CONTINUOUS INTERNET TELEMETRY24H DRIFT12,057 material changesacross 11,447 domains · 24h to ~3h ago · +3,294 vs yesterdayNOW560 curated domains not reachablelast probe, steadySITE ERRORS34,304 sites serving errorslast probe · 5xx / 404 / TLSBOT DEFENSEbot defense observed on 156,289 sites429 rate-limit / 403 bot-block, a posture signalMOVERokta.comNo mail routes in the latest observation

vichy.co.uk

Observed Aug 2, 2026, 09:33 UTC (1d ago). Every field below was attested with an Ed25519 signature at scan time.

This reading of vichy.co.uk was taken 1d ago

vichy.co.uk is on the survey sweep, which works its way across the whole catalog rather than returning to one name on a schedule. Putting vichy.co.uk under watch moves it to the fast lane, where DomainDrift re-checks it about every 5 minutes and signs each reading, so a change becomes a dated event within minutes instead of waiting for the sweep to come round.

Watch vichy.co.uk Watching a domain needs a DRM3 account. The reading above stays free and public either way.
Guarded by a firewall
Runs onCloudflare
Secured byGoogle Trust Services
Also usesGoogle Search Console
IPv6 · tranco
Every line above is a signed observation. Check the math at the bottom of the page.
EVIDENCE OF WILDCARD DNSobserved 2026-08-02 09:33 UTC

DomainDrift asked this domain for a TXT record at a name nobody registers, and got an answer back. A domain that answers a name that was never created is answering names in general, and that is wildcard DNS.

Wildcard DNS clusters around domain parking, dynamic DNS and catch-all hosting. It is also a real attack surface: if every invented hostname resolves, then a hostname an attacker invents resolves too, which is the ground state for subdomain takeover and for phishing hosted under a name that looks legitimate.

This is evidence of wildcard behaviour, not a proven fact. It rests on one control name: a domain could legitimately serve a TXT record at exactly that name for an unrelated reason, and a wildcard that answers address records but not TXT records would not be caught here at all. What this reading is and is not.

INFRASTRUCTURE MAPwhat vichy.co.uk actually stands on - every host below is a signed observation
vichy.co.uk
A / AAAA
104.17.211.3104.17.212.32606:4700::6811:d4032606:4700::6811:d303
Cloudflareserves the site
NS
adam.ns.cloudflare.comleia.ns.cloudflare.com
cloudflare.comanswers its DNS
TLS
vichy.co.uk
Google Trust Servicesissued its certificate

DNS Records

A 2

  • 104.17.211.3
  • 104.17.212.3

AAAA 2

  • 2606:4700::6811:d403
  • 2606:4700::6811:d303

TXT 3

  • ca3-38e6b3de163448909a1f840ef6bd377f
  • google-site-verification=w4WeZLO9Un-yu3I2j5jcc0vfBlFb2xgvrt6A98R5DKA
  • v=spf1 a:production.emea.loreal.demandware.net -all

NS 2

  • adam.ns.cloudflare.com
  • leia.ns.cloudflare.com

SOA 1

  • adam.ns.cloudflare.com dns.cloudflare.com

MCP_RECORDS 1

  • v=spf1 -all

DMARC_RECORDS 1

  • v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:tnoff9hr@ag.eu.dmarcadvisor.com; aspf=s; adkim=s;

BIMI_RECORDS 1

  • v=spf1 -all

MTA_STS_RECORDS 1

  • v=spf1 -all

TLS Certificates (3)

Common NameIssuerExpires
vichy.co.uk C=US, O=Google Trust Services, CN=WE1 Tue, 20 Oct 2026 05:02:50 +0000
WE1 C=US, O=Google Trust Services LLC, CN=GTS Root R4 Tue, 20 Feb 2029 14:00:00 +0000
GTS Root R4 C=BE, O=GlobalSign nv-sa, 2.5.4.11=Root CA, CN=GlobalSign Root CA Fri, 28 Jan 2028 00:00:42 +0000

Subdomains (0)

None observed.

The proof

Signed at scan time. Check the math yourself. Every line above is part of one signed observation. Re-hash it and check the Ed25519 signature in your own browser; nothing leaves your machine.

Verify this receipt

Ed25519 Receipt

Receipt ID
rcpt_72ef0ff455626a82
Output Hash
89be1c37a92daba6d51663dd338e7921b2b99df1a3677cb799bf3e60a6fcc30e
Signature
ed25519:94a511cebe2e755d011d7c3e763a1090510044e83728de35623f2cadeb3521c58c569b14524d07333e1f8ec1c622e6730ebafacb528d652d6cfb1df0cb32e000
Public Key
ed25519:4859bb613d650e12dd7478cc307c73a8712fabc115a9dc59f65534ed3c09a8f9
Parent
(genesis)
Plane
fast
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