uol.edu.pk
Observed Aug 3, 2026, 00:39 UTC (3d ago). Every field below was attested with an Ed25519 signature at scan time.
uol.edu.pk is on the survey sweep, which works its way across the whole catalog rather than returning to one name on a schedule. Putting uol.edu.pk under watch moves it to the fast lane, where DomainDrift re-checks it about every 5 minutes and signs each reading, so a change becomes a dated event within minutes instead of waiting for the sweep to come round.
Watch uol.edu.pk Watching a domain needs a DRM3 account. The reading above stays free and public either way.DomainDrift asked this domain for a TXT record at a name nobody registers, and got an answer back. A domain that answers a name that was never created is answering names in general, and that is wildcard DNS.
Wildcard DNS clusters around domain parking, dynamic DNS and catch-all hosting. It is also a real attack surface: if every invented hostname resolves, then a hostname an attacker invents resolves too, which is the ground state for subdomain takeover and for phishing hosted under a name that looks legitimate.
This is evidence of wildcard behaviour, not a proven fact. It rests on one control name: a domain could legitimately serve a TXT record at exactly that name for an unrelated reason, and a wildcard that answers address records but not TXT records would not be caught here at all. What this reading is and is not.
DNS Records
A 2
104.20.28.249172.66.170.182
AAAA 2
2606:4700:10::6814:1cf92606:4700:10::ac42:aab6
MX 5
1aspmx.l.google.com10aspmx2.googlemail.com10aspmx3.googlemail.com5alt1.aspmx.l.google.com5alt2.aspmx.l.google.com
TXT 7
ZOOM_verify_LXhGj1z0QGeIgzEn0Nh9bQ_A9B06AEB9EF4730AA1384F084B283E74google-site-verification=DAtY0FxWd12uX2hNvESGZy2_v05rmfHuZ_QOpTa9Xzcgoogle-site-verification=KAMGfCnR45ckvSirAUPay9pb1RTV2z_Knpz5eLUGRPsgoogle-site-verification=SJx_ARUm6vZFGn6gox3nZRGmoTFFu44v6_1vDXpBV54v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; pct=100; rua=mailto:dmarc@uol.edu.pkv=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all
NS 2
agustin.ns.cloudflare.comingrid.ns.cloudflare.com
SOA 1
agustin.ns.cloudflare.com dns.cloudflare.com
CAA 10
issue "comodoca.com"issue "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"issue "letsencrypt.org"issue "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"issue "ssl.com"issuewild "comodoca.com"issuewild "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"issuewild "letsencrypt.org"issuewild "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"issuewild "ssl.com"
MCP_RECORDS 1
ZOOM_verify_LXhGj1z0QGeIgzEn0Nh9bQ
DMARC_RECORDS 1
v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; pct=100; rua=mailto:ede5b3d1def44984b3a60fa530395dca@dmarc-reports.cloudflare.net,mailto:dmarc@uol.edu.pk
BIMI_RECORDS 1
ZOOM_verify_LXhGj1z0QGeIgzEn0Nh9bQ
MTA_STS_RECORDS 1
ZOOM_verify_LXhGj1z0QGeIgzEn0Nh9bQ
TLS Certificates (3)
| Common Name | Issuer | Expires |
|---|---|---|
*.uol.edu.pk |
C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, 2.5.4.11=www.digicert.com, CN=RapidSSL TLS RSA CA G1 | Sat, 06 Feb 2027 23:59:59 +0000 |
RapidSSL TLS RSA CA G1 |
C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, 2.5.4.11=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert Global Root G2 | Tue, 02 Nov 2027 12:24:33 +0000 |
DigiCert Global Root G2 |
C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, 2.5.4.11=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert Global Root CA | Sun, 09 Nov 2031 23:59:59 +0000 |
Subdomains (0)
None observed.
Signed at scan time. Check the math yourself. Every line above is part of one signed observation. Re-hash it and check the Ed25519 signature in your own browser; the only network request the check makes is for the published public keys.
Verify this receiptEd25519 Receipt
- Receipt ID
rcpt_916f450729461d76- Output Hash
95250244e4fc4de4e52ab7acd5c48b2642367ec1fde8c82b1be3effd0023b0d7- Signature
ed25519:aa9e993cf5c91bcb1a520715405401cf62d1b5ea393f26664bd6e95ad4987b24dfd14a86f536e6d19d05f6a45f869cc28442bcd97577ab443986e85d77649409- Public Key
ed25519:4859bb613d650e12dd7478cc307c73a8712fabc115a9dc59f65534ed3c09a8f9- Parent
(genesis)- Plane
- fast