resamania.fr
Observed Jul 26, 2026, 11:19 UTC (10d ago). Every field below was attested with an Ed25519 signature at scan time.
resamania.fr is on the survey sweep, which works its way across the whole catalog rather than returning to one name on a schedule. Putting resamania.fr under watch moves it to the fast lane, where DomainDrift re-checks it about every 5 minutes and signs each reading, so a change becomes a dated event within minutes instead of waiting for the sweep to come round.
Watch resamania.fr Watching a domain needs a DRM3 account. The reading above stays free and public either way.DomainDrift asked this domain for a TXT record at a name nobody registers, and got an answer back. A domain that answers a name that was never created is answering names in general, and that is wildcard DNS.
Wildcard DNS clusters around domain parking, dynamic DNS and catch-all hosting. It is also a real attack surface: if every invented hostname resolves, then a hostname an attacker invents resolves too, which is the ground state for subdomain takeover and for phishing hosted under a name that looks legitimate.
This is evidence of wildcard behaviour, not a proven fact. It rests on one control name: a domain could legitimately serve a TXT record at exactly that name for an unrelated reason, and a wildcard that answers address records but not TXT records would not be caught here at all. What this reading is and is not.
DNS Records
A 1
23.185.0.1
AAAA 2
2620:12a:8000::12620:12a:8001::1
MX 1
10resamania-fr.mail.protection.outlook.com
TXT 11
atlassian-domain-verification=1AEq8Ic6rEsIVzdnm/TgKWhbGYfCG7xrsoJ8H3whq2G1cuFMUdxP6j/eKXxmBxwHatlassian-domain-verification=7hCS5Hy7GaMCjLXVUqx49jhPcEkekjjqTUlnmnRlbptBwt5Q4LccaU/ins20qGtJatlassian-domain-verification=Zp7cWJXDIaBokCbkkSp1InfDOKyXSrmhY88EgmlE6vlBC5t35M1TG/BJKdAdjySwv=spf1 include:mx.ovh.com a mx ip4:51.38.45.176 ip4:5.39.75.97 ip4:91.121.35.135 ip4:167.114.238.233 ip4:92.154.54.123 include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:mail.zendesk.com include:app.resamania.fr include:sendgrid.net include:_spf.google.com ~allgoogle-site-verification=PFStboRh5_H0zKpoxI7j7M2rMrHWbdgsds2MCCiSldsMS=ms76706614google-site-verification=Rb5p4v7zcRk9DD48N4Xeh-nwWdXIv5kQOmh4PWBrh2Ev=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:sysadmin@stadline.comv=spf1 ip4:37.187.69.16 ip4:135.125.104.210 ip4:57.128.99.154 ip4:37.59.21.27 ip4:91.121.38.121 ip4:87.98.141.47 ip4:87.98.141.49 ip4:152.228.211.214 ip4:54.36.55.113 ip4:51.68.166.222 include:44112902.spf04.hubspotemail.net ~allv=spf1 ip4:37.187.69.16 ip4:135.125.104.210 ip4:57.128.99.154 ip4:37.59.21.27 ip4:91.121.38.121 ip4:87.98.141.47 ip4:87.98.141.49 ip4:152.228.211.214 ip4:54.36.55.113 ip4:51.68.166.222 include:44112902.spf04.hubspotemail.net ~all
NS 2
dns10.ovh.netns10.ovh.net
SOA 1
dns10.ovh.net tech.ovh.net
TLS Certificates (3)
| Common Name | Issuer | Expires |
|---|---|---|
deciplus.fr |
C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=YR1 | Tue, 15 Sep 2026 07:36:08 +0000 |
YR1 |
C=US, O=ISRG, CN=Root YR | Sat, 02 Sep 2028 23:59:59 +0000 |
Root YR |
C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG Root X1 | Thu, 02 Sep 2032 23:59:59 +0000 |
Subdomains (1)
Signed at scan time. Check the math yourself. Every line above is part of one signed observation. Re-hash it and check the Ed25519 signature in your own browser; the only network request the check makes is for the published public keys.
Verify this receiptEd25519 Receipt
- Receipt ID
rcpt_db9f157c9247552a- Output Hash
21e706d63270e7aca9cd9042c2d0589ac5b5ed95d0efd0b687d76fc6fe5b0c76- Signature
ed25519:d5d79d38eda5f4dd1da195e310b8be18f6e373bf306945c523443b52b416f21f5ca664725409aa016e401498449213aec9973cb327a3aee654346117c1a43609- Public Key
ed25519:4859bb613d650e12dd7478cc307c73a8712fabc115a9dc59f65534ed3c09a8f9- Parent
(genesis)- Plane
- fast