vellinga.frl
Observed Aug 3, 2026, 03:32 UTC (21h ago). Every field below was attested with an Ed25519 signature at scan time. Catalog observation, re-checked on rotation - watch it for 5-minute checks.
DomainDrift asked this domain for a TXT record at a name nobody registers, and got an answer back. A domain that answers a name that was never created is answering names in general, and that is wildcard DNS.
Wildcard DNS clusters around domain parking, dynamic DNS and catch-all hosting. It is also a real attack surface: if every invented hostname resolves, then a hostname an attacker invents resolves too, which is the ground state for subdomain takeover and for phishing hosted under a name that looks legitimate.
This is evidence of wildcard behaviour, not a proven fact. It rests on one control name: a domain could legitimately serve a TXT record at exactly that name for an unrelated reason, and a wildcard that answers address records but not TXT records would not be caught here at all. What this reading is and is not.
DNS Records
A 1
85.184.249.201
MX 1
0vellinga-frl.mail.protection.outlook.com
TXT 3
MS=ms97093430google-site-verification=2_cYET257qQudns6jp__eTYGkbtmKTjVs0ZUK-Zyoyov=spf1 a mx ip4:85.184.249.201 include:spf.protection.outlook.com -all
NS 2
nsn1.mijndomein.nlnsn2.mijndomein.nl
SOA 1
nsn1.mijndomein.nl hostmaster.vellinga.frl
MCP_RECORDS 3
MS=ms97093430google-site-verification=2_cYET257qQudns6jp__eTYGkbtmKTjVs0ZUK-Zyoyov=spf1 a mx ip4:85.184.249.201 include:spf.protection.outlook.com -all
DMARC_RECORDS 1
v=DMARC1; p=none; pct=100; rua=mailto:info@ricter.nl; ruf=mailto:info@ricter.nl
BIMI_RECORDS 3
MS=ms97093430google-site-verification=2_cYET257qQudns6jp__eTYGkbtmKTjVs0ZUK-Zyoyov=spf1 a mx ip4:85.184.249.201 include:spf.protection.outlook.com -all
MTA_STS_RECORDS 3
MS=ms97093430google-site-verification=2_cYET257qQudns6jp__eTYGkbtmKTjVs0ZUK-Zyoyov=spf1 a mx ip4:85.184.249.201 include:spf.protection.outlook.com -all
TLS Certificates (3)
| Common Name | Issuer | Expires |
|---|---|---|
vellinga.frl |
C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=YR1 | Mon, 12 Oct 2026 16:42:43 +0000 |
YR1 |
C=US, O=ISRG, CN=Root YR | Sat, 02 Sep 2028 23:59:59 +0000 |
Root YR |
C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG Root X1 | Thu, 02 Sep 2032 23:59:59 +0000 |
Subdomains (1)
Signed at scan time. Check the math yourself. Every line above is part of one signed observation. Re-hash it and check the Ed25519 signature in your own browser; nothing leaves your machine.
Verify this receiptEd25519 Receipt
- Receipt ID
rcpt_2ced8dabb859d826- Output Hash
f8254f22c959ab82defcbeb816a90d60a595aa6d7c09bc6e78620f49a7eed44e- Signature
ed25519:bb7373e2539b2bca40e05146d82f0250aa5fa78c41b0f29c643d21e756f4176f967a467e50e44a626d9a5371411a140f9b5a47e5a2e44792cd2d6e4b372d6705- Public Key
ed25519:4859bb613d650e12dd7478cc307c73a8712fabc115a9dc59f65534ed3c09a8f9- Parent
(genesis)- Plane
- fast