CONTINUOUS INTERNET TELEMETRY24H DRIFT43,686 material changesacross 39,414 domains · 24h to ~40m ago · +9,069 vs yesterdaySHIFT35 domains moved DNS from koaladns.com to magpiedns.coma coordinated move · 24hNOW542 curated domains not reachablelast probe, steadySITE ERRORS33,822 sites serving errorslast probe · 5xx / 404 / TLSBOT DEFENSEbot defense observed on 151,367 sites429 rate-limit / 403 bot-block, a posture signal

utel03.net

Observed Aug 3, 2026, 01:41 UTC (2d ago). Every field below was attested with an Ed25519 signature at scan time.

This reading of utel03.net was taken 2d ago

utel03.net is on the survey sweep, which works its way across the whole catalog rather than returning to one name on a schedule. Putting utel03.net under watch moves it to the fast lane, where DomainDrift re-checks it about every 5 minutes and signs each reading, so a change becomes a dated event within minutes instead of waiting for the sweep to come round.

Watch utel03.net Watching a domain needs a DRM3 account. The reading above stays free and public either way.
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Up right now
Secured byZeroSSL GmbH
IPv6 · tranco
Every line above is a signed observation. Check the math at the bottom of the page.
EVIDENCE OF WILDCARD DNSobserved 2026-08-04 18:19 UTC

DomainDrift asked this domain for a TXT record at a name nobody registers, and got an answer back. A domain that answers a name that was never created is answering names in general, and that is wildcard DNS.

Wildcard DNS clusters around domain parking, dynamic DNS and catch-all hosting. It is also a real attack surface: if every invented hostname resolves, then a hostname an attacker invents resolves too, which is the ground state for subdomain takeover and for phishing hosted under a name that looks legitimate.

This is evidence of wildcard behaviour, not a proven fact. It rests on one control name: a domain could legitimately serve a TXT record at exactly that name for an unrelated reason, and a wildcard that answers address records but not TXT records would not be caught here at all. What this reading is and is not.

INFRASTRUCTURE MAPwhat utel03.net actually stands on - every host below is a signed observation
utel03.net
A / AAAA
34.41.139.1932600:1900:4001:96e:8000:1:ac84:9000
2600serves the site
NS
ns1.hwrn.netns2.hwrn.net
hwrn.netanswers its DNS
MX
mx1.csof.netmx2.csof.net
csof.netreceives its email
TLS
*.utel03.net
ZeroSSL GmbHissued its certificate

DNS Records

A 1

  • 34.41.139.193

AAAA 1

  • 2600:1900:4001:96e:8000:1:ac84:9000

MX 2

  • 10mx1.csof.net
  • 10mx2.csof.net

TXT 1

  • v=spf1 include:_incspfcheck.mailspike.net -all

NS 2

  • ns1.hwrn.net
  • ns2.hwrn.net

SOA 1

  • ns1.hwrn.net hostmaster.hwrn.net

MCP_RECORDS 1

  • v=spf1 include:_incspfcheck.mailspike.net -all

DMARC_RECORDS 1

  • v=spf1 include:_incspfcheck.mailspike.net -all

BIMI_RECORDS 1

  • v=spf1 include:_incspfcheck.mailspike.net -all

MTA_STS_RECORDS 1

  • v=spf1 include:_incspfcheck.mailspike.net -all

TLS Certificates (2)

Common NameIssuerExpires
*.utel03.net C=AT, O=ZeroSSL GmbH, CN=ZeroSSL RSA DV SSL CA 2 Sat, 05 Sep 2026 23:59:59 +0000
ZeroSSL RSA DV SSL CA 2 C=GB, O=Sectigo Limited, CN=Sectigo Public Server Authentication Root R46 Sun, 23 Sep 2035 23:59:59 +0000

Subdomains (0)

None observed.

The proof

Signed at scan time. Check the math yourself. Every line above is part of one signed observation. Re-hash it and check the Ed25519 signature in your own browser; the only network request the check makes is for the published public keys.

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Ed25519 Receipt

Receipt ID
rcpt_595f37c19719c9d1
Output Hash
190d483791e6c66a8bfa1c97736479290ca23169eb7078a9f099f0a2731678a6
Signature
ed25519:de44105b578796fadbad0b611ca80fed8036446a176ff30adadc8a86f40be80f814160f1f5a11ed0def58e601e0f11a14856894d1fe67a873503e34e5573d001
Public Key
ed25519:4859bb613d650e12dd7478cc307c73a8712fabc115a9dc59f65534ed3c09a8f9
Parent
(genesis)
Plane
fast
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