sanad.gov.jo
Observed Aug 16, 2026, 09:00 UTC (1d ago). Every field below was attested with an Ed25519 signature at scan time.
sanad.gov.jo is on the survey sweep, which works its way across the whole catalog rather than returning to one name on a schedule. Putting sanad.gov.jo under watch moves it to the fast lane, where DomainDrift re-checks it about every 5 minutes and signs each reading, so a change becomes a dated event within minutes instead of waiting for the sweep to come round.
Watch sanad.gov.jo Watching a domain needs a DRM3 account. The reading above stays free and public either way.Steady. No change on record for sanad.gov.jo in the last day; this reading matches the one before it. The steady record is signed like every other reading. Watch it to catch the next move the moment it lands.
DNS Records
A 1
15.197.128.52
TXT 6
_qkj4lismlenlnc9ywcqf6pq2wn69qyp_wgevseplyp8ubnz11w8ucrj3lcz2mv7h9qfkwbfnk1c2z1fkzjskdk66qy68nmxmjbn8j9fm45thydc8b3pvtz6rq7nrrkmtq3zg948qz6c1212wc63qgn34t2k4ckcx5gtj5fl1f0dj8v1r8lh5m1lt6tmflbl
NS 4
ns-1520.awsdns-62.orgns-1856.awsdns-40.co.ukns-791.awsdns-34.netns-98.awsdns-12.com
SOA 1
ns-1520.awsdns-62.org awsdns-hostmaster.amazon.com
CAA 5
iodef "mailto:systems@modee.gov.jo"issue "amazonaws.com"issue "digicert.com"issuewild "amazonaws.com"issuewild "digicert.com"
MCP_RECORDS 1
_wgevseplyp8ubnz11w8ucrj3lcz2mv7
DMARC_RECORDS 1
_wgevseplyp8ubnz11w8ucrj3lcz2mv7
BIMI_RECORDS 1
_wgevseplyp8ubnz11w8ucrj3lcz2mv7
MTA_STS_RECORDS 1
_wgevseplyp8ubnz11w8ucrj3lcz2mv7
TLS Certificates (3)
| Common Name | Issuer | Expires |
|---|---|---|
sanad.gov.jo |
C=US, O=Amazon, CN=Amazon RSA 2048 M01 | Thu, 15 Oct 2026 23:59:59 +0000 |
Amazon RSA 2048 M01 |
C=US, O=Amazon, CN=Amazon Root CA 1 | Fri, 23 Aug 2030 22:21:28 +0000 |
Amazon Root CA 1 |
C=US, ST=Arizona, L=Scottsdale, O=Starfield Technologies, Inc., CN=Starfield Services Root Certificate Authority - G2 | Thu, 31 Dec 2037 01:00:00 +0000 |
Subdomains (0)
None observed.
DomainDrift asked this domain for one hostname that nobody ever registered, and it answered. A domain that answers invented hostnames is running wildcard DNS. It is common and usually deliberate. A SaaS platform gives every customer a subdomain this way. How the check works
Signed at scan time. Check the math yourself. Every line above is part of one signed observation. Re-hash it and check the Ed25519 signature in your own browser; the only network request the check makes is for the published public keys.
Verify this receiptEd25519 Receipt
- Receipt ID
rcpt_95a9d3e30b4b1ab9- Output Hash
eba6fd744e4664e4eaf0505eb7e0a6270a3d2fa062d4f08faf64a0b08c0127f0- Signature
ed25519:bb6e684f3fd559dff392fb149a824658995d1dc26d59a57c0febffd2d80c932419a49d91462d1768bfd876b0bddcd1a5a090d36bfec247712616ac63c080c103- Public Key
ed25519:4859bb613d650e12dd7478cc307c73a8712fabc115a9dc59f65534ed3c09a8f9- Parent
(genesis)- Plane
- fast