sb-railing.be
Observed Aug 11, 2026, 01:02 UTC (4d ago). Every field below was attested with an Ed25519 signature at scan time.
sb-railing.be is on the survey sweep, which works its way across the whole catalog rather than returning to one name on a schedule. Putting sb-railing.be under watch moves it to the fast lane, where DomainDrift re-checks it about every 5 minutes and signs each reading, so a change becomes a dated event within minutes instead of waiting for the sweep to come round.
Watch sb-railing.be Watching a domain needs a DRM3 account. The reading above stays free and public either way.DomainDrift asked this domain for a TXT record at a name nobody registers, and got an answer back. A domain that answers a name that was never created is answering names in general, and that is wildcard DNS.
Wildcard DNS clusters around domain parking, dynamic DNS and catch-all hosting. It is also a real attack surface: if every invented hostname resolves, then a hostname an attacker invents resolves too, which is the ground state for subdomain takeover and for phishing hosted under a name that looks legitimate.
This is evidence of wildcard behaviour, not a proven fact. It rests on one control name: a domain could legitimately serve a TXT record at exactly that name for an unrelated reason, and a wildcard that answers address records but not TXT records would not be caught here at all. What this reading is and is not.
DNS Records
A 1
37.252.127.167
MX 2
10primary.yourfilter.nl20fallback.yourfilter.nl
TXT 2
v=spf1 a mx ip4:37.252.127.167 include:_spf.yourfilter.nl -allgoogle-site-verification=0jcu-pFQC5yUL2L6-upvE46K3TrUT6ywAHcOipVemQc
NS 3
ns4.firstfind.nlns3.firstfind.nlns5.firstfind.net
SOA 1
ns3.firstfind.nl hostmaster.firstfind.nl
MCP_RECORDS 1
v=spf1 ip4:167.127.252.37 include:_spf.yourfilter.nl a ~all
DMARC_RECORDS 1
v=DMARC1; p=none; sp=none; rf=afrf; pct=100; ri=86400
BIMI_RECORDS 1
v=spf1 ip4:167.127.252.37 include:_spf.yourfilter.nl a ~all
MTA_STS_RECORDS 1
v=spf1 ip4:167.127.252.37 include:_spf.yourfilter.nl a ~all
TLS Certificates (3)
| Common Name | Issuer | Expires |
|---|---|---|
sb-railing.de |
C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=YR2 | Fri, 11 Sep 2026 07:00:50 +0000 |
YR2 |
C=US, O=ISRG, CN=Root YR | Sat, 02 Sep 2028 23:59:59 +0000 |
Root YR |
C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG Root X1 | Thu, 02 Sep 2032 23:59:59 +0000 |
Subdomains (1)
Signed at scan time. Check the math yourself. Every line above is part of one signed observation. Re-hash it and check the Ed25519 signature in your own browser; the only network request the check makes is for the published public keys.
Verify this receiptEd25519 Receipt
- Receipt ID
rcpt_b74db2a879c4ae9e- Output Hash
7b31cdb91ecfd10d1fb15617cd22a146984d7fd2da2d0299925d4d3623f4583d- Signature
ed25519:5b989fdc8c54aa7d7551eb1408fd7fdb20e6b060496e92bda2b46df73b117492ae6eb2b80eae083b4b3c599ffa134a2bd3df2b0e882b3dcd37d41e25e3534808- Public Key
ed25519:4859bb613d650e12dd7478cc307c73a8712fabc115a9dc59f65534ed3c09a8f9- Parent
(genesis)- Plane
- fast