satel.pl
Observed Aug 11, 2026, 01:59 UTC (3d ago). Every field below was attested with an Ed25519 signature at scan time.
satel.pl is on the survey sweep, which works its way across the whole catalog rather than returning to one name on a schedule. Putting satel.pl under watch moves it to the fast lane, where DomainDrift re-checks it about every 5 minutes and signs each reading, so a change becomes a dated event within minutes instead of waiting for the sweep to come round.
Watch satel.pl Watching a domain needs a DRM3 account. The reading above stays free and public either way.
Microsoft 365
Google Search ConsoleDomainDrift asked this domain for a TXT record at a name nobody registers, and got an answer back. A domain that answers a name that was never created is answering names in general, and that is wildcard DNS.
Wildcard DNS clusters around domain parking, dynamic DNS and catch-all hosting. It is also a real attack surface: if every invented hostname resolves, then a hostname an attacker invents resolves too, which is the ground state for subdomain takeover and for phishing hosted under a name that looks legitimate.
This is evidence of wildcard behaviour, not a proven fact. It rests on one control name: a domain could legitimately serve a TXT record at exactly that name for an unrelated reason, and a wildcard that answers address records but not TXT records would not be caught here at all. What this reading is and is not.
DNS Records
A 1
192.124.249.117
MX 1
0mta.satel.pl
TXT 14
1bf24b1e95195d5717c750164bd91679bc01ea5b49dd5df079c34c61304e1e467ddc62eab493021bfd88e02b0ff36fe59dcf350b1f1ff702a43fe372c5109e8c53600dcff0ae60197b4bfa559c5d9688487315bf239f4fdcd3571068df0259MS=4FE6F69BF2C4909E81AA8B57905ADB91C673ACA2SATEL sp. z o.o.ade6d9298f777d662c8c87d9db386baf17f69ff868202653a36ffe6134441dc2c65a71d7baf0c8824d216f06350a1f97020e7ae98847cc552d443f8359a2cb5d06fb92365496d2d008e9a28775ddfa5e98a349a9610efdd993f304ce920f74d24bdc3c2169bc54547e8e756f25d72f7c118f1c437643bc46b0c3d56834a93google-site-verification=J1DHSeyWph43vupTyyooFlf0fjD5STMfvd4vLw-nnoI
NS 2
lee.ns.cloudflare.comlily.ns.cloudflare.com
SOA 1
lee.ns.cloudflare.com dns.cloudflare.com
MCP_RECORDS 1
61af218c4bd587d5fbccd3bd94894d4bd63d87acd78c7895180d33ee53b5d3d5
DMARC_RECORDS 1
v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:b0fa9b7cc4dc4a0b9335ec4a0b0f4de6@dmarc-reports.cloudflare.net,mailto:dmarc@satel.pl; ruf=mailto:failures@satel.pl;
BIMI_RECORDS 1
61af218c4bd587d5fbccd3bd94894d4bd63d87acd78c7895180d33ee53b5d3d5
MTA_STS_RECORDS 1
61af218c4bd587d5fbccd3bd94894d4bd63d87acd78c7895180d33ee53b5d3d5
TLS Certificates (3)
| Common Name | Issuer | Expires |
|---|---|---|
satel.pl |
C=US, O=Starfield Technologies, CN=Starfield TLS Intermediate CA DV - R1v1 | Fri, 25 Sep 2026 03:48:33 +0000 |
Starfield TLS Intermediate CA DV - R1v1 |
C=US, O=Starfield Technologies, CN=Starfield TLS Root CA - R1 | Thu, 23 Aug 2040 11:59:59 +0000 |
Starfield TLS Root CA - R1 |
C=US, ST=Arizona, L=Scottsdale, O=Starfield Technologies, Inc., CN=Starfield Root Certificate Authority - G2 | Thu, 31 Dec 2037 23:59:59 +0000 |
Subdomains (1)
Signed at scan time. Check the math yourself. Every line above is part of one signed observation. Re-hash it and check the Ed25519 signature in your own browser; the only network request the check makes is for the published public keys.
Verify this receiptEd25519 Receipt
- Receipt ID
rcpt_8de6968592d0915c- Output Hash
0305b49f156a5fe4cd190ae28db586247c286129f5b3866b2a65101ffd771a08- Signature
ed25519:328dd6ac8120846ba65e338a3bd6474f05c285d47941c7310c721f0f627f682a12d672b5228399094b5bdf418030f00bf0bb25a92e5cb22386ad270ba3a0c906- Public Key
ed25519:4859bb613d650e12dd7478cc307c73a8712fabc115a9dc59f65534ed3c09a8f9- Parent
(genesis)- Plane
- fast