CONTINUOUS INTERNET TELEMETRY24H DRIFT68,088 material changesacross 64,935 domains · 24h to ~2h ago · +33,471 vs yesterdayROTATION57 domains moved DNS from koaladns.com to magpiedns.com, 56 moved backa rotation loop, not a migration · 24hNOW538 curated domains not reachablelast probe, steadySITE ERRORS33,857 sites serving errorslast probe · 5xx / 404 / TLSBOT DEFENSEbot defense observed on 123,111 sites429 rate-limit / 403 bot-block, a posture signal

ssotica.com.br

Observed Aug 2, 2026, 19:17 UTC (3d ago). Every field below was attested with an Ed25519 signature at scan time.

This reading of ssotica.com.br was taken 3d ago

ssotica.com.br is on the survey sweep, which works its way across the whole catalog rather than returning to one name on a schedule. Putting ssotica.com.br under watch moves it to the fast lane, where DomainDrift re-checks it about every 5 minutes and signs each reading, so a change becomes a dated event within minutes instead of waiting for the sweep to come round.

Watch ssotica.com.br Watching a domain needs a DRM3 account. The reading above stays free and public either way.
Verify this receipt yourself + Watch this domain
Guarded by a firewall
Runs onAmazon
Email byGoogle Workspace
Secured byAmazon
Registered toIpê Tecnologia em Sistemas Ltda
Also usesGoogle Search Console
tranco_40k
Every line above is a signed observation. Check the math at the bottom of the page.
EVIDENCE OF WILDCARD DNSobserved 2026-08-05 07:18 UTC

DomainDrift asked this domain for a TXT record at a name nobody registers, and got an answer back. A domain that answers a name that was never created is answering names in general, and that is wildcard DNS.

Wildcard DNS clusters around domain parking, dynamic DNS and catch-all hosting. It is also a real attack surface: if every invented hostname resolves, then a hostname an attacker invents resolves too, which is the ground state for subdomain takeover and for phishing hosted under a name that looks legitimate.

This is evidence of wildcard behaviour, not a proven fact. It rests on one control name: a domain could legitimately serve a TXT record at exactly that name for an unrelated reason, and a wildcard that answers address records but not TXT records would not be caught here at all. What this reading is and is not.

INFRASTRUCTURE MAPwhat ssotica.com.br actually stands on - every host below is a signed observation
ssotica.com.br
A / AAAA
44.207.216.15998.82.88.230
Amazonserves the site
NS
ns-1237.awsdns-26.orgns-1591.awsdns-06.co.ukns-275.awsdns-34.comns-634.awsdns-15.net
awsdns-26.org + awsdns-06.co.uk + moreanswers its DNS
MX
aspmx.l.google.comalt3.aspmx.l.google.comalt4.aspmx.l.google.comalt1.aspmx.l.google.com+1 more
Google Workspacereceives its email
TLS
ssotica.com.br
Amazonissued its certificate

DNS Records

A 2

  • 44.207.216.159
  • 98.82.88.230

MX 5

  • 1aspmx.l.google.com
  • 10alt3.aspmx.l.google.com
  • 10alt4.aspmx.l.google.com
  • 5alt1.aspmx.l.google.com
  • 5alt2.aspmx.l.google.com

TXT 3

  • google-site-verification=jxugDbI4AM4EirY7a8S_uzz-VetRp7Yzh9hf_7CiYag
  • include:_spf.rdstation.com.br
  • v=spf1 include:sparkpostmail.com include:spf.ecentry.io a mx ~all

NS 4

  • ns-1237.awsdns-26.org
  • ns-1591.awsdns-06.co.uk
  • ns-275.awsdns-34.com
  • ns-634.awsdns-15.net

SOA 1

  • ns-1237.awsdns-26.org awsdns-hostmaster.amazon.com

MCP_RECORDS 3

  • google-site-verification=jxugDbI4AM4EirY7a8S_uzz-VetRp7Yzh9hf_7CiYag
  • include:_spf.rdstation.com.br
  • v=spf1 include:sparkpostmail.com include:spf.ecentry.io a mx ~all

DMARC_RECORDS 3

  • google-site-verification=jxugDbI4AM4EirY7a8S_uzz-VetRp7Yzh9hf_7CiYag
  • include:_spf.rdstation.com.br
  • v=spf1 include:sparkpostmail.com include:spf.ecentry.io a mx ~all

BIMI_RECORDS 3

  • google-site-verification=jxugDbI4AM4EirY7a8S_uzz-VetRp7Yzh9hf_7CiYag
  • include:_spf.rdstation.com.br
  • v=spf1 include:sparkpostmail.com include:spf.ecentry.io a mx ~all

MTA_STS_RECORDS 3

  • google-site-verification=jxugDbI4AM4EirY7a8S_uzz-VetRp7Yzh9hf_7CiYag
  • include:_spf.rdstation.com.br
  • v=spf1 include:sparkpostmail.com include:spf.ecentry.io a mx ~all

TLS Certificates (3)

Common NameIssuerExpires
ssotica.com.br C=US, O=Amazon, CN=Amazon RSA 2048 M04 Mon, 01 Feb 2027 23:59:59 +0000
Amazon RSA 2048 M04 C=US, O=Amazon, CN=Amazon Root CA 1 Fri, 23 Aug 2030 22:26:35 +0000
Amazon Root CA 1 C=US, ST=Arizona, L=Scottsdale, O=Starfield Technologies, Inc., CN=Starfield Services Root Certificate Authority - G2 Thu, 31 Dec 2037 01:00:00 +0000

Subdomains (0)

None observed.

The proof

Signed at scan time. Check the math yourself. Every line above is part of one signed observation. Re-hash it and check the Ed25519 signature in your own browser; the only network request the check makes is for the published public keys.

Verify this receipt

Ed25519 Receipt

Receipt ID
rcpt_f30c0e21372e4364
Output Hash
ef507d741d1396b1995e22d162c35a420b4164578c82e359fddb1fb4756ab844
Signature
ed25519:f24030244a9cb252bd4d27ff2edd51128a0b02cd8657d49866970e35a087233002dda1e8175c84234f73831feab423f5499552712da69d27d3d18d4826e0940f
Public Key
ed25519:4859bb613d650e12dd7478cc307c73a8712fabc115a9dc59f65534ed3c09a8f9
Parent
(genesis)
Plane
fast
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