sa-apps.ru
Observed Aug 10, 2026, 20:09 UTC (4d ago). Every field below was attested with an Ed25519 signature at scan time.
sa-apps.ru is on the survey sweep, which works its way across the whole catalog rather than returning to one name on a schedule. Putting sa-apps.ru under watch moves it to the fast lane, where DomainDrift re-checks it about every 5 minutes and signs each reading, so a change becomes a dated event within minutes instead of waiting for the sweep to come round.
Watch sa-apps.ru Watching a domain needs a DRM3 account. The reading above stays free and public either way.
Let's EncryptDomainDrift asked this domain for a TXT record at a name nobody registers, and got an answer back. A domain that answers a name that was never created is answering names in general, and that is wildcard DNS.
Wildcard DNS clusters around domain parking, dynamic DNS and catch-all hosting. It is also a real attack surface: if every invented hostname resolves, then a hostname an attacker invents resolves too, which is the ground state for subdomain takeover and for phishing hosted under a name that looks legitimate.
This is evidence of wildcard behaviour, not a proven fact. It rests on one control name: a domain could legitimately serve a TXT record at exactly that name for an unrelated reason, and a wildcard that answers address records but not TXT records would not be caught here at all. What this reading is and is not.
DNS Records
A 1
45.10.52.47
MX 1
10mail.secret-agents.ru
TXT 1
v=spf1 a mx include:spf.postal.secret-agents.ru ~all
NS 2
ns1.reg.runs2.reg.ru
SOA 1
ns1.reg.ru hostmaster.ns1.reg.ru
MCP_RECORDS 1
v=spf1 a mx include:spf.postal.secret-agents.ru ~all
DMARC_RECORDS 1
v=spf1 a mx include:spf.postal.secret-agents.ru ~all
BIMI_RECORDS 1
v=spf1 a mx include:spf.postal.secret-agents.ru ~all
MTA_STS_RECORDS 1
v=spf1 a mx include:spf.postal.secret-agents.ru ~all
TLS Certificates (4)
| Common Name | Issuer | Expires |
|---|---|---|
sa-apps.ru |
C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=YE2 | Fri, 23 Oct 2026 08:14:47 +0000 |
YE2 |
C=US, O=ISRG, CN=Root YE | Sat, 02 Sep 2028 23:59:59 +0000 |
Root YE |
C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG Root X2 | Thu, 02 Sep 2032 23:59:59 +0000 |
ISRG Root X2 |
C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG Root X1 | Thu, 02 Sep 2032 23:59:59 +0000 |
Subdomains (0)
None observed.
Signed at scan time. Check the math yourself. Every line above is part of one signed observation. Re-hash it and check the Ed25519 signature in your own browser; the only network request the check makes is for the published public keys.
Verify this receiptEd25519 Receipt
- Receipt ID
rcpt_a5049b90f768da61- Output Hash
450e311c903213b23b897d39547d91c91e09a493b8c04d479cdb712efc0615e5- Signature
ed25519:34e44816d349cf33bedf9ade725835e0d34f998ae095c7fce108dd212b00f40b9a82e2473dcb1fec61f4f58e66b35af761252d2aee5f24969ed2ac523cb33509- Public Key
ed25519:4859bb613d650e12dd7478cc307c73a8712fabc115a9dc59f65534ed3c09a8f9- Parent
(genesis)- Plane
- fast