rte.eu
Observed Aug 11, 2026, 00:50 UTC (4d ago). Every field below was attested with an Ed25519 signature at scan time.
rte.eu is on the survey sweep, which works its way across the whole catalog rather than returning to one name on a schedule. Putting rte.eu under watch moves it to the fast lane, where DomainDrift re-checks it about every 5 minutes and signs each reading, so a change becomes a dated event within minutes instead of waiting for the sweep to come round.
Watch rte.eu Watching a domain needs a DRM3 account. The reading above stays free and public either way.
Cloudflare
Google Trust ServicesDomainDrift asked this domain for a TXT record at a name nobody registers, and got an answer back. A domain that answers a name that was never created is answering names in general, and that is wildcard DNS.
Wildcard DNS clusters around domain parking, dynamic DNS and catch-all hosting. It is also a real attack surface: if every invented hostname resolves, then a hostname an attacker invents resolves too, which is the ground state for subdomain takeover and for phishing hosted under a name that looks legitimate.
This is evidence of wildcard behaviour, not a proven fact. It rests on one control name: a domain could legitimately serve a TXT record at exactly that name for an unrelated reason, and a wildcard that answers address records but not TXT records would not be caught here at all. What this reading is and is not.
DNS Records
A 2
104.16.182.89104.17.156.88
MX 1
0
TXT 1
v=spf1 -all
NS 3
blue.foundationdns.comblue.foundationdns.netblue.foundationdns.org
SOA 1
blue.foundationdns.com hostmaster.rte.ie
CAA 11
iodef "mailto:ssladmin@rte.ie"issue "comodoca.com"issue "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"issue "letsencrypt.org"issue "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"issue "ssl.com"issuewild "comodoca.com"issuewild "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"issuewild "letsencrypt.org"issuewild "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
MCP_RECORDS 2
v=DKIM1; p=v=spf1 -all
DMARC_RECORDS 1
v=DMARC1; p=reject
BIMI_RECORDS 2
v=DKIM1; p=v=spf1 -all
MTA_STS_RECORDS 2
v=DKIM1; p=v=spf1 -all
TLS Certificates (3)
| Common Name | Issuer | Expires |
|---|---|---|
rte.eu |
C=US, O=Google Trust Services, CN=WE1 | Wed, 07 Oct 2026 03:06:46 +0000 |
WE1 |
C=US, O=Google Trust Services LLC, CN=GTS Root R4 | Tue, 20 Feb 2029 14:00:00 +0000 |
GTS Root R4 |
C=BE, O=GlobalSign nv-sa, 2.5.4.11=Root CA, CN=GlobalSign Root CA | Fri, 28 Jan 2028 00:00:42 +0000 |
Subdomains (0)
None observed.
Signed at scan time. Check the math yourself. Every line above is part of one signed observation. Re-hash it and check the Ed25519 signature in your own browser; the only network request the check makes is for the published public keys.
Verify this receiptEd25519 Receipt
- Receipt ID
rcpt_9a4aa339bba0efb0- Output Hash
daccfdddc51df346e129155251559d9284aaed5b6c435d16a03ceb311b174d3d- Signature
ed25519:89b88a719cf699787e9ab05ea990d777c8998fcb09cd86b8b01035f8632b3d75b0decf5b587f5783c683d5c53d63ffb0081da7694bede6564c617a869a354902- Public Key
ed25519:4859bb613d650e12dd7478cc307c73a8712fabc115a9dc59f65534ed3c09a8f9- Parent
(genesis)- Plane
- fast