salskea.fi
Observed Aug 11, 2026, 06:51 UTC (5d ago). Every field below was attested with an Ed25519 signature at scan time.
salskea.fi is on the survey sweep, which works its way across the whole catalog rather than returning to one name on a schedule. Putting salskea.fi under watch moves it to the fast lane, where DomainDrift re-checks it about every 5 minutes and signs each reading, so a change becomes a dated event within minutes instead of waiting for the sweep to come round.
Watch salskea.fi Watching a domain needs a DRM3 account. The reading above stays free and public either way.
Google (SPF sender)
Let's EncryptDomainDrift asked this domain for a TXT record at a name nobody registers, and got an answer back. A domain that answers a name that was never created is answering names in general, and that is wildcard DNS.
Wildcard DNS clusters around domain parking, dynamic DNS and catch-all hosting. It is also a real attack surface: if every invented hostname resolves, then a hostname an attacker invents resolves too, which is the ground state for subdomain takeover and for phishing hosted under a name that looks legitimate.
This is evidence of wildcard behaviour, not a proven fact. It rests on one control name: a domain could legitimately serve a TXT record at exactly that name for an unrelated reason, and a wildcard that answers address records but not TXT records would not be caught here at all. What this reading is and is not.
DNS Records
A 1
94.237.14.4
AAAA 1
2a04:3545:1000:720:cc6e:e8ff:fe52:6953
MX 4
10mx1.smtp.goog20mx2.smtp.goog30mx3.smtp.goog40mx4.smtp.goog
TXT 1
v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com include:_spf.salskea.fi -all
NS 8
ns1.salskea.fins2.salskea.fins3.salskea.fins4.salskea.fins5.salskea.fins6.salskea.fins7.salskea.fins8.salskea.fi
SOA 1
ns1.salskea.fi hostmaster.salskea.fi
MCP_RECORDS 1
v=spf1 -all
DMARC_RECORDS 1
v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; adkim=r; aspf=r; pct=100; fo=1; rua=mailto:re+kafkj5efgtv@dmarc.postmarkapp.com
BIMI_RECORDS 1
v=BIMI1; l=https://cdn.salskea.fi/logot/salskea-bimi-logo.svg
MTA_STS_RECORDS 1
v=spf1 -all
TLS Certificates (3)
| Common Name | Issuer | Expires |
|---|---|---|
salskea.fi |
C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=YR1 | Fri, 16 Oct 2026 09:43:21 +0000 |
YR1 |
C=US, O=ISRG, CN=Root YR | Sat, 02 Sep 2028 23:59:59 +0000 |
Root YR |
C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG Root X1 | Thu, 02 Sep 2032 23:59:59 +0000 |
Subdomains (1)
Signed at scan time. Check the math yourself. Every line above is part of one signed observation. Re-hash it and check the Ed25519 signature in your own browser; the only network request the check makes is for the published public keys.
Verify this receiptEd25519 Receipt
- Receipt ID
rcpt_11ba6abe15e49837- Output Hash
014c072087ac847d42fa2709a09fae7114b35e7ba025a30b12018656ab5d44df- Signature
ed25519:f039d35a0760c014d590e77c8dd3ef1999a975fee273c92675f778c8b052ffa2da541543e9f07ac06f0bb4e564f3fb763239e4684f845ca60fe3a9ca6be12402- Public Key
ed25519:4859bb613d650e12dd7478cc307c73a8712fabc115a9dc59f65534ed3c09a8f9- Parent
(genesis)- Plane
- fast