishing hosted under a name that looks legitimate.
This is evidence of wildcard behaviour, not a proven fact. It rests on one control name: a domain could legitimately serve a TXT record at exactly that name for an unrelated reason, and a wildcard that answers address records but not TXT records would not be caught here at all. What this reading is and is not.
DNS Records
A 2
199.60.103.28199.60.103.128
MX 1
0rdc-nl.mail.protection.outlook.com
TXT 11
google-site-verification=g6AyiLGDLRh6WRTcn9GeFIn0wGkzxwj0atuJvQSuUhEfigma-domain-verification=ed22f032835ae8acf96b46ac7727ad5f722faa155f2f46f93bf98429a9b1102f-1728552085MS=ms17812651MS=ms95007501axway-amplify=66d2bf8e-79c7-4a98-8185-729bd1224e11atlassian-domain-verification=X6RwAsp8NYIEBNFbp3vmZBUwMCGY2vu9yX8UeAkyAfsrGVYwJXfaGvP7QanaoDQ1apple-domain-verification=YFYa4YWXXPPU2oHxv=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:148214027.spf06.hubspotemail.net include:144738774.spf03.hubspotemail.net include:sendgrid.net include:spf.trustit.eu include:_spf.salesforce.com -allaxway-amplify=e1077959-e178-4beb-86ee-ca6ab5247505miro-verification=0260caa5bdf5ddb926091f335e0c370cb118e0f0
NS 3
ns150.premiumdns-yourhosting.netns71.premiumdns-yourhosting.nlns80.premiumdns-yourhosting.eu
SOA 1
ns71.premiumdns-yourhosting.nl hostmaster.dns.yourhosting.nl
CAA 5
issuewild "sectigo.com"issue "sectigo.com"issue "pki.goog"iodef "mailto:security@bovemij.nl"issue "letsencrypt.org"
MCP_RECORDS 1
v=spf1 -all
DMARC_RECORDS 1
v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; rua=mailto:p76el4l4@rua.eu.dmarcmanager.app; ruf=mailto:p76el4l4@ruf.eu.dmarcmanager.app; fo=1; adkim=s; aspf=r
BIMI_RECORDS 1
v=spf1 -all
MTA_STS_RECORDS 1
v=spf1 -all
TLS Certificates (4)
| Common Name | Issuer | Expires |
|---|---|---|
9e2c3045.sni.cloudflaressl.com |
C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=YE2 | Tue, 06 Oct 2026 05:17:47 +0000 |
YE2 |
C=US, O=ISRG, CN=Root YE | Sat, 02 Sep 2028 23:59:59 +0000 |
Root YE |
C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG Root X2 | Thu, 02 Sep 2032 23:59:59 +0000 |
ISRG Root X2 |
C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG Root X1 | Thu, 02 Sep 2032 23:59:59 +0000 |
Subdomains (0)
None observed.
Signed at scan time. Check the math yourself. Every line above is part of one signed observation. Re-hash it and check the Ed25519 signature in your own browser; the only network request the check makes is for the published public keys.
Verify this receiptEd25519 Receipt
- Receipt ID
rcpt_87f19afeb24486e3- Output Hash
e00b1414edfbc358566889dc9895a3f7c8ae6fb61c276aa12a00442d374d9e23- Signature
ed25519:c1a219f838f0fe39a95e3b5a3fcfa66d43df3d6559178235c65e69357f8b160ddcc4fbf4b959870a16b512fa0ddde818be89b15de3b79e38118fe0ac9fd73401- Public Key
ed25519:4859bb613d650e12dd7478cc307c73a8712fabc115a9dc59f65534ed3c09a8f9- Parent
(genesis)- Plane
- fast