CONTINUOUS INTERNET TELEMETRY24H DRIFT66,120 material changesacross 63,653 domains · 24h to ~3h ago · +31,503 vs yesterdayROTATION56 domains moved DNS from magpiedns.com to koaladns.com, 56 moved backa rotation loop, not a migration · 24hNOW538 curated domains not reachablelast probe, steadySITE ERRORS33,857 sites serving errorslast probe · 5xx / 404 / TLSBOT DEFENSEbot defense observed on 123,111 sites429 rate-limit / 403 bot-block, a posture signal

ros.co.nz

Observed Aug 2, 2026, 15:06 UTC (3d ago). Every field below was attested with an Ed25519 signature at scan time.

This reading of ros.co.nz was taken 3d ago

ros.co.nz is on the survey sweep, which works its way across the whole catalog rather than returning to one name on a schedule. Putting ros.co.nz under watch moves it to the fast lane, where DomainDrift re-checks it about every 5 minutes and signs each reading, so a change becomes a dated event within minutes instead of waiting for the sweep to come round.

Watch ros.co.nz Watching a domain needs a DRM3 account. The reading above stays free and public either way.
Up right now
Secured byGoDaddy.com
majestic
Every line above is a signed observation. Check the math at the bottom of the page.
EVIDENCE OF WILDCARD DNSobserved 2026-08-05 03:25 UTC

DomainDrift asked this domain for a TXT record at a name nobody registers, and got an answer back. A domain that answers a name that was never created is answering names in general, and that is wildcard DNS.

Wildcard DNS clusters around domain parking, dynamic DNS and catch-all hosting. It is also a real attack surface: if every invented hostname resolves, then a hostname an attacker invents resolves too, which is the ground state for subdomain takeover and for phishing hosted under a name that looks legitimate.

This is evidence of wildcard behaviour, not a proven fact. It rests on one control name: a domain could legitimately serve a TXT record at exactly that name for an unrelated reason, and a wildcard that answers address records but not TXT records would not be caught here at all. What this reading is and is not.

INFRASTRUCTURE MAPwhat ros.co.nz actually stands on - every host below is a signed observation
ros.co.nz
A / AAAA
76.223.54.14613.248.169.48
unattributedserves the site
NS
ns1.afternic.comns2.afternic.com
afternic.comanswers its DNS
TLS
ros.co.nz
GoDaddy.comissued its certificate

DNS Records

A 2

  • 76.223.54.146
  • 13.248.169.48

MX 1

  • 0

TXT 1

  • v=spf1 -all

NS 2

  • ns1.afternic.com
  • ns2.afternic.com

SOA 1

  • ns2.afternic.com dns.jomax.net

MCP_RECORDS 1

  • v=spf1 -all

DMARC_RECORDS 1

  • v=spf1 -all

BIMI_RECORDS 1

  • v=spf1 -all

MTA_STS_RECORDS 1

  • v=spf1 -all

TLS Certificates (4)

Common NameIssuerExpires
ros.co.nz C=US, O=GoDaddy.com, CN=GoDaddy TLS Intermediate CA DV - R1v1 Sat, 24 Oct 2026 21:13:53 +0000
GoDaddy TLS Intermediate CA DV - R1v1 C=US, O=GoDaddy.com, CN=GoDaddy TLS Root CA - R1 Fri, 24 Aug 2040 11:59:59 +0000
GoDaddy TLS Root CA - R1 C=US, ST=Arizona, L=Scottsdale, O=GoDaddy.com, Inc., CN=Go Daddy Root Certificate Authority - G2 Thu, 31 Dec 2037 23:59:59 +0000
Go Daddy Root Certificate Authority - G2 C=US, ST=Arizona, L=Scottsdale, O=GoDaddy.com, Inc., CN=Go Daddy Root Certificate Authority - G2 Thu, 31 Dec 2037 23:59:59 +0000

Subdomains (0)

None observed.

The proof

Signed at scan time. Check the math yourself. Every line above is part of one signed observation. Re-hash it and check the Ed25519 signature in your own browser; the only network request the check makes is for the published public keys.

Verify this receipt

Ed25519 Receipt

Receipt ID
rcpt_504b4f095166215c
Output Hash
8e9fad90b6fd61c46115ae21c2ae57e9620094e47bc1a27a8cbea95f427b9605
Signature
ed25519:f5f21cb1ac666f72ad9754395e05ab2c6b8a61966cf3b627426e3916a91bf2d60b115498675df6a88221aea22004bd0c612ff2f514071c8ba92b130562a2ed0b
Public Key
ed25519:4859bb613d650e12dd7478cc307c73a8712fabc115a9dc59f65534ed3c09a8f9
Parent
(genesis)
Plane
fast
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