saint-brevin.com
Observed Aug 12, 2026, 05:18 UTC (4d ago). Every field below was attested with an Ed25519 signature at scan time.
saint-brevin.com is on the survey sweep, which works its way across the whole catalog rather than returning to one name on a schedule. Putting saint-brevin.com under watch moves it to the fast lane, where DomainDrift re-checks it about every 5 minutes and signs each reading, so a change becomes a dated event within minutes instead of waiting for the sweep to come round.
Watch saint-brevin.com Watching a domain needs a DRM3 account. The reading above stays free and public either way.
Let's EncryptDomainDrift asked this domain for a TXT record at a name nobody registers, and got an answer back. A domain that answers a name that was never created is answering names in general, and that is wildcard DNS.
Wildcard DNS clusters around domain parking, dynamic DNS and catch-all hosting. It is also a real attack surface: if every invented hostname resolves, then a hostname an attacker invents resolves too, which is the ground state for subdomain takeover and for phishing hosted under a name that looks legitimate.
This is evidence of wildcard behaviour, not a proven fact. It rests on one control name: a domain could legitimately serve a TXT record at exactly that name for an unrelated reason, and a wildcard that answers address records but not TXT records would not be caught here at all. What this reading is and is not.
DNS Records
A 1
141.95.144.45
MX 1
10mx1.ingenie.fr
TXT 1
v=spf1 mx include:spf.ingenie.fr ~all
NS 2
ns2.ingenie.frns1.ingenie.fr
SOA 1
ns1.ingenie.fr postmaster.ingenie.fr
SRV 1
smtp.ingenie.fr:587 p10
MCP_RECORDS 1
v=spf1 mx include:spf.ingenie.fr ~all
DMARC_RECORDS 1
v=spf1 mx include:spf.ingenie.fr ~all
BIMI_RECORDS 1
v=spf1 mx include:spf.ingenie.fr ~all
MTA_STS_RECORDS 1
v=spf1 mx include:spf.ingenie.fr ~all
TLS Certificates (3)
| Common Name | Issuer | Expires |
|---|---|---|
saint-brevin.com |
C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=YR1 | Wed, 30 Sep 2026 05:07:46 +0000 |
YR1 |
C=US, O=ISRG, CN=Root YR | Sat, 02 Sep 2028 23:59:59 +0000 |
Root YR |
C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG Root X1 | Thu, 02 Sep 2032 23:59:59 +0000 |
Subdomains (0)
None observed.
Signed at scan time. Check the math yourself. Every line above is part of one signed observation. Re-hash it and check the Ed25519 signature in your own browser; the only network request the check makes is for the published public keys.
Verify this receiptEd25519 Receipt
- Receipt ID
rcpt_7d7c5f8b4ea31494- Output Hash
60c8e46a267e7b98ccc7990491e2aeb13ff3d1f40bd25f0f4fff47a2b6cac906- Signature
ed25519:a88284613764e56d57f6b12fedad1ddc12e1dca9599819001b3b84665d4562873d7fed9de57b6d4c1124f36f0468c2edc2892258da566bffab5b2a8b7095fd05- Public Key
ed25519:4859bb613d650e12dd7478cc307c73a8712fabc115a9dc59f65534ed3c09a8f9- Parent
(genesis)- Plane
- fast