urzad.info.pl
Observed Aug 2, 2026, 13:36 UTC (3d ago). Every field below was attested with an Ed25519 signature at scan time.
urzad.info.pl is on the survey sweep, which works its way across the whole catalog rather than returning to one name on a schedule. Putting urzad.info.pl under watch moves it to the fast lane, where DomainDrift re-checks it about every 5 minutes and signs each reading, so a change becomes a dated event within minutes instead of waiting for the sweep to come round.
Watch urzad.info.pl Watching a domain needs a DRM3 account. The reading above stays free and public either way.DomainDrift asked this domain for a TXT record at a name nobody registers, and got an answer back. A domain that answers a name that was never created is answering names in general, and that is wildcard DNS.
Wildcard DNS clusters around domain parking, dynamic DNS and catch-all hosting. It is also a real attack surface: if every invented hostname resolves, then a hostname an attacker invents resolves too, which is the ground state for subdomain takeover and for phishing hosted under a name that looks legitimate.
This is evidence of wildcard behaviour, not a proven fact. It rests on one control name: a domain could legitimately serve a TXT record at exactly that name for an unrelated reason, and a wildcard that answers address records but not TXT records would not be caught here at all. What this reading is and is not.
DNS Records
A 2
104.21.84.150172.67.194.46
AAAA 2
2606:4700:3035::ac43:c22e2606:4700:3035::6815:5496
TXT 2
google-site-verification=VTHiG5JVaErQUKjfMWXCBxzA3KpSR-gBy9yLqPpXZ4cv=spf1 a mx include:spf.tld.pl -all
NS 2
dave.ns.cloudflare.comjocelyn.ns.cloudflare.com
SOA 1
dave.ns.cloudflare.com dns.cloudflare.com
CAA 10
issue "comodoca.com"issue "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"issue "letsencrypt.org"issue "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"issue "ssl.com"issuewild "comodoca.com"issuewild "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"issuewild "letsencrypt.org"issuewild "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"issuewild "ssl.com"
MCP_RECORDS 1
v=spf1 a mx include:spf.tld.pl -all
DMARC_RECORDS 1
v=spf1 a mx include:spf.tld.pl -all
BIMI_RECORDS 1
v=spf1 a mx include:spf.tld.pl -all
MTA_STS_RECORDS 1
v=spf1 a mx include:spf.tld.pl -all
TLS Certificates (3)
| Common Name | Issuer | Expires |
|---|---|---|
urzad.info.pl |
C=US, O=Google Trust Services, CN=WE1 | Fri, 11 Sep 2026 01:40:10 +0000 |
WE1 |
C=US, O=Google Trust Services LLC, CN=GTS Root R4 | Tue, 20 Feb 2029 14:00:00 +0000 |
GTS Root R4 |
C=BE, O=GlobalSign nv-sa, 2.5.4.11=Root CA, CN=GlobalSign Root CA | Fri, 28 Jan 2028 00:00:42 +0000 |
Subdomains (0)
None observed.
Signed at scan time. Check the math yourself. Every line above is part of one signed observation. Re-hash it and check the Ed25519 signature in your own browser; the only network request the check makes is for the published public keys.
Verify this receiptEd25519 Receipt
- Receipt ID
rcpt_7b9f9e128109071f- Output Hash
0fb13788e19c7d035471e69ff76d8557620913f95f2f57cdf565da8fdd934694- Signature
ed25519:28201be52f6f7f0bb31cdaa2469879c263a0f3188cd29025bdb1a22c657c6369c19e7e7bc2f2882549001e2ee758c403609fc45d27300b84010d0df79e8e7a07- Public Key
ed25519:4859bb613d650e12dd7478cc307c73a8712fabc115a9dc59f65534ed3c09a8f9- Parent
(genesis)- Plane
- fast