vhs-stuttgart.de
Observed Aug 2, 2026, 12:57 UTC (3d ago). Every field below was attested with an Ed25519 signature at scan time.
vhs-stuttgart.de is on the survey sweep, which works its way across the whole catalog rather than returning to one name on a schedule. Putting vhs-stuttgart.de under watch moves it to the fast lane, where DomainDrift re-checks it about every 5 minutes and signs each reading, so a change becomes a dated event within minutes instead of waiting for the sweep to come round.
Watch vhs-stuttgart.de Watching a domain needs a DRM3 account. The reading above stays free and public either way.DomainDrift asked this domain for a TXT record at a name nobody registers, and got an answer back. A domain that answers a name that was never created is answering names in general, and that is wildcard DNS.
Wildcard DNS clusters around domain parking, dynamic DNS and catch-all hosting. It is also a real attack surface: if every invented hostname resolves, then a hostname an attacker invents resolves too, which is the ground state for subdomain takeover and for phishing hosted under a name that looks legitimate.
This is evidence of wildcard behaviour, not a proven fact. It rests on one control name: a domain could legitimately serve a TXT record at exactly that name for an unrelated reason, and a wildcard that answers address records but not TXT records would not be caught here at all. What this reading is and is not.
DNS Records
A 1
92.205.51.26
AAAA 1
2a00:1169:103:a1d0::
MX 1
5mail.vhs-stuttgart.de
TXT 3
MS=ms99427247v=spf1 mx a -allapple-domain-verification=WucpF2gltyAnAKVf
NS 2
ns81.domaincontrol.comns82.domaincontrol.com
SOA 1
ns81.domaincontrol.com dns.jomax.net
MCP_RECORDS 2
dd2ruol1he2c2505kbbp7j63glMS=ms99427247
DMARC_RECORDS 1
v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:edv@vhs-stuttgart.de;
BIMI_RECORDS 2
dd2ruol1he2c2505kbbp7j63glMS=ms99427247
MTA_STS_RECORDS 2
dd2ruol1he2c2505kbbp7j63glMS=ms99427247
TLS Certificates (4)
| Common Name | Issuer | Expires |
|---|---|---|
*.vhs-stuttgart.de |
C=US, O=Starfield Technologies, CN=Starfield TLS Intermediate CA DV - R1v1 | Sat, 19 Dec 2026 10:54:28 +0000 |
Starfield TLS Intermediate CA DV - R1v1 |
C=US, O=Starfield Technologies, CN=Starfield TLS Root CA - R1 | Thu, 23 Aug 2040 11:59:59 +0000 |
Starfield TLS Root CA - R1 |
C=US, ST=Arizona, L=Scottsdale, O=Starfield Technologies, Inc., CN=Starfield Root Certificate Authority - G2 | Thu, 31 Dec 2037 23:59:59 +0000 |
Starfield Root Certificate Authority - G2 |
C=US, ST=Arizona, L=Scottsdale, O=Starfield Technologies, Inc., CN=Starfield Root Certificate Authority - G2 | Thu, 31 Dec 2037 23:59:59 +0000 |
Subdomains (0)
None observed.
Signed at scan time. Check the math yourself. Every line above is part of one signed observation. Re-hash it and check the Ed25519 signature in your own browser; the only network request the check makes is for the published public keys.
Verify this receiptEd25519 Receipt
- Receipt ID
rcpt_9af1836dce70f623- Output Hash
9b1a7d6ba357951a9ee655b0a162a53c8bbdafac4135fe98f3003a0ece9e9baa- Signature
ed25519:771eb87512d243de5a45708e3d062d02c23fc8986467c608ab98969ecdf5bf6498c6cc9d1b0135884ee4e0ab3c1385bf7179661d53f309222ae0c5bcbd533e0e- Public Key
ed25519:4859bb613d650e12dd7478cc307c73a8712fabc115a9dc59f65534ed3c09a8f9- Parent
(genesis)- Plane
- fast