sats.dk
Observed Aug 11, 2026, 01:23 UTC (5d ago). Every field below was attested with an Ed25519 signature at scan time.
sats.dk is on the survey sweep, which works its way across the whole catalog rather than returning to one name on a schedule. Putting sats.dk under watch moves it to the fast lane, where DomainDrift re-checks it about every 5 minutes and signs each reading, so a change becomes a dated event within minutes instead of waiting for the sweep to come round.
Watch sats.dk Watching a domain needs a DRM3 account. The reading above stays free and public either way.
Microsoft 365
DigiCert
Facebook/Meta
Google Search ConsoleDomainDrift asked this domain for a TXT record at a name nobody registers, and got an answer back. A domain that answers a name that was never created is answering names in general, and that is wildcard DNS.
Wildcard DNS clusters around domain parking, dynamic DNS and catch-all hosting. It is also a real attack surface: if every invented hostname resolves, then a hostname an attacker invents resolves too, which is the ground state for subdomain takeover and for phishing hosted under a name that looks legitimate.
This is evidence of wildcard behaviour, not a proven fact. It rests on one control name: a domain could legitimately serve a TXT record at exactly that name for an unrelated reason, and a wildcard that answers address records but not TXT records would not be caught here at all. What this reading is and is not.
DNS Records
A 1
150.171.109.74
MX 1
0sats-dk.mail.protection.outlook.com
TXT 7
v=spf1 -allMS=ms50034398include:spf.flowmailer.netlucid-verification=74kwu94bdgbr1fjak797SFMC-yVIlXABcMe9riJ5bwoMl8aIizytlUTAEn8Lnv79_facebook-domain-verification=h8g7e5xmq8ostshwn1nw28c0oy57elgoogle-site-verification=en9VoHzN8FzIRd1Wub0Ew1RAnSVI1h2HW_oiMsPeaQU
NS 4
ns1-37.azure-dns.comns2-37.azure-dns.netns3-37.azure-dns.orgns4-37.azure-dns.info
SOA 1
ns1-37.azure-dns.com azuredns-hostmaster.microsoft.com
MCP_RECORDS 1
v=spf1 -all
DMARC_RECORDS 1
v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:8d7nuj9r@ag.eu.dmarcadvisor.com,mailto:rua@dmarc.portsgroup.com,mailto:noreply@sats.no;
BIMI_RECORDS 1
v=spf1 -all
MTA_STS_RECORDS 1
v=spf1 -all
TLS Certificates (3)
| Common Name | Issuer | Expires |
|---|---|---|
sats.dk |
C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, 2.5.4.11=www.digicert.com, CN=GeoTrust TLS RSA CA G1 | Tue, 01 Sep 2026 23:59:59 +0000 |
GeoTrust TLS RSA CA G1 |
C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, 2.5.4.11=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert Global Root G2 | Tue, 02 Nov 2027 12:23:37 +0000 |
DigiCert Global Root G2 |
C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, 2.5.4.11=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert Global Root G2 | Fri, 15 Jan 2038 12:00:00 +0000 |
Subdomains (0)
None observed.
Signed at scan time. Check the math yourself. Every line above is part of one signed observation. Re-hash it and check the Ed25519 signature in your own browser; the only network request the check makes is for the published public keys.
Verify this receiptEd25519 Receipt
- Receipt ID
rcpt_28d9f530157504a0- Output Hash
ef225ac0814e9d79508aca656ab259a3cc695ec9e321e6396e621bbc93305238- Signature
ed25519:b98d3c9617aa99809de3c3e3374b070bada457ed8873887ab7d8b6fd0288febabfe03f19f4c4dd001aacb280d519a1abdfe24ba403d5a6859783973d20559706- Public Key
ed25519:4859bb613d650e12dd7478cc307c73a8712fabc115a9dc59f65534ed3c09a8f9- Parent
(genesis)- Plane
- fast