sardegna.net
Observed Aug 10, 2026, 23:58 UTC (6d ago). Every field below was attested with an Ed25519 signature at scan time.
sardegna.net is on the survey sweep, which works its way across the whole catalog rather than returning to one name on a schedule. Putting sardegna.net under watch moves it to the fast lane, where DomainDrift re-checks it about every 5 minutes and signs each reading, so a change becomes a dated event within minutes instead of waiting for the sweep to come round.
Watch sardegna.net Watching a domain needs a DRM3 account. The reading above stays free and public either way.Steady. No change on record for sardegna.net in the last day; this reading matches the one before it. That steadiness is itself a signed result, not a gap in one. Watch it to catch the next move the moment it lands.
DNS Records
A 2
76.223.54.14613.248.169.48
MX 1
0
TXT 1
v=spf1 -all
NS 2
ns1.afternic.comns2.afternic.com
SOA 1
ns2.afternic.com dns.jomax.net
MCP_RECORDS 1
v=spf1 -all
DMARC_RECORDS 1
v=spf1 -all
BIMI_RECORDS 1
v=spf1 -all
MTA_STS_RECORDS 1
v=spf1 -all
TLS Certificates (4)
| Common Name | Issuer | Expires |
|---|---|---|
sardegna.net |
C=US, O=GoDaddy.com, CN=GoDaddy TLS Intermediate CA DV - R1v1 | Sun, 15 Nov 2026 11:20:33 +0000 |
GoDaddy TLS Intermediate CA DV - R1v1 |
C=US, O=GoDaddy.com, CN=GoDaddy TLS Root CA - R1 | Fri, 24 Aug 2040 11:59:59 +0000 |
GoDaddy TLS Root CA - R1 |
C=US, ST=Arizona, L=Scottsdale, O=GoDaddy.com, Inc., CN=Go Daddy Root Certificate Authority - G2 | Thu, 31 Dec 2037 23:59:59 +0000 |
Go Daddy Root Certificate Authority - G2 |
C=US, ST=Arizona, L=Scottsdale, O=GoDaddy.com, Inc., CN=Go Daddy Root Certificate Authority - G2 | Thu, 31 Dec 2037 23:59:59 +0000 |
Subdomains (0)
None observed.
DomainDrift asked this domain for a made-up hostname that nobody ever registered, and it answered. A domain that answers a name that was never created answers made-up names in general, which is wildcard DNS. It is common and often deliberate - SaaS platforms give every customer a subdomain this way.
This is evidence of wildcard behaviour, not a proven fact. It rests on one control name: a domain could legitimately serve a TXT record at exactly that name for an unrelated reason, and a wildcard that answers address records but not TXT records would not be caught here at all. Why it can matter, and what this reading is not.
Signed at scan time. Check the math yourself. Every line above is part of one signed observation. Re-hash it and check the Ed25519 signature in your own browser; the only network request the check makes is for the published public keys.
Verify this receiptEd25519 Receipt
- Receipt ID
rcpt_2ca7bc8ed150093b- Output Hash
ceec6cd4eb6953ca430ea786d0ec47cc646714c14fd6063605755b12db689b85- Signature
ed25519:e426cfbf63eb7632eb8c6bc2af18d05debb2945892c9032d23290c342c2219e2e7c667ec24d7c5f6e8eb93f7f06213e739348ab75f29bcf81864efb1f3101009- Public Key
ed25519:4859bb613d650e12dd7478cc307c73a8712fabc115a9dc59f65534ed3c09a8f9- Parent
(genesis)- Plane
- fast